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INTRODUCTION
I t  was one o f  Dewey*s deepest convictions th a t philosophers, because 
o f  the sp ec ia l in te l le c tu a l  nature  o f th e i r  a c t iv i ty ,  tend to  read in to  
experience elements th a t  a re  not involved in  i t  a s  i t  o r ig in a lly  occurs. 
And, perhaps even more im portan tly , they tend to  ignore elements th a t 
a re  involved in  experience as  i t  o r ig in a lly  occurs. Philosophers a re  
engaged in  an a c t iv i ty  o f  inqu iry t they look a t  experience from a cog­
n it iv e  po in t o f view. They ask themselves what experience i s  l ik e ,  and 
in ad v erten tly  take a s  a ty p ic a l example o f experience the obviously 
in te l le c tu a l  and cognitive  kind o f experience in which they a re  engaged 
while in q u irin g  about experience. But in  doing so they a re  p ro jec ting  
in to  a l l  experience an a t t i tu d e  and o. content th a t  a re  simply not p resen t 
in  much o f  the experience th a t we have, and a re  Ignoring an a t t i tu d e  and 
a  content th a t  a re  involved in  much o f our experience. For in  much of 
our experience, even th a t  o f a  philosopher, we a re  no t engaged in  knowing 
o r  cognition a t  a l l j  we a re  engaged in  lov ing , pursuing, escaping, h a tin g , 
hoping, try in g , doing, e tc .  And such experience i s  r e a l ly  o f  a  non- 
cognitive  s o r t .
What Dewey means here may become c le a re r  i f  we consider the analogy 
o f  studying events in  ano ther age o f mam's h is to ry . I t  i s  a  no to riously  
d i f f i c u l t  and, indeed, perhaps impossible ta sk  to  recap ture  the po in t o f  
view th a t  smother people had upon themselves and the  world. I f  one i s  
studying ancien t Greek h is to ry , fo r  example, o n e 's  f i r s t  in c lin a tio n  i s
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to  understand the a t t i tu d e  and behavior o f  these people from o n e 's  own 
po in t o f  view. In learn in g  about Socra tes, fo r  example, many students 
find  i t  r id icu lo u s  th a t  th is  man behaved a s  he did a t  the t r i a l  and then 
in  the p rison . They see Socrates as a  foo l fo r  no t doing what h is  accusers 
expected o f him, o r  of no t a t  le a s t  escaping when the  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f doing 
so was given to  him by C rito  and o th er fr ien d s . But, o f course, in  doing 
so such studen ts a re  p ro jec tin g  th e i r  own and th e i r  a g e 's  values and 
p r io r i t ie s  in to  S ocra tes. They a re  viewing Socrates as  being fundamen­
ta l ly  the same as them selves. In  doing so , o f  course, they f a i l  to  
understand Socrates and ancien t Greece a t  a l l .
Now the  s itu a tio n  i s  analogous when one t r i e s  to  understand exper­
ience from the po in t o f  view o f h is  p resen t kind o f experience, when th a t  
experience i s  o f a  cognitive  s o r t .  What r e s u l ts ,  Dewey says, i s  an im­
poverished view o f  what experience i s .
An example o f the d is to r tio n  o f experience th a t  occurs when a p h ilo s­
opher views experience in  th is  e n tire ly  cognitive  manner i s  the  kind o f 
view most philosophers take o f perception . According to  such a  ty p ic a lly  
philosophical reading o f perception , what one a c tu a lly  sees when one sees , 
fo r  example, a  c h a ir , a re  the
"co lo r th a t  belongs to  i t  under [ c e r ta in ]  conditions o f  l ig h t ,  
the shape which the c h a ir  d isp lays when viewed from th is  angle, 
e tc ."  The man who has the experience, as d i s t in c t  from a  ph ilos­
opher th eo riz in g  about i t ,  would probably say th a t  he experienced 
the c h a ir  most fu lly  no t when looking a t  i t  bu t when meaning to  
s i t  down in  i t ,  and th a t  he can mean to  s i t  down in  i t  p rec ise ly  
because h is  experience i s  n o t lim ited  to  co lo r under sp e c if ic  
conditions o f l ig h t  and angular shape. He would probably say 
th a t  when he looks a t  i t ,  in s tead  o f  experiencing something le ss  
than a  c h a ir  he experiences a  good deal more than a c h a ir  t th a t 
he lay s  hold o f a  wide s p a t ia l  con tex t, such as the room where
■-  3 -
the c h a ir  i s ,  and a  spread o f i t s  h is to ry , including the c h a ir 's  
period , p rice  paid fo r  i t ,  consequences, public  as  w ell as per- , 
sonal, which flow from i t s  use as household fu rn itu re , and so on,
Dewey puts th is  po in t more c o lo rfu lly  a  few pages la te r :
I  would ra th e r  take the experience o f  the dog o f  Odysseus upon h is  
m aste r 's  re tu rn  as  an example o f  the  s o r t  o f  th ing  experience i s  , . . 
than t r u s t  to  such statem ents £as the above], A physio log ist may 
fo r  h is  sp ec ia l purpose reduce O th e llo 's  perception o f a  handker­
c h ie f  to  simple elements o f a  co lo r under c e r ta in  conditions o f  l ig h t  
and shapes seen under c e r ta in  angular conditions o f v is io n . But the 
a c tu a l experience was charged with h is to ry  and prophecyj f u l l  o f 
love, jealousy , and v i l la in y , f u l f i l l i n g  p ast human re la tio n sh ip s  
and moving f a ta l ly  to  tra g ic  d estin y .
Now i t  seems to  me th a t  Dewey i s  q u ite  r ig h t  in  th is  c r itic ism  of 
the  ty p ic a l way in  which philosophers th ink  about perception . Not only 
was i t  tru e  o f  the philosophers whose view he was c r i t ic iz in g ,  but i t  i s  
tru e  o f  many who do philosophy today. The quotation he gives sounds very 
fa m ilia r . Perception i s  s t i l l  in te rp re te d  in  an o v e rin te lle c tu a liz e d  
way, I  b e liev e , th e re fo re , th a t  a  c a re fu l reading o f  Dewey's view w ill  
throw considerable l ig h t  on th is  question o f the na tu re  o f  perception.
For Dewey describes our experience with the kind o f s e n s i t iv i ty  one finds 
in  a  novel. I t  i s  th e re fo re  an en ligh ten ing  and even re fresh in g  exper­
ience to  read him. Most philosophers con ten t themselves, i t  seems to  me, 
with repeating  the  same old t i r e d  formulas with regard to  experience.
Dewey never f a i l s  to  uncover something new. Even i f  he i s  wrong, he is  
ex c itin g ly  wrong.
One might even make use o f  one o f pragmatism 's best-known th eo rie s  
- - th a t  a pe rso n 's  perception occurs only by v irtu e  o f  h is  being involved 
in  a  problem atic s itu a tio n  to  which awareness o f the th ings perceived i s  
re lev an t—and say th a t  i t  was p re c ise ly  Dewey's g re a t in te r e s t  in  l i f e
- i t ­
alic! o f  ways to  improve i t  th a t  made him so sen s itiv e  to  i t ,  I  am sug­
g estin g , th a t  i s ,  th a t  the reason fo r  the  impoverished s ta te  o f  much 
contemporary philosophy i s  the puny in te r e s t  in  l i f e  o f  i t s  p ra c ti t io n e rs .
I t  i s  no t re lev an t to  the problem atic s itu a tio n  o f such persons what 
various kinds o f  experience a re  re a lly  l ik e ,  since liv in g  in a  f u l l  and 
complete sense o f  the term i s  no t an end o f th e i r  l iv e s .  I  remember 
Chamer P e rry 's  r id ic u lin g  G. E. Moore fo r  recognizing "as by f a r  the 
most valuable th ings which we can know o r  imagine"^ only so c ia l in te r ­
course with fr ien d s  and contemplation o f  b e au tifu l o b jec ts . This, Perry 
sa id , i s  an expression o f the emasculated world o f the B ritish  p ro fesso r 
o f philosophy. But su re ly  l i f e  i s  r ic h e r  than th is .  For there  a re  many 
o th er kinds o f  people than professors o f  philosophy a t  Cambridge U niversity , 
and th e re  a re  correspondingly many o th e r a c t iv i t ie s  th a t  people fin d  to  be 
most valuable in  l i f e .  L ife includes among i t s  most valuable a c t i v i t i e s ,  
fo r  example, g iv ing  a ss is tan ce  to  su ffe rin g  and needy people, avenging an 
in ju s t ic e  to  a  fr ien d , "paying a t te n tio n ,"  a s  Dewey puts i t ,  perhaps a  
b i t  p ro fe s so r ia lly  h im self, " to  a  young woman," rep a irin g  a  de fec tiv e  
autom obile, making a  b e au tifu l ob jec t, so lv ing  a  problem in  physics, 
learn in g  the h is to ry  and p resen t conditions o f  an Indian tr ib e  in  the 
mountains o f Mexico, making and s a il in g  a  boat across the A tlan tic  Ocean, 
climbing a  mountain, playing a  tenn is  game, and so on.
For Dewey, as fo r  Terence, nothing human was a l ie n . And I  be lieve 
i t  i s  th i s  constan t readiness and zealous d esire  to  re tu rn  to  the fa c ts  
and to  consider a l l  kinds o f  phenomena ( a l l  kinds of perception , fo r  
example) th a t  made h is  view as  en lightening  as i t  i s .
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In what fo llow s, then , I  would lik e  to  o f fe r  th is  immensely r ic h  
and ingenious view fo r the re a d e r 's  considera tion . I  be lieve  a  very
v
good case can be made fo r  i t ,  and I  s h a ll  t r y  to  do so. But even i f ,  
in  the l a s t  a n a ly s is , i t s  basic  theses cannot be defended, i t  i s  a  view 
which has nevertheless  shed tremendous l ig h t  on our experience and which 
has the capacity  to  open our eyes to  aspects o f  r e a l i ty  n o t s u f f ic ie n tly  
noted o r  apprecia ted  before. And th a t i s  something th a t  cannot be sa id  
o f views which, though perhaps more e a s ily  d e fen sib le , a re  so by v ir tu e  
o f being innocuously general and s u p e r f ic ia l , lik e  th a t  o f  the philosopher 
whom Dewey quotes in  the passage from Experience and Nature re fe rred  to  
above.
INOTES
1. John Dewey, Experience and Nature ( f i r s t  e d itio n j La S a lle ,  111,i 
Open Court Publishing Co., 1925), pp. ^5“^ *
2. Ib id . p. 56.
3. G, E. Moore, P rin c ip le  Ethica (Cambridgei Cambridge U niversity  P ress, 
1962 [ f i r s t  published, 1903J ) ,  p. 188.
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CHAPTER I
PERCEPTION IN GENERAL
Dewey recognizes, I  b e lie v e , th ree  kinds o f  perception! (1) per­
ception  as  fe e lin g ! ( 2) perception a s  awareness o f  s ig n if ic a t io n ! and 
(3) perception a s  presence of sense. He makes a  fu r th e r  d is tin c tio n  
between sense-perception , on the one hand, and perception of ob jec ts  
in o th e r modes o f awareness, such as memory, im agination, h a llu c in a tio n , 
and so on, on the  o th er. Before d iscussing  in  d e ta i l  in subsequent chap­
te r s  the th ree  basic  kinds o f  perception , I  s h a ll ,  in  th i s  chap ter, a t ­
tempt to  give th e  reader a  general idea o f what they are  and how they 
re la te  to  each o th e r. And I  s h a ll  show how exactly  Dewey d is tin g u ish es  
sense-perception from o th e r kinds o f perception o f o b jec ts .
In  genera l, I  s h a ll  be concerned to  o f fe r  no t only an ex p lica tio n  
o f Dewey’s views, but an evaluation  o f them as w e ll. Where I  be lieve 
he i s  c o rre c t, I  s h a ll  defend h is  view by presenting  h is  own reasons 
fo r  tak ing  the view he ta k es , considering ob jections th a t have and seem 
to  me can be made, and f in a l ly  defending h is  view a g a in s t these o b jec tio n s.
One o f the most im portant reasons why Dewey’s theory o f perception 
seems p lausib le  to  me i s  th a t  i t  allow s fo r  a so lu tio n  o f c e r ta in  very 
thorny problems about the natu re  o f  mind and i t s  re la t io n  to  the body. 
Accordingly, a f t e r  I  have examined h is  view o f perception in  Chapters 
One, Two, and Three in  some d e ta i l ,  and have considered various ob jections 
and defenses th a t  a r is e  w ithin  the sp e c if ic  area o f  perception i t s e l f ,
-  7 -
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I  s h a l l ,  in  Chapter Four, attem pt to  show th a t  i t —as co n trasted  with 
o th e r th e o rie s—enables us to  solve the  much more general mind-body 
problem.
Dewey uses the  term "perception" in  a  very general way to  r e f e r  to  
any awareness we may have o f  an ob ject,*  my awareness now, fo r  example, o f
the coffee  cup on my desk. And an o b jec t he d e fin es  as  "a s e t  o f  q u a li-
2t i e s  tre a te d  as  p o te n t ia l i t ie s  fo r  sp ec ified  e x is te n t ia l  consequences."
But percep tual awareness need n o t be awareness o f an ob ject "contempora-
3
neously a ffe c tin g  the bod ily  organs." My n o s ta lg ic  awareness o f  th a t  
f in e  o ld  coffee cup I  used to  have bu t which i s  now gone i s  a lso  a  case 
o f  percep tion . This i s  perception by way o f  r e c a l l .  I t  i s  d if f e r e n t  from 
sense-percep tion  in  th a t  i t  i s  no t perceived by means o f contemporaneously 
opera ting  sense-organs (hands, f e e t ,  nose, eyes, e t c . ) ,  bu t by means o f 
"some o th e r organic s tru c tu re ."  Sense-perception i s  then awareness o f 
an o b jec t in  "some p resen t s ja c e -re la tio n "  with o n e 's  p re sen tly  operating 
sense-organs.^
That the perception o f  an o b jec t which I  am now having i s  a  sense- 
perception and n o t a  memory-perception o r an tic ip a tio n -p ercep tio n  o r 
iaag ination -percep tion  i s  not an in t r in s ic  c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  the presented 
q u a l i t ie s  themselves. I n t r in s ic a l ly ,  the two kinds o f  p resen ta tion  a re  
the  same| the sensed coffee  cup and the  remembered coffee cup (one could 
add the  dreamed and the i l lu s o ry  coffee cup) a re  a l l ,  in  them selves, 
equally  capable o f  being In te rp re ted  a s  sen se -p resen ta tio n s . There i s  
no c h a ra c te r is t ic ,  th a t  i s ,  in  the  nature  o f  a  memory-perception o r 
illu so ry -p ercep tlo n  taken by i t s e l f  why i t  should be considered a  memory-
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perception o r illu so ry -p e rc e p tio n . The reason i s  e x tr in s ic  to  i t .
Now what ex ac tly  i s  involved in  saying the p resen ta tion  i s  regarded 
as being a  sense-perception  o r a  p resen ta tion  o f  some o th e r kind only by 
v irtu e  o f  something e x tr in s ic  to  i t ?  Let us consider an examplei Former 
P residen t Eisenhower has ju s t  died and I  have been s i t t i n g  up much o f the 
n ig h t watching reruns o f  scenes from h is  l i f e .  That n ig h t I  wake from 
my s le e p  and see a  l i t t l e  fig u re  on my bedroom w all which seems to  be a  
l i t t l e  Dwight Elsenhower. I t  i s  a s  though the  former P residen t has come 
to  pay me a  v i s i t  in  the n ig h t.
Now how do I  go about determ ining whether th is  fig u re  i s  an ob ject 
o f sense-perception  or o f  h a llu c in a tio n ?  By re f le c t in g  on the presented 
q u a l i t ie s  them selves, the p a r t ic u la r  shape, c o lo r, s iz e , e tc ."  Or per­
haps by re f le c tin g  on the  a c t  by which I  apprehend the p resen ta tion?  
Dewey’ s po in t i s  th a t  n e ith e r  o f these  i s  the  way to  determine whether 
one i s  having a  sense-percep tion , a  h a llu c in a tio n , a  dream, o r  whatever. 
The only way to  do i t  i s  by means o f  considera tion  o f m ateria l e x tr in s ic  
to  the  presented q u a l i t ie s  them selves. There a re  two ways in  which -this 
can be donei ( l )  One can inquire  in to  the  causa tive  conditions o f  the 
presented m aterial} (2) one can check to  see i f  the  consequences o f  a c tin g  
on the  assumption th a t ,  f o r  example, the  fig u re  on my w all r e a l ly  i s
Eisenhower—whether a c tin g  on th a t  assumption produces consequences which
7
square with what one can expect i f  a  l i t t l e  Eisenhower re a lly  i s  th e re .
What fundamentally c h a rac te rizes  a  sense-perception  a s  opposed to  
a remembered o r  h a llu c in a ted  perception i s  th a t  a  sense-perception can 
be "o v ertly  ac ted  upon now o r immediately, . . . When inqu iry  reveals
-  10 -
th a t  an ob jec t ex te rn a l to  the organism i s  now operative and a ffe c tin g
the organism, the  pertinency o f  overt ac tio n  i s  e stab lish ed  and the kind
0
o f ov ert adjustm ent th a t  should be made i s  in  evidence,"
I f  I  am ly ing  in  bed seeming to  see a  l i t t l e  Dwight Elsenhower on 
my w a ll, no amount o f Inspection o f the presented m ateria l i t s e l f  w ill  
t e l l  me whether I  am sense-perceiv ing , h a llu c in a tin g , o r something e ls e .
The contents o f  sense-perception do n o t come labeled  as  such, nor do the 
a c ts  o f  sense-perception come with la b e ls  o r c h a ra c te r is t ic s  which d is ­
tin g u ish  them-so w ell from a l l  o th e r kinds of perception th a t  they might
q
as w ell be sa id  to  have la b e ls .
What i s  necessary to  determine what kind o f  perception I  am having 
i s ,  a s  ind ica ted  above, to  inqu ire  in to  causative conditions and to  p er­
form experiments to  determine fu tu re  consequences. Now one o f  the causa­
tiv e  fac to rs  in  the case in  question i s ,  of course, the evening*s a c t iv i ty  
o f viewing Eisenhower on te le v is io n . This f a c t  w ill  be re lev an t in  judg­
ing whether the  presented fig u re  i s  an ob ject o f  sense-perception as 
opposed to  some o ther kind o f  perception .
The o th er way o f  find ing  out what kind o f  perception i s  going on i s  
to  acqu ire  fu r th e r  presented m ateria l by means o f  some new overt a c tio n .
By squ in ting  my eyes, reaching over and turn ing  on the l ig h t ,  pu tting  on 
my g la sse s , I  have subsequent presented m ateria l which, i f  i t  squares with 
the fig u res  o f  my i n i t i a l  experience, w ill  serve to  v e rify  th a t  experience 
as having indeed been sense-perception and not h a llu c in a tio n . Or i f  I  
address the fig u re  and receive an appropria te  response, then again I  have 
evidence th a t ,  unusual a s  i t  may seem, I  have been having a  sense-perception .
- 1 1  -
Im p lic it in  Dewey*8 a n a ly s is  i s  h is  view th a t  sense-perception i s  
an experience which in d ica tes  the relevance o f a  p resen t overt a c tio n .
To sense-percelve i s  to  experience some presented m ate ria l which means 
th a t a  c e rta in  ac tio n  i s  re le v an t now. When I  merely r e c a l l  o r imagine 
a coffee cup, immediate ac tio n  i s  not re le v an t. I  cannot reach out and 
take a  drink from i t .  I  cannot pour some more coffee in to  i t .
The determ ination o f presented m ate ria l as sense-perceptual ra th e r  
than conceptual o r  fa n c ifu l takes place in  the course o f  inqu iry . And 
the "ultim ate need o f the inqu iry  is  found in  the n ecessity  o f d iscover­
ing what i s  to  be done, o r o f  developing a  response su ita b ly  adapted to  
the requirements o f  a  situation ,"*®
Dewey is  here arguing a g a in s t an old bugaboo o f  h is  da ting  from the 
days o f Essays in  Experimental Logic and e a r l i e r —v iz . ,  the so -ca lled  
sp ec ta to r  theory o f  knowledge. According to  th is  theory , a  kind o f d is ­
embodied mind can, simply by examining the ob ject o f  i t s  awareness o r  
" in te n tio n ,"  determine whether the  o b jec t is  perceived o r  merely fa n c i-  
fu l ,  v a lid  o r in v a lid . C la r ity  and d is tin c tn e s s  might be the c r i t e r i a .  
For Dewey, on the con trary , p r io r  to  some kind o f o v e rt, experim ental 
a c tio n , we have no way o f knowing whether a th ing  re a lly  e x is ts ,  "We 
do not believe a  th in g  to  be *there* because we a re  d ire c t ly  cognizant 
of an ex ternal o rig in  fo r  our perception; we in fe r  some ex ternal stim u­
la tio n  o f  our sensory apparatus because we a re  su ccessfu lly  engaged in  
HUmotor response."
How do I  know, then, th a t  I  am sense-perceiving? Because my 
responding is  working.
12
In  summary, we have seen th a t  sense-perception  fo r  Dewey occurs when 
presented m a te ria l, e .g . ,  the presented coffee-cup-data , i s  found, upon 
in q u iry , to  be contemporaneously a ffe c tin g  o n e 's  sense-organs. (The way 
we know, in  the course o f  inqu iry , th a t  we a re  perceiv ing  by means o f our 
sense organs, to  which the presented m a te ria l in  question i s  being con­
temporaneously presented, w il l  become c le a r  l a t e r  when we d iscuss percep­
tio n  o f sense. S u ffice  i t  to  say now th a t  th i s  fa c t  i s  perceived d ire c t ly  
as the funded r e s u l t  o f  previous a c t i v i t i e s  o f  in q u iry .)  And the way we 
know th a t  presented m ateria l i s  contemporaneously a ffe c tin g  our sense 
organs i s  no t by inspec ting  the  data them selves, but by means of overt 
a c ts  th a t  t e s t  whether the  da ta  presented square with subsequent o r 
previous presented d a ta .
When we sense-percelve, then , presented m ate ria l has the meaning of
being re lev an t to  contemporaneous a c tio n s . In a  passage in  Experience
and Nature in  which he d iscusses types o f  percep tion , Dewey recognizes
12two o th e r general types o f meaning th a t  presented m ateria l may have.
F ir s t ,  th e re  a re  "conceptual" meanings; secondly, "non-cognitive" meanings. 
Conception, o r the  presence o f conceptual meanings, occurs when presented 
m ateria l mean o r in d ica te  a s ta te  o f a f f a i r s  th a t  "cannot be [o v e rtly ]  
acted  upon now o r immediately, but to  which a c tio n  of a  p ra c t ic a l  s o r t  
i s  nevertheless re le v a n t,"  My thought now o f a  place I  would lik e  to  be 
during the  Christmas vacation i s  the awareness o f  a conceptual meaning.
The image o f , say, the  narrow a lle y s  o f  Guanajuato, Mexico, i s  not some­
thing th a t  I  can walk through a t  th is  moment. Perhaps a t  some fu tu re , 
"deferred" time I  s h a l l  be ab le  to  do so , but n o t now, contemporaneously.
I-  13 -
S im ila rly , the  boxer In tra in in g  f o r  an upcoming f ig h t  i s  no t sense- 
perceiving h is  opponent now a s  he shadow-boxes, does road work, and 
punches h is  bag and h is  sparring  p a rtn e r. I f  he were sense-perceiv ing  
h is  upcoming opponent, he could h i t  him now, in s tead  o f  the bag and h is  
sparring  p a rtn e r. He i s ,  ra th e r , conceiving him a3 someone he w il l  be 
ab le to  sense-perceive (hopefully  mostly w ith h is  f i s t  r a th e r  than h is  
head) l a t e r .
The second non-sense-perceptual kind o f meaning which presented 
m ateria l may have Dewey c a l l s  "non-cognltiva" percep tion . On page 339 
o f  Experience and Nature Dewey includes in  non-cognitive perception (as 
d is tingu ished  here from conceptual perception and sense-perception) only 
perception involving the s o r t  o f  meaning th a t  one is  aware o f in  imagi­
n ative  o r  fa n c ifu l co n tex ts. I t  i s  the kind o f perception one has when 
one looks a t  a  pa in ting  o r  watches a play o r reads a  novel. One i s  n o t, 
Dewey says, involved, in  such cases, in  a  problem atic s itu a tio n  o f  a  
p ra c tic a l s o r t  to  which ov ert a c tio n  on one 's  p a r t i s  re lev an t. I f  you 
see O thello about to  s tab  Iago, you do no t leap  to  h is  defense, o r  even 
c a l l  a  cop. And th is  n o t ju s t  because you a re  a  contemporary and th e re ­
fore uninvolved man. Overt ac tio n  i s  ir re le v a n t a lto g e th e r , both now 
13and l a t e r .
In  genera l, then, such non-cognitive perceptions do not a f f e c t  one 's
v i t a l ,  p ra c tic a l  in te r e s t s ,  but c a l l  fo r  ac tio n s  o f a  “dram atic o r  U te r ­
i' h.
ary  o r p lay fu l s o r t . ” And fo r  th i s  reason Dewey does n o t re fe r  to  them 
as sense-perceptions. But elsewhere Dewey includes among non-cognitive 
perceptions the perception one has in  "a ffe c tio n , love and ha te , d e s ire ,
I-  1 ^  -
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happiness and m isery." J The young man "paying a t te n tio n  to  a  young 
woman" i s  an example o f  th is  kind o f  percep tion .*^ He i s  n o t u sually  
"observantly" aware o f  h e r. And y e t p ra c tic a l ,  v i t a l  ac tion  in  response 
to  h e r  i s  re lev an t indeed. This i s  n o t a  p lay  o r a  novel. I f  i t  were, 
many a  read er o f novels would be f a r  le s s  d is s a t is f ie d  with the  kind o f 
experience he i s  having than in  fa c t  he i s .
Ib is  kind o f so -ca lled  "non-cognitive" perception i s  obviously a  
very im portant p a rt o f  our l iv e s .  And I  th ink  Dewey i s  r ig h t in  d is ­
tin g u ish in g  i t  from the kind o f  perception one has o f  th ings when involved 
in  d e lib e ra te  inqu iry  about them. The young man "paying a tte n tio n "  may 
be s iz in g  up h is  g i r l  to  see whether she would make him a  good w ife. In 
such a  case , h is  perception o f  h e r  would become cogn itive! c e r ta in  char­
a c te r i s t i c s  would be e x p l ic i t ly  noted as s ig n ify in g  c e r ta in  th ings he may 
expect from h er. But u sually  he i s  n o t, in  Dewey's view, in q u irin g  about
h e r, b u t ju s t  responding to  h e r  in  an " a f fe c t ia n a l ,"  " so c ia l ,"  and "aes- 
17th e tic "  way. ' The same d iffe ren ce  can be seen in  many cases. Eating 
Chinese food in  an a c tiv e -a ffec tio n a l-en jo y in g  way, on one hand, and e a t­
ing  i t  in  an e f fo r t  to  determine the in g red ien ts , t h e i r  p roportions, e t c . ,  
on the  o th e r.
I t  seems to  me th a t ,  in  in te rp re tin g  Dewey's theory  o f percep tion , 
i t  i s  necessary to  d is tin g u ish  the kind ju s t  d iscussed  from a l l  th ree  o f  
the  previous types. I t  i s  c le a r ly  no t conceptual, since  i t  i s  a  kind o f 
perception  in  which we a re  dealing  with o b jec ts  contemporaneously a f f e c t­
ing our sense organs. Nor i s  i t  fa n c ifu l o r p la y fu l, since ov ert action  
i s  re le v a n t. F in a lly , as we have ju s t  seen, i t  i s  n o t l ik e  cognitive
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sense-perception in  th a t  i t  i s  n o t a  product o f  in q u iry  th a t has ju s t  
preceded i t .
But, as we s h a l l  see in  g re a te r  d e ta i l  l a t e r ,  th is  kind o f  non-
cognitive  sense-perception i s  n o t re le v an t to  the passage from Dewey
18ju s t  quoted because i t  does n o t, in  Dewey*s view, involve any meaning. 
I t  i s  a  mere response to  f e l t  q u a l i t ie s ,  which q u a l i t ie s  a re  n o t i n t e r ­
preted  e i th e r  as the q u a l i t ie s  they a re  o r  as  p a rts  o f  an o b je c t. The 
perception o f the sidewalk as  one walks on i t  i s  an example o f  th is .
One n e ith e r  remarks i t s  cracked q u a lity  as  cracked, nor in te rp re ts  i t ,  
even im p lic it ly , as  being a  sidew alk. One ju s t  fe e ls  q u a l i t ie s  and 
responds.
But th e re  i s  another kind o f  "non-cognitive" perception recognized
by Dewey, This i s  a  kind of perception  one does have in  contexts o f
inq u iry , bu t which is  no t i t s e l f  co g n itiv e . I t  i s  a  perception o f  a
th ing  in  a  d ire c t  and immediate way as  re lev an t to  a  problem a t  hand.
I f  my c a r  breaks down on the expressway, I  perceive the cars  bearing
down on me and the shoulder over on the  s id e  o f the road in  th i s  non-
cognitive  way. That i s ,  I  perceive them as  cars  and as a  shoulder in
th is  non-cognitive way. The q u a l i t ie s  th a t  mean cars  and th a t  mean
shoulder a re  perceived non-cognitive ly  and, as we s h a l l  see , Dewey c a l l s  
19th i s  meaning sense. But the perception o f  the  cars  and the  shoulder 
as meaning " I ’d b e t te r  g e t over th e re  o r  I  w ill  be smashed"—th is  per­
ception i s  co g n itiv e . Dewey c a l l s  I t  perception  as  awareness o f  s lg n lf -  
20ic a t io n . The old fa m ilia r  o b jec ts  which previous inquiry-experience 
has taught me about I  experience non-cogn itive ly j but the new meaning
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they have In combination Kith each other in  th is  situation I  experience 
cognitively,
Nov th is  kind o f non-cognitive perception  occurs( according to  Dewey, 
only in  problem atic s i tu a tio n s  where re f le c tio n  and in q u iry  a re  going on.
I t  i s  th e re fo re  d if f e r e n t  from the  perception  th a t  was discussed above in  
which we a re  involved in  an ac tiv e-so c ia l-a ffec tio n a l-en jo y m en t kind o f  
a c t iv i ty .  For in  th i s  kind o f percep tion , e .g . ,  in  which one i s  uninquir­
ing ly  courting  a  g i r l ,  one i s  no t aware o f  a  meaning a t  a l l .  One i s  simply 
responding to  q u a l i t i e s .  So th i s  kind o f  experience Dewey sometimes does 
n o t even c a l l  perception  a t  a l l  (although, as  we have seen, sometimes he 
does) because he sometimes l im its  perception to  awareness o f meaning.
And th i s  kind o f perception  involves the  mere presence o f  q u a li t ie s  (which 
mere presence Dewey c a l l s  fe e lin g ) and the  immediate, u n re flec ted  response 
to  such q u a l i t ie s .
Another k ind o f  perception which Dewey recognizes bu t which does no t 
seem to  f a l l  under any o f  the th ree  types previously mentioned i s  memory- 
perception . Ihe re c a lle d  coffee-cup, f o r  example, i s  not sense-perceived, 
fo r  i t  i s  no t an o b jec t contemporaneously a ffe c tin g  ray sense organs. Nor 
i s  i t  conceptual, s ince  i t  i s  n o t a n tic ip a to ry , but ra th e r  re tro sp e c tiv e . 
F in a lly , i t  i s  n o t fa n c ifu l o r  p lay fu l, b u t ra th e r  e i th e r  cognitive o r  
non-cognitive, bu t nevertheless  rev e la to ry  o f r e a l i ty .  When one remembers, 
th a t  i s ,  he e i th e r  e x p l ic i t ly  and consciously cognizes h is  p a s t, o r , a s  
a  r e s u l t  o f  previous such cogn itions, he remembers w ithout re f le c tio n , 
as  when one u n re fle c tin g ly  remembers th a t  those th ings approaching him 
on the expressway a re  c a rs .
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We should, th e re fo re , i t  seems to  me, add a  fourth  type o f  perception 
recognized by Dewey—v iz . ,  memory. And under th i s  we should again make 
the d is t in c tio n  between perception as awareness of s ig n if ic a tio n  and as 
presence o f sense.
Now l e t  me try  to  put a l l  o f  these kinds o f perception to g e th er in  
the follow ing o u tlin e . This whole d iscussion  has n ecessa rily  been sketchy 
and cannot make complete sense a t  th is  p o in t. Hopefully i t  w ill  become 
c le a re r  in  the d e ta iled  d iscussions th a t  follow .
THE TYPES OF PERCEPTION RECOGNIZED BY DEWEY
A. Sense-Perception
1, Cognitive—Perception as Awareness o f S ig n ific a tio n
2, Non-cognitive—
a . Mere Peeling o r Having o f  Q u alities
b . Active, S o c ia l, A ffec tio n a l, Enjoying Perception;
Perception as Response to  Had Q ua litie s
c . Perception o f  Sense, Occurring Only in  Contexts o f Inquiry
B. Conceptual Perception
C. P ancifu l o r P lay fu l o r Dramatic o r  L ite ra ry  Perception
D. Memory-Perception
There a re , then, fo r  Dewey, a t  le a s t  f iv e  basic  kinds o f perception.
And th e re  a re  a lso  fiv e  kinds o f  sense-perception .
F i r s t ,  th e re  i s  the kind of sense-perception i l lu s t r a te d  in  the exper­
ience one might have o f the c u ttin g  down o f tre e s  in  fro n t o f  h is  apartment 
bu ild ing , a f te r  being rudely awakened by the cacophonous, ja r r in g  sounds made 
by the  autom atic saws and the raucous vo ices. One g e ts  up and p a r tic ip a te s
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in  a  l i t t l e  b i t  o f inqu iry  to  determine ju s t  what the source o f th a t  hor­
r ib le  sound i s .  Perception of the contemporaneously occurring events which 
re su lts  when one ra is e s  h is  shade and peers out in  an a c t  of experim ental 
inqu iry , although not a  very system atic one, i s  cognitive sense-perception . 
In th is  case, i t  i s  the perception o f the v isu a l da ta  o f the men outside 
and th e i r  rap id ly  moving saws as being the source o f the cacophonous, j a r ­
rin g , and obnoxious sounds one had been hearing . Note th a t as  cognitive 
i t  occurs as the  so lu tio n  o f a problem. The perception , then, i s  o f some­
thing as being an explanation of something e ls e . This i s  a  case o f per­
ception o f s ig n if ic a t io n .
But one 's  f i r s t  perception o f those sounds, before any inqu iry  began 
to  take p lace, took place in  the mode of what Dewey c a lls  fe e lin g . One 
i s  no t in te rp re tin g  them o r a t tr ib u tin g  any meaning to  them a t  a l l ,  although 
he may nevertheless  respond to  them by grimacing, moaning, o r even jumping 
up and slamming the window. This k ind  of sense-perception Dewey sometimes 
regards as including the a c tiv e , a f fe c t io n a l, so c ia l, e tc . ,  kind o f  per­
ception in  which, as I  have sa id , he th inks we a re  involved in  much o f 
our experience. He includes the l a t t e r  in the c la ss  o f  fee ling -percep tion  
because he believes no meaning i s  p resen t in i t .  I  s h a ll  th e re fo re  d is ­
cuss i t  in  Chapter Three, which i s  concerned w ith fee lin g .
F in a lly , when one looked outside in  an attem pt to  determine the source 
o f a l l  the n o ise , one no ticed  saws and men. These were grasped immediately 
as such. One did not have to  r e f le c t  in  o rder to  recognize the  saw- 
q u a li t ie s  as saws and the m an-qualities as men. These were grasped imme­
d ia te ly  as such. These kinds of inference one had made in  the p ast and
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they were now autom atic. Such percep tions, which, he i t  noted again , do 
involve grasping a  meaning and occur, according to  Dewey, only in  contexts 
of in q u iry , Dewey c a l l s  perception o f sense.
In  the passage in  Experience and Nature which suggested th i s  d iscus­
sion (p , 338 f . ) ,  Dewey neg lec ts  the kind of perception o f meaning c a lled  
perception o f sense. I  suspect th i s  i s  because o f h is  concern a t  th is  
po in t to  show th a t  presented m ate ria l i s  n o t in t r in s ic a l ly  one o r ano ther 
kind o f  perception . Subsequent inqu iry  i s  required  to  determine whether 
i t  i s  sense-perception, im agination, a n tic ip a tio n , o r  whatever. This par­
t i c u la r  kind o f  non-cognitive perception—i . e . ,  perception of sense—does 
n o t, however, show i t s e l f  to  be sense-perception as a  re s u l t  o f  a  con­
s id e ra tio n  o f e x tr in s ic  m atters revealed to  inqu iry . I t  Is  immediately 
taken to  be sense-percep tion . So i t  seems to  be an exception to  the view 
th a t only e x tr in s ic  considera tions enable us to  judge a  perception to  be 
o f one s o r t  o r  another.
Dewey's answer here i s  th a t  such non-cognitive sense-perceptions a re
22a  r e s u l t  o f  previous cognitive  sense-percep tions. At one tim e, th a t 
i s ,  we were aware of the nature  o f  men and saws by way o f an tic ip a tio n  
o f consequences which th i s  kind o f th ing  had come to  suggest to  u s . We 
were n o t sure what a saw was; we had to  th ink  about i t  and what was to  
be done with i t ,  in the way the new d riv e r  i s  no t sure o f what the  c lu tch  
i s  and what i s  to  be done with i t .  But now, o f course, we do no t have 
to  s to p  and th ink  about a  saw o r  a  mam. We experience the meanings of 
these  th ings w ithout r e f le c t io n , o r  "au tom atica lly ."
As we have seen, Dewey uses the  word s ig n if ic a tio n  fo r the kind o f
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meaning q u a l i t ie s  do have when we a re  cognizantly  aware o f  them, IM s 
i s  the way we a re  aware o f  q u a l i t ie s  and th e i r  meanings when we a re  en­
gaged in  a  problem atic s i tu a t io n . But when we become fa m ilia r  with such 
q u a l i t ie s  a s  those o f a  saw o r  a  man, i t s  a n tic ip a te d  consequences become 
an " in te g ra l  and funded fea tu re"  o f those q u a l i t ie s  them selves. The 
fu tu re  consequences, the  meaning, o f  the  q u a l i t ie s  "already  belong to  
the th in g "; they become "commuted" in to  the  q u a l i t ie s  themselves and a re
grasped a t  the same time as the q u a l i t ie s  them selves. Ib is  Dewey c a l l s
23grasping the  sense o f  the q u a l i t ie s .
I  s h a l l  d iscuss in  d e ta i l  below, in  Chapter Two, these two d is t in c t  
kinds o f  percep tion , the cognitive  one o f grasping the  s ig n if ic a tio n  o f 
a  s e t  o f q u a l i t ie s ,  and the non-cognitive one o f  g e ttin g  the  sense o f 
them.
We see , then , th a t  Dewey recognizes two types o f perception o f the 
meaning th a t  presented m ateria l has, the f i r s t  being perception o f  s ig ­
n if ic a t io n ,  the  second o f the sense o f th a t  m a te ria l. Now the presen ta­
tio n  o f the  m a te ria l i t s e l f  i s  the o th er kind of perception which I  am 
arguing th a t  Dewey recognizes, even though he does no t u su a lly  use the 
term perception to  r e f e r  to  i t .  In every case o f  sense-perception there  
i s  n e ce ssa rily  involved a  p resen ta tion  o f q u a l i t ie s  them selves, and th is  
having o f q u a l i t ie s  Dewey c a l l s  fe e lin g . Feeling i s  a  non-cognitive, 
non-observant kind o f  awareness. Sometimes i t  occurs to g e th er with the 
in te rp re ta tio n  o r meaning c o n s titu ted  by sense and s ig n if ic a t io n , but 
in  lower anim als which are  locomotive and which have d is tan ce -recep to rs , 
and sometimes perhaps in  man, i t  occurs to ta l ly  w ithout any in te rp re ta tio n .
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Feelings may be p a lnsf p leasu res , odors, c o lo rs , no ises , tones, o r what- 
everj but they a re  so only " p io le p tic a lly  and p o te n tia lly ,"  In them­
se lv e s , they a re  simply had q u a l i t ie s ,  to ta l ly  u n in te rp re ted , u n c la ss if ie d , 
unlocated. The f e l t  s ta te  o f consciousness which one might l a t e r  leam  
to  c a l l  "hunger" i s ,  before sudi use o f  language to  c la s s ify  and lo cate  
i t ,  n e ith e r  bodily no r m ental, n e ith e r  in ten se  nor weak, d ire c ted  n e ith e r 
toward milk nor toward liv e r}  i t  simply i s .  I t  may cause responses, but 
i t  i s  no t known o r understood. There i s  the hunger and the  cry ing , but 
there  i s  not hunger, the recogn ition , "Hunger," and then the crying.
Dewey seems to  have changed h is  mind between the w ritin g  o f the 
"In troduction" to  Essays in  Experimental Logic and the w riting  o f  Logict 
The Theory of Inquiry  on the question o f whether fe e lin g  ever occurs in  
human beings to ta l ly  unaccompanied by in te rp re ta tio n a l a c t iv i ty .  In the 
"In troduction" to  the Essays he claims th a t  although fe e lin g  may perhaps 
sometimes occur w ithout in te rp re ta tio n  o r meaning, i t  u sually  does not 
and possib ly  never does. Most o f our experience occurs in  a prim arily  
non-cognitive framework, in  which th e re  i s  a minimum o f cog n itio n a l ac­
t i v i t y  going on. But "some element o f  re f le c tio n  o r inference may be 
requ ired  in  any s itu a tio n  to  which the term 'ex p erien ce ' i s  app licab le  
in  any way which co n tra s ts  w ith , say, the 'ex p erien ce ' o f  an o y s te r or
25a growing bean v ine ,"
But in  Logic: The Theory o f  Inqu iry  he says " th a t e i th e r  an
immediate overt response occurs, l ik e  using the ty p ew rite r o r picking 
up the  book (in  which cases the  s i tu a tio n  i s  no t a  cogn itiona l one), 
o r . . . the ob ject d ire c t ly  noted i s  p a r t  of an a c t  o f inqu iry  d irec ted
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towaiti knowledge." And we see front a  passage In  Experience and Nature 
th a t  i t  I s  h is  view th a t  " the  re a d ie r  a  response* the  le s s  consciousness*
27
meaning* th ink ing  I t  p e rm its .” So th a t  i t  seems c le a r  th a t  he came to  
th ink  th a t ,  in  a  good deal o f our experience, fee lin g  does occur w ithout 
any accompanying In te rp re ta tio n  and meaning.
In  d iscussing  above the  fa c t  th a t  fe e lin g s , when they  occur w ithout 
in te rp re ta t io n , a re  only p ro le p tic a lly  odors, sounds, co lo rs , e t c . ,  I  
used a s  an example one th a t  Dewey him self uses, the fe e lin g  o f  hunger.
In i t s  o r ig in a l s ta t e ,  th i s  f e l t  q u a lity  i s  not r e a l ly  hunger; i t  i s  
merely the p o te n tia l i ty  fo r  a  l a t e r  in te rp re ta tio n  o f i t  as  hunger. Now 
perception o f i t  a s  hunger, when i t  does occur, i s  n o t, s t r i c t l y  speaking, 
a  case o f  sense-percep tion . For Dewey lim its  the term sense-perception 
to  ob jec ts  the perception o f which begins w ith ex te rn a l sense-organs.
This d is tin c tio n  between "p e rip h e ra lly  in i t ia te d  perceptions and ones
in te rn a lly  in i t i a te d  i s  not one th a t  perceptions come marked w ith; i t  i s
28a  product o f  a n a ly t ic a l  observation ."  N evertheless, Dewey does recog­
n ize  th is  a s  a  leg itim a te  d is t in c t io n .
The perception o f hunger, then , o r  o f any o th e r in te rn a l  s ta t e ,  i s
n o t then a  case o f  sense-percep tion , bu t perception by means o f  some pro- 
29p riocep tive  organ. 7 S t r i c t ly  speaking, then , i t  seems th a t we should 
add ano ther kind o f perception to  our o u tlin e  above. The terms fe e lin g , 
s ig n if ic a t io n , and sense should then be viewed as  applying to  perception 
in  gen era l, one sub-category o f which i s  sense-percep tion , ano ther o f 
which i s  perhaps "p ro p rio -cep tio n ."  The t r i p a r t i t e  d iv is io n  would seem 
a lso  to  apply to  many, i f  n o t a l l ,  o f  the o th e r types o f  percep tion ,
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although Dewey does n o t, a s  f a r  as  I  can t e l l ,  e x p lic i t ly  apply i t  in  th i3  
way. In perception by way o f r e c a l l ,  fo r  example, one may be fe e lin g  o r 
having q u a l i t ie s  which a re  n o t produced by ob jects contemporaneously a f ­
fec tin g  one 's  sense organs, o r  one 's  proprioceptive organs e i th e r .  They
are  produced by "some o th e r organic s tru c tu re ,"  a s  he puts i t  in  the essay,
30"A N a tu ra lis t ic  Theory o f Percep tion ."  And these q u a l i t ie s  a re  in te r ­
p re ted , e i th e r  in  the  sense o f acqu iring  a  sense o r in  th a t o f acqu iring  
a  s ig n if ic a tio n , as  meaning some p a s t event in  one 's  l i f e .  S im ila rly , 
imaginary perception may be based on q u a l i t ie s  f e l t  a s  a  re s u lt  o f  some 
o th er organic s tru c tu re  than one 's  e x te rn a l sense-organs, o r o n e 's  pro­
p rio cep to rs , both o f  which t e s t i f y  to  a  contemporaneously occurring event. 
Such q u a l i t ie s  then come to  have some s ig n if ic a tio n  o r  sense a s  an in te r ­
p re ta tio n  o f these q u a l i t ie s .
Dewey's view th a t  th e re  i s  no in t r in s ic  d ifference  between the various 
kinds o f  perception ( i . e . ,  between sense-perception , h a llu c in a tio n , imagi­
na tio n , and so on) perhaps s t r ik e s  the reader a t  f i r s t  a s  highly implau­
s ib le .  For th e re  do su re ly  seem to  be fundamental and obvious d iffe ren ces  
between them, d iffe ren ces  th a t  a re  in t r in s ic ,  not e x tr in s ic . One does 
no t have to  engage in  in q u iry , even o f a  prim itive s o r t ,  to  know th a t  he 
i s  now remembering what he was doing around noon yesterday , o r  th a t  he 
i s  now seeing o r  sense-perceiv ing  c e r ta in  ob jects around him, and so on.
The d iffe ren ce  between these various kinds o f perception i s  ju s t  obvious. 
When I  remember, I  know I  remember. And so on with the  o thers . Of course, 
th e re  a re  bo rderline  cases (and borderline  people, v iz . ,  madmen) in  which 
one may no t be sure whether he i s  imagining or sense-perceiv ing . And here
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i t  i s  necessary to  engage in  in v estig a tiv e  o r  inqu iring  a c t iv i ty .  But 
such instances a re  ra re ,  and i t  would be preposterous to  in f e r  from such 
instances o f  d i f f ic u l ty  in  id en tify in g  the type of perception one i s  hav­
ing to  the conclusion th a t a l l  are  in t r in s ic a l ly  lik e  them and cannot be 
known to  be what they  are  w ithout e x tr in s ic  considerations being made.
Furthermore, even i f  we gran t Dewey’s  contention th a t perceptions 
do no t d i f f e r  in t r in s ic a l ly  bu t only e x tr in s ic a l ly  (whether these  ex­
t r in s ic  considera tions be cu rren t ones o r  ones th a t were made in  the 
past and have now vouchsafed th is  s o r t  o f perception , in  th i s  s o r t  of
circum stance, as being memory, im agination, o r  whatever), a fu r th e r  
31d if f ic u l ty  a r is e s .  When one engages (o r  i s  engaged) in  th is  inves­
tig a tiv e  procedure to  determine whether a s e t  o f presented q u a li t ie s  
which he i s  now having a re , l e t  us say , imaginary o r cases o f sense- 
pereeptlon, he must perform some a c t and then have more presented q u a li­
t i e s  as  a re s u l t  o f th a t  a c t .  But what about th is  perception? I s  i t  
one th a t  i s  known to  be sense-perception in t r in s ic a l ly ,  o r  does i t  too 
requ ire  fu r th e r , e x tr in s ic  considerations before i t  can be d e f in ite ly  
determined to  be a  case o f sense-perception and no t im agination, memory, 
o r whatever? I f  the  l a t t e r ,  as Dewey's view would seem to  commit him to  
holding, then an in f in i te  reg ress  seems to  r e s u l t .  For obviously the 
same question  w il l  a r is e  about th is  p u ta tiv e  sense-perception as wells 
What k ind  o f perception  ju s t i f i e s  i t ?  A perception known in t r in s ic a l ly  
to  be sense-percep tion , or scoe fu r th e r  sense-perception known i t s e l f  
only e x tr in s ic a l ly  to  be sense-perception? And so on end lessly .
Now, o f  course we do n o t, and could n o t, engage in  an in f in i ty  o f
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t e s t s  fo r  any p a r t ic u la r  sense-perception we th ink  we a re  having. I t
follow s, th e re fo re , th a t e i th e r  we never do have a  leg itim a te  sense-
perception , a  view th a t  Dewey's theory re s u l ts  in ,  o r  we have some sense-
percep tions, a  view Dewey e x p l ic i t ly  den ies.
Dewey answers th is  type o f objection  in  the  chap ter o f  Logics The
32Theory o f  Inquiry  ca lled  "Immediate Knowledge." He describes the objec­
tio n  as
a  d ia le c t ic a l  argument which has been used ev er since the time of 
A r is to t le ,  and i s  s t i l l  cu rren t today. I t  i s  argued th a t  inference 
must r e s t  upon something known from which i t  s t a r t s ,  so th a t  unless 
th e re  a re  tru e  premises which serve as  such a  b a s is  i t  i s  im possible, 
no m atter how adequate inference and d iscu rs iv e  reasoning may be, 
to  a r r iv e  a t  true  conclusions. Hence the only way o f avoiding a 
regressus ad in fin itum  i s  sa id  to  be the ex istence  o f tru th s  imme­
d ia te ly  known. . . , But the d ia le c t ic a l  rep ly  i s  sim ple. I t  su f­
f ic e s  to  have h y p o the tica l (cond itiona l) m ate ria l such th a t  i t  
d ire c ts  inqu iry  in to  channels in  which new m a te ria l, fa c tu a l and 
conceptual, i s  d isc lo sed , m ateria l which i s  more re lev an t, more 
weighted and confirmed, more f r u i t f u l ,  than were the i n i t i a l  fa c ts  
and conceptions which served as the po in t o f d e p a r t u r e .33
Every in q u iry , then , fo r  Dewey, begins with c e r ta in  th ings taken
fo r  granted . These a re  n o t taken fo r granted because they a re  s e l f -
ev iden t, immediately known, indubitab le  t ru th s .  They a re  simply the
"funded" r e s u lts  o f previous in q u ir ie s . And th e re  are  two s o r ts  o f such
th in g s , which Dewey re fe rs  to  as  "conceptual" and "perceptual" o r  " fa c tu a l
•Ul
o b je c ts ."  Conceptual o b jec ts  a re  w e ll-e stab lish ed  hypotheses o r th e ­
o rie s  about what w ill  happen i f  c e r ta in  ac tio n s  a re  performed. They 
"may be and u su a lly  a re  a b strac ted  from ap p lica tio n  to  th is  and th a t 
immediate e x is te n t ia l  s i tu a t io n . But on th a t  very account, they are
instrum ents o f a  wide, in d e f in ite  scope o f o p era tional ap p lica tio n , a c tu a l
35ap p lic a tio n  being made as  sp ec ia l conditions p resen t them selves."
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Let us take a s  an example o f such a  conceptual o b jec t th a t  o f  "dan­
gerous s i tu a t io n ."  This o b jec t In d ica tes , In  a  general way, th a t  un d esir­
able and possib ly  even ca tas tro p h ic  consequences may r e s u l t  i f  c e r ta in  
developments occur o r  i f  c e r ta in  preventive ac tio n s  are n o t taken. But 
o f course i t  i s  s u f f ic ie n tly  general to  be app licab le  to  a  tremendous 
v a rie ty  o f fa c tu a l s i tu a t io n s . The f i l l i n g  in  o f the su b jec t o f the judg­
ment to  which the  conceptual o b jec t, "dangerous s i tu a tio n ,"  i s  a  p red ica te  
i s  done by means o f a  determ ination o f what Dewey c a l ls  a  perceptual o r 
fa c tu a l o b jec t. The breakdown o f my c a r  on a  crowded expressway might be 
an example o f  a  percep tual o b jec t. My judgment would then become, "The 
breakdown o f my c a r  on th is  expressway i s  a  dangerous s i tu a t io n ."
Now the two o b je c ts , perceptual and conceptual, did no t come to  us 
in  a  moment o f  contem plative specu la tion , nor were they the products o f 
in tu i t io n .  They a re  the products o f previous in q u ir ie s  in  response to  
previous problem atic s i tu a tio n s . I  perceive th i s  as a breakdown o f  my 
car because o f previous experience with cars  th a t  suddenly lose speed 
w ithout e i th e r  being out o f gas, having been dece le ra ted , e tc . Such an 
ob ject i s  "a s e t  o f  q u a l i t ie s  tre a ted  a s  p o te n t ia l i t ie s  fo r  sp ec ified  
e x is te n t ia l  consequences."
When we a re  try in g  to  determine what the  meaning o f a  p a r tic u la r  
s e t o f  q u a l i t ie s  i s ,  e .g . ,  th e  sudden d ece le ra tio n  of o n e 's  c a r , we are  
attem pting to  determ ine o r define  a percep tual ob jec t. What does th is  
s itu a tio n  mean? J u s t  a s  in  th e  case o f  the o ffensive sounds th a t  woke 
one from s leep , one engaged in  some o v e rt, experim ental a c ts  to  determine 
what they  meant. In  the course o f  such an inqu iry  we encounter o th e r
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o b jec ts , both percep tual and conceptual, which a re  the products o f p re­
vious in q u ir ie s —such a s  the  cars  bearing down upon one from behind, the 
shoulder onto which one might be ab le  to  p u ll  o f f  and out o f  th e i r  path , 
e tc . Or, in  th e  case o f  the  o ffensive sounds, men using mechanical saws 
on dead t r e e s .  And o f course inqu iry  u sually  s tops here . We take fo r  
granted th a t  th ese  th ings a re  r e a l ly  th e re , contemporaneously a ffe c tin g  
our sense-organs. The reason we do th is  i s ,  ag a in , not th a t  they a re  
given as  s e lf -e v id e n tly  and indubitab ly  sense-percep tions, ra th e r  than 
im agination-perceptlons, de lusion-percep ilons, o r  h a llu c in a tio n -p ercep tio n s . 
I t  i s  ra th e r  th a t  they a re  taken to  be sense-perceptions because we see 
no grounds fo r  doubting them to  be such. These o b jec ts  a re  the  a l te rn a ­
tiv e  to  the "hard data" and " f i r s t  p rin c ip le s"  which o th e r  philosophers 
th ink a re  presupposed in  a l l  our judgments about the  w orld. Some ob jec ts  
o r p r in c ip le s , Dewey recognizes, a re  presupposed in  a l l  inqu iry  o r judg­
ment, bu t these  need no t be ob jec ts  o r  p r in c ip le s  about which we can be 
ab so lu te ly  c e r ta in , but ones which a re  taken a s  being e stab lish ed  hypoth­
eses and ob jec ts  "so in s t i tu te d  and confirmed in  the  course o f  d if fe re n t 
in q u ir ie s , th a t  i t  would be a  waste o f  time and energy in  fu r th e r  in q u ir -
37ie s  to  make them o b jec ts  o f  in v e s tig a tio n  before proceeding to  use them,"
One might, however, ask fu r th e r  how any perceptual o b jec t ever got 
e s tab lish ed  in  the  f i r s t  p lace, i f  th e re  were no o th e r  perceptual ob jec ts  
to  use to  e s ta b lish  i t .  Granted th a t  now we have percep tual o b jec ts  l ik e  
men, t r e e s ,  saws, e tc .  to  use in  making o th e r percep tual judgments. And 
granted th a t  they  a re  p re tty  w ell e s tab lish ed  and founded, so th a t  i t  
would be a  "waste o f time and energy" to  c a l l  them in  qu estio n . But
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i s n ' t  th i s  p rec ise ly  "because they  have been seen in  th e  past to  be con­
firmed by those "hard ," indub itab le  da ta  th a t  c e r ta in  philosophers re fe r  
to?
C. I .  Lewis' theory i s  an example o f  th i s  view. There a re , he says 
in  f n a lv s ls  o f Knowledge and V aluation, c e r ta in  "term inating  judgments" 
which can be v e rif ie d  d ire c t ly  and c e r ta in ly . And i t  i s  the p o s s ib il i ty  
o f c e r ta in  confirm ation o f such judgments th a t  enables us to  have the con­
v ic tio n  we do about any p a r t ic u la r  judgment which i s  no t so v e r if ia b le — 
fo r  example, the perceptual judgment th a t  those men out there  a re  sawing 
a  t r e e .  "Only," Lewis says, " i f  something i s  conclusively  tru e  by v irtu e  
o f experience, can any ex istence o r  f e e t  o f  r e a l i ty  be rendered even 
p ro b a b le ." ^
At th i s  po in t I  th ink  we might, in  defense o f  Dewey's view, r e f e r
to  the  thought o f  ano ther pragm atist who, o f course, had considerable
in fluence  on Dewey, G. S . P e irce . P e irce , in  a  b r i l l i a n t  essay c a lled
39"Questions Concerning C ertain F acu ltie s  Claimed fo r  Man, " 7 d iscusses 
the question  o f whether we have any in tu i t iv e  cog n itio n . This he defines 
as a  cognition o r judgment no t "determined" o r  supported by some o th er 
cogn ition . This i s  the  kind o f cognition o r  knowledge which Lewis th inks 
i s  necessary  i f  we a re  ever to  have any fe c tu a l knowledge a t  a l l .  And 
the assumed n ecessity  fo r  th is  i s  what i s  in  back o f  th is  e n tire  argument 
a g a in s t Dewey's view,
Peirce  re fe rs  to  th i s  argument in  "Questions Concerning C ertain  
F acu ltie s  Claimed fo r  Man" as an argument which claim s th a t th e re  aust 
be some such s e lf -e v id e n t, se lf-confirm ing  judgments to  found the  ordinary
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perceptual judgments we make. And one o f  h is  counter-arguments seems to  
me to  o f fe r  an ex ce llen t reason fo r  b e liev in g  Dewey's view to  be p lau sib le  
and the  ob jection  we have been considering  untenable, This i s  h is  p o in t 
th a t  a  v a r ie ty  o f  prem ises, none o f  which i s  i t s e l f  c e r ta in , may o f f e r  
support fo r  a  conclusion to  such an ex ten t th a t  i t  i s  more c e r ta in  than  
any one o f them.
Let us suppose, fo r  example, th a t  a  dozen w itnesses t e s t i f y  to  an 
occurrence. Then my b e l ie f  in  the  occurrence r e s ts  on the  b e l ie f  
th a t  each o f these  men i s  gen era lly  to  be believed upon oath . Yet 
the fa c t  t e s t i f i e d  to  i s  made more c e r ta in  than th a t  o f  any o f those 
men i s  genera lly  to  be believed .™
Now, s im ila r ly , i f  I  am concerned to  in q u ire  in to  the p rec ise  na tu re  
o f  the  perception o f Dwight Eisenhower on my bedroom w all ( e .g . ,  by pu t­
tin g  on my g la sses  and looking around th e  room fo r  o th e r sources fo r  the  
image), I  may be led  to  the  conclusion th a t  i t  i s  a  shadow th a t  was c a s t  
th e re  by a  s t r e e t  lamp. This shadow so c a s t  upon the  spot where I  thought 
I  had seen a  l i t t l e  Eisenhower d isconfirm s my o r ig in a l inference as to  what 
I  was seeing . But now how do I  know th a t  th e  shadow i s  indeed a  shadow 
and not r e a l ly  a  delusion  o r h a llu c in a tio n  o r  memory? In sh o r t, how do 
I  know th a t  I  am sense-perceiving? The answer is  th a t  I  do no t know in  
the  sense o f being ab so lu te ly  c e r ta in , bu t th a t  th e re  are  many o ther 
sense-percep tions, themselves a lso  not ab so lu te ly  c e r ta in , w ith which 
the  inference th a t  th i s  i s  a  shadow so c a s t  square. There i s  a  s t r e e t  
lamp and i t  c a s ts  a  l ig h t  across the  photographic en la rg er which i s  s i t ­
t in g  on a  ta b le  in  my room, and the shadow i s  roughly the same shape a s  
the  head o f the en la rg er. Furthermore, I  d id  no t have my g lasses  on, and 
w ithout them cannot be sure ju s t  what I  am seeing, and I  had been seeing
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scenes from the l i f e  o f Eisenhower on te le v is io n  before I  went to  bed.
The way th a t  I  have what Dewey c a l l s  "warranted a s s e r t ib i l i t y "  (he 
p re fe rs  to  avoid the  term "knowledge") i s  through the fe e t  th a t th is  
in te rp re ta tio n  does seem to  account fo r  the phenomena o f the  s i tu a tio n . 
I t  i s ,  then , i f  you w il l ,  a  kind o f  coherence theory o f knowledge and 
hence, since  knowledge i s  involved in  cognitive  and in d ire c tly  in  non- 
cognitive  percep tion , a  coherence theory o f percep tion . There i s ,  then , 
no regressus ad in fin itum  not because we reach a case o f  Inheren tly  and 
in t r in s ic a l ly  knowable sense-percep tion . R ather i t  i s  because we reach 
a  perception which squares w ith the  o th e r percep tions which we a re  hav­
in g , w ith those we have had in  the p a s t, and with those we expect to  
have in  the  fu tu re . And with the  perceptions which o th e r people t e l l  
us they are  having.
Something l ik e  th is  must be the  way in  which we f i r s t  come to  d is ­
tin g u ish  our sense-perceptions from our im agination-perceptions, dream- 
percep tions, e tc .  I t  i s  because some o f them cohere w ith o th e rs , none 
o f  which i s  i t s e l f  known to  be a  sense-perception . And some a re  no t 
borne out by subsequent developments among the  perceptual m ateria l and 
do no t square w ith what has come befo re . None o f o n e 's  perceptual exper­
iences o f , say , h is  mother a s  she tends to  him in  h is  c r ib  i s  r e a l ly  c e r­
ta in ly  a  sense-percep tion , bu t the  f a c t  th a t  they a l l  square w ith each 
o th e r and do n o t come and go in  the  way the "bad man" o f one 's  dreams 
do must make the  d is tin c tio n  between the r e a l  and the  imaginary, fo r  
example, begin to  take hold in  the  c h i ld 's  mind.
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CHAPTER I I
FEELING
We come now to  the d e ta ile d  a n a ly s is  of Dewey's view o f the f i r s t  o f 
the  th ree  kinds o f  perception he recognizes. This he c a l l s  fe e lin g . As 
I  have ind ica ted  above, each o f the th ree  kinds perception can occur 
in  any o f the various forms o f  perception . Feeling i s  n o t lim ited  to  
q u a l i t ie s  th a t  a re  received through ex te rn a l sense-organs, but can be 
produced by in te rn a l ,  p roprioceptive senso rs, o r o th e r "organic s tru c tu re s ,"  
th is  l a s t  source being responsib le  fo r  q u a l i t ie s  in te rp re te d  a s  memories, 
fo r  example.
Dewey does n o t generally  c a l l  fe e lin g  a  kind o f perception .*  He 
usually  lim its  th a t  term to  the kind of awareness we have of q u a li t ie s  
to g e th er with th e i r  meaning, which meaning i s  e i th e r  th e  s ig n if ic a tio n  
o r the sense o f the  q u a li t ie s  o r presented m ate ria l. I  am including h is  
view of i t  in  my d iscussion  o f h is  theory  o f percep tion , however, because 
i t  i s  a  kind o f awareness which i s  custom arily  discussed in  philosophical 
accounts o f percep tion , many philosophers considering i t  a  kind o f percep­
t io n . Furthermore, as we s h a l l  see (p . ^5), i t  i s  in  Dewey's view pre­
c ise ly  because philosophers have viewed what Dewey c a l l s  "fee ling" on an 
analogy w ith the cognitive  kind of perception which Dewey c a l ls  "aware­
ness o f s ig n if ic a tio n "  th a t  many o f the problems o f perception a r i s e .
Feeling i s  the  having, in  a non-cognitive way, o f  q u a l i t ie s .  I t  i s  
the  occurrence o f these  q u a l i t ie s  in  a  liv in g  organism. These q u a li t ie s
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include such th ings a s  co lo rs , sounds, shapes, e t c . ,  which are  sensed by 
sense-organs, a s  w ell as  such q u a l i t ie s  as pa in fu ln ess , obnoxiousness, 
p leasure , s e t t le d ,  d is tu rb ed , harsh , barren , e tc .  This l a s t  group Dewey, 
following Santayana, o ften  c a l l s  " te r t ia ry "  q u a l i t ie s .  But such q u a l i t ie s  
a re  not f e l t  a s  what they a r e ,  a s , f o r  example, d is tu rb ed . Because f e e l­
ing i s  dumb; i t  does n o t know what i s  being had o r even th a t  anything i s  
being hadi fe e lin g  i s  ju s t  q u a l i t ie s  occurring . Dewey's view, then , i s  
l ik e  th a t  o f James in  "Does Consciousness E x ist?” Q u a litie s , o r  "n eu tra l 
data" (as James re fe rs  to  them), ju s t  happen. There i s  no a c t  o f being 
conscious o f th e i r  happening. There i s  no knowledge involved. And there  
i s  no su b jec t to  which the  f e l t  q u a l i t ie s  occur.
As we saw in  Chapter One, f e l t  q u a l i t ie s ,  in  th e i r  o r ig in a l s ta t e ,  
before in te rp re ta tio n  occurs, a re  only "p ro le p tic a lly "  hunger o r  red o r 
fe a r , o r  bodily  o r environm ental. They have no ch a rac te r o r meaning or 
c la s s if ic a t io n  a t  a l l  in  t h e i r  o r ig in a l  s ta te .  They ju s t  a re . They may 
cause responses, bu t they do no t do so because they mean something th a t  
makes th a t  response re le v an t. A dog may perk up i t s  ears  when i t  hears 
thunder, bu t th i s  i s  merely a  response, not a reac tio n  to  an in te rp re ta ­
tio n  o f a  sound-quality  as  meaning thunder o r even danger.
In  o rder to  t r y  to  make c le a re r  what Dewey i s  g e ttin g  a t  he re , I  
would l ik e  to  ask the read er to  imagine what the  experience o f Helen 
K elle r must have been l ik e  p r io r  to  th a t  momentous occasion when she 
came to  learn  th a t  th ings have names. I f  the read er has seen the  play 
o r  movie, "The M iracle Worker," he w il l  remember what a  te r r ib ly  ex c itin g  
moment i t  was, both fo r  Helen K e lle r and h er teach er.
What happened was a  revo lu tion  in  Helen K e lle r 's  experience, a  revo­
lu tio n  h e r  teachers  had "been t iy in g  to  accomplish fo r  some tim e. They 
had "been try in g  to  teach h er th a t  th ings have names and what some o f those 
names a re .
Now, what I  would lik e  the reader to  t r y  to  imagine i s  what Helen 
K e lle r 's  experience was lik e  p r io r  to  th a t  tim e. W ell, o f course some 
q u a l i t ie s  did b rin g  fo rth  responses, b u t were these phenomena, these qual­
i t i e s ,  in  any sense known or cognized? Perhaps i t  i s  im possible to  say, 
bu t I  be lieve  i t  i s  possib le  th a t  her experience was much l ik e  th a t  o f 
the h igher animals who have fe e lin g , but n o t mind. Let us anyway suppose 
th a t  th i s  was roughly what her experience was l ik e ,  and, in  try in g  to  imag­
ine  i t ,  I  be lieve  we w ill  ge t very c lose  to  what Dewey means by fe e lin g .
Let us suppose, then , th a t  p r io r  to  d iscovering th a t  a l l  th a t  p res­
sure on the hand meant a  word o r  s ig n , Helen K e lle r re a l ly  d id  no t have 
knowledge. Because, in  her experience, nothing r e a l ly  represented any­
th ing  e ls e . There was water and then there  was the response o f running 
away or sh ivering , but th e re  was no cognition o f i t  a s  w ater.
Now the kind  o f  experience which she must have had o f the world p r io r  
to  le a rn in g  about language and rep resen ta tio n  o r s ig n if ic a tio n  corresponds 
to  what Dewey c a l l s  fe e lin g . What happens in  experience o f th i s  type i s  
simply th a t  q u a l i t ie s  occur. There i s ,  fo r  example, a  wet, co ld  q u a lity .
I t  i s  n o t known as  being wet and cold; i t  i s  no t recognized; i t  c a l l s  
fo r th  n e ith e r  memory nor expecta tion . There i s  .just the  wet o r ju s t  the 
sm ell, in  the case o f , say, an o lfac to ry  sensation .
Now these q u a l i t ie s  may cause one to  a c t  in  a  c e r ta in  way, bu t unless
-  37 -
with the sm ell one an tic ip a te d  th a t ac tio n  o r thought o f such ac tio n ,
un less, in  sh o rt, the sm ell re fe rred  back to  something in  the past o r
ahead to  something in  the fu tu re , th e re  was no knowledge o r meaning.
Ihere  was ju s t  a b ru te , q u a li ta tiv e  event.
This i s  the kind o f experience I  am supposing Helen K elle r had p r io r
to  th a t  moment a t  the pump when she learned the name fo r  w ater and thereby
learned th a t  there were names and meanings. Ihere had been (indeed, there
must have been fo r  l i f e  to  survive) q u a l i t ie s ,  movements,■and sa tis fa c to ry
completions of those movements—as in  ea tin g , fo r  example. But th ese , I
am supposing, occurred in  what Dewey c a l ls  a
b ru te ly  s e r ia l  fashion. . . . The sm all, S, i s  replaced (and d is ­
placed) by a f e l t  movement, K, th i s  i s  replaced by the g r a t i f i c a ­
tio n , G. Viewed from w ithout, as  we are  now regarding i t ,  there  i s  
S-K-G. But from w ith in , fo r  i t s e l f ,  i t  is  now S, now G, and so on 
to  the  end o f the chap ter. Nowhere i s  there  looking before and 
a f t e r ; 2 memory and a n tic ip a tio n  a re  not bom . Such an experience 
n e ith e r  i s ,  in  whole o r  in  p a r t, a  knowledge, no r does i t  exercise 
a cognitive  fu n c tio n ,3
So we may suppose th a t  Helen K e lle r had previously  learned to  respond 
to  the w ater from the pump by drinking i t .  But th e re  was ju s t  the w ater 
and the d rink ing , occurring in  a  "b ru te ly  s e r ia l"  fash ion . The w ater did 
no t cause h e r  to  "look ahead" to  the drink ing ; i t  d id  not symbolize i t .
I t  simply ca lled  fo rth  the response o f the d rinking .
I t  i s  only when the q u a li t ie s  o f wet and cold contain in  themselves, 
by way o f a n tic ip a tio n , the drinking and the g ra t i f ic a t io n ,  th a t  signs 
and mind a re  bom . This Helen K eller had not achieved. Apparently she 
had even learned the names o f  some th in g s , but again  in  a b ru te ly  mechan­
ic a l  fash ion , not in  a tru ly  rep resen ta tiv e  fash ion . The w ater caused 
h e r to  make ce rta in  pressures on h e r hand, and presumably she could even,
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a f t e r  receiv ing  these p ressu res, respond ap p ro p ria te ly  by making h e r way 
to  the w ater. But the  pressures themselves did not mean, contain imma- 
nen tly  in  themselves, the w ater i t s e l f .  Not u n t i l  th a t moment a t  the  pump 
did  she learn  th a t and what s igns a re , and thereby become a human being.
So when she learned th a t the  pressure on the  hand was a s ig n , knowl­
edge and mind were bom . She no longer responded to  th ings merely in  
th e i r  immediacy, bu t began to  be capable o f  remembering the past instances 
o f such th ings and a n tic ip a tin g  fu tu re  ones. In  doing so , she began to  
have the  second kind o f  perception  which Dewey recognizes—the perception 
o f the s ig n if ic a tio n  o f q u a l i t ie s .  Now she was ab le  to  a n tic ip a te  the 
ta s te  and the th irst-quench ing  q u a l i t ie s ,  the easy p e n e tra b il ity , the  
coolness o f the w ater ju s t  from the  words sp e lled  out on h e r hand. Ib is  
a n tic ip a tio n  marked an advance to  the le v e l of perception ca lled  s ig n i f i ­
ca tio n . When experience reaches th is  le v e l , Dewey says
q u a li ta tiv e  immediacies cease to  be dumbly rap turous, a  possession 
th a t  i s  obsessive and an incorpora tion  th a t  involves submergence: 
conditions found in  sensation  and passions. They become capable 
o f  survey, contem plation, and id e a l o r  lo g ic a l e labo ra tion ; when 
something can be sa id  o f q u a l i t ie s  they a m  purveyors o f in s tru c ­
tio n ,  , , , Even the dumb pang o f an ache achieves a  s ig n if ic a n t 
ex istence when i t  can be designated and descanted upon; i t  ceases 
to  be merely oppressive and becomes im portan t,^
This passage seems to  me one o f the most r ic h ly  suggestive passages 
in  Dewey*s w ritin g s. I t  i s  an example o f  the  s o r t  of th ing  I  was saying 
in the  In troduction  about the  way in  which Dewey*s account o f experience 
rev ea ls  so much about our experience. He never contents h im self with 
simply recounting the obvious fa c ts  and then try in g  to  fin d  an in te rp re ­
ta t io n  o f  them which w ill  be more d ia le c t ic a l ly  defensib le  than th a t  o f 
some o th e r equally t r i t e  and hackneyed account. He a c tu a lly  dares to
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say something novel.
The notion o f q u a l i t ie s  as being "obsessive" seems to  me esp ec ia lly  
r ic h  in  suggestions as to  what fee lin g  i s  l ik e . "Obsessive" here im plies, 
I  b e liev e , as does "submergence," the re la t iv e  in a b i l i ty  one has o f  escap­
ing from the q u a li t ie s  one i s  fe e lin g . One has a  toothache, but one does 
not know th a t  i t  i s  a toothache and therefo re  does not know what to  do 
about i t .  One i s  submerged in  i t .  Only when signs and th e i r  meanings 
come in to  ex istence i s  i t  possib le  to  escape th is  submergence in  the 
obsessive, "durably rapturous" world o f bare q u a l i t ie s .  Then one can 
compare p resen t experience to  o th e rs , remember what one d id  then, and 
get o u t, "Survey" becomes possib le  and, through i t ,  escape from pain .
An experience I  once had, which I  have a lready  re fe rre d  to , i l l u s ­
t r a te s  th is  notion o f  the "submergence" and re la t iv e  im p o ssib ility  o f 
escape th a t  ch arac te rizes  fe e lin g . While I  was a sleep  e a r ly  one morning, 
the a i r  in  my bedroom had become permeated with a th ic k , smoky, sulphuric 
content given o f f ,  presumably, by some old so f t coal th a t the ja n i to r  had 
decided to  use, I  s le p t  in  the midst o f th is  g h astly , dangerous p o llu ­
tio n  fo r  I  do not know how long before I  woke gasping and coughing, I  
suddenly re a liz e d  I  had been breathing and ta s t in g  th is  "gook" fo r  some 
tim e, bu t w ithout, o f  course, even th ink ing  of the  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f escap­
ing from i t .  The moment I  woke up, o f course, I  threw the  window open 
and breathed the wonderfully fresh  Chicago a i r  from o u ts id e . ( I  never 
thought I  would find  Chicago a i r  re fresh in g ly  c lea n .)  Now as  I  lay  there  
in  the  midst o f  th a t  s tu f f ,  I  believe I  was perceiving purely in  the mode 
o f  what Dewey c a l l s  fe e lin g . I  was su ffe rin g , and I  was perhaps coughing,
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but I  had no idea th a t I  was su ffe rin g  o r coughing o r what I  was s u ffe r­
ing . I  was dumbly and obsessively  immersed in  a s e t  o f q u a l i t ie s ,  and, 
since I  was not conscious, which only e x is ts  when meanings a re  given to  
q u a l i t ie s ,  I  was not capable o f  in te rp re tin g  those q u a li t ie s  o r  o f doing 
anything to  escape from them. When I  woke, when mind and capacity  fo r  
naming and grasping meanings returned  to my experience, my f i r s t  e f fo r t  
was to  charac te rize  these q u a l i t ie s  I  was experiencing. To the dumb, 
an im al-like  absorption in  them which characterized  my e a r l i e r  experience 
( fe e lin g ) , they were n e ith e r  sm elled, breathed, seen, f e l t ,  heard, due 
to  in te rn a l o r ex te rn a l causes; they ju s t  were. But consciousness imme­
d ia te ly  c la s s if ie d : "I'm  breath ing  i t ;  i t ' s  in the a i r , "  and then en te r­
ta ined  possib le courses o f action  to  escape th is  oppression: (a) run out
o f the apartment immediately; (b) throw open the window; (c) t r y  another 
room, perhaps i t ' s  only in  th is  one; and so on.
When q u a li t ie s  begin to  be in te rp re te d , when signs and meanings come 
in to  ex istence , the world begins to  become organized in to  o b jec ts . Whereas 
before i t  was a  swimming mass o f "blooming, buzzing" q u a l i t ie s ,  without 
ch arac te r o r  s ig n ifican ce , now some o f those q u a li t ie s  become separated 
o f f  and form ob jec ts . In  the case o f  Helen K e lle r 's  experience, a s e t  
of q u a l i t ie s  became, through the acq u is itio n  o f a  meaning, a bucket o f 
w ater, a  b e l l ,  my teacher, the porch, and so on. And they were thus 
formed in to  ob jects in  th a t  they came to  s ig n ify  what could be done with 
them and what one could expect from them. An ob ject i s  p rec ise ly  th a t:  
the  s ig n if ic a tio n  o f a  s e t  o f q u a l i t ie s  with regard to  fu tu re  e v e n tu a litie s .
But, a f t e r  a time, some o f these  fu tu re  e v e n tu a litie s  th a t  a  s e t  o f
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q u a l i t ie s  lik e  those o f  w ater had previously  s ig n if ie d  come to  be imme­
d ia te ly  apprehended as p a r t o f those q u a l i t ie s .  This, too , o f course 
must have happened to  Miss K e lle r . She came to  experience the ta s te ,  
the  th irst-quench ing  q u a lity , e tc ,  o f the  w ater, no longer as ind ica ted  
o r  re fe rred  to  by the given q u a l i t ie s ,  but as  a c tu a lly  contained in  them. 
Such perception , as  we have seen, Dewey c a l l s  perception o f the sense o f 
a  s e t  o f  q u a l i t ie s .
The sense o f  a  s e t  o f  q u a l i t ie s  i s  inheren t in  i t  and is  grasped 
immediately. But th is  occurs, I  take Dewey to  m aintain,"’ only in  contexts 
o f inqu iry . In such a  con tex t, the th in g , which i s  a  s e t  o f q u a l i t ie s  
w ith a  sense, i t s e l f  s ig n if ie s  some new, a n tic ip a te d  e v en tu a lity , l ik e ,  
in  the case o f w ater perceived in  the mode o f  sense, giv ing some o f th is  
to  a  person one knows i s  very th i r s ty .  The q u a l i t ie s ,  plus t h e i r  imme­
d ia te ly  contained sense, s ig n ify  an ac tio n  n o t i t s e l f  p a r t o f the  essence 
o f  w ater. So what was before awareness ju s t  o f presented m ate ria l i t s e l f  
has now matured, through experience and consequent "funded" meanings, in to  
awareness o f ob jects  themselves as  s ig n ify in g  possib le  e v e n tu a litie s .
Now Dewey*s view o f  fee lin g  i s  s im ila r  to  th a t  which some philosophers 
have o f what they  c a l l  immediate knowledge o r  knowledge by acquaintance. 
These philosophers, however, claim  th a t  th i s  most elementary kind o f 
awareness i s  a  cognitive  kind o f awareness, th a t  in  i t  we a re  knowing 
the  world. R ussell i s  an example o f  a philosopher who holds th i s  view. 
Consider the following passage from h is  Problems o f Philosophy»
We s h a l l  say we have acquaintance with anything o f which we 
a re  d ire c t ly  aware, w ithout the interm ediary o f any process o f 
in ference o r any knowledge o f  t ru th s . Thus in  the  presence of
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my ta b le  I  am acquainted with the sense-data  th a t  make up the 
appearance o f my ta b le —i t s  co lour, shape, hardness, smoothness, 
e t c . ;  a l l  these  a re  th ings o f  which I  am immediately conscious 
when I  am seeing and touching my ta b le . The p a r t ic u la r  shade o f 
co lour th a t  I  am seeing may have many th ings sa id  about i t —I may 
say th a t  i t  i s  brown, th a t  i t  i s  r a th e r  dark, and so on. But such 
sta tem en ts, though they make me know tru th s  about the co lour, do 
n o t make me know the co lour i t s e l f  any b e t te r  than I  d id  beforei 
so f a r  as concerns knowledge o f  the co lour i t s e l f ,  as  opposed to  
knowledge o f tru th s  about i t ,  I  know the  colour p e rfe c tly  and com­
p le te ly  when I  see l t .°  and no fu r th e r  knowledge o f i t  i t s e l f  i s  
even th e o re tic a lly  po ssib le . Thus the sense-data  which make up 
the appearance o f  my ta b le  a re  th ings with which I  have acquain t­
ance, th ings immediately known to  me ju s t  a s  they a r e .7
So, fo r  R u sse ll, the q u a l i t ie s  which we a re  immediately aware o f  in  
our experience a re  known. Dewey d isagrees w ith th i s .  He adm its, as  we 
have seen, th a t  th e re  i s  a  stage  in  our experience in  which c e r ta in  b ru te , 
dumb q u a l i t ie s  a re  p resen t. But he denies th a t we know, o r  a re  even con­
scious o f , these  q u a l i t ie s .  For him, we simply have them; they are  p resen t.
There a re  sev era l reasons why Dewey takes th is  view, and I  would lik e  
now to  in d ic a te  what they a re .
F i r s t ,  th e re  i s  the testim ony o f  a  c a re fu l look a t  the fa c ts  them­
se lv e s , the  s o r t  o f  method some philosophers c a l l  "phenomenology," and
Q
which Dewey c a l l s  the  "em pirical, deno tative  method." Dewey th inks th a t  
philosophers l ik e  R usse ll, who th ink  o f  our i n i t i a l  o r  most elem entary 
perception  o f r e a l i ty  as being a kind o f knowledge, a re  simply not look­
ing  a t  experience, but a re  ra th e r  m anipulating a b s tra c t  concepts. I f  one 
looks a t  the  f a c ts ,  Dewey says, he w il l  fin d  th a t  we have constan tly  a  
k ind o f  perception  which i s  to ta l ly  non-cognitive. Every time we respond 
to  a  stim ulus, which we do in  much o f our l iv in g , we a re  perceiving in  
th i s  non-cognitive way these  elem entary s e n se -q u a litie s  which R ussell 
th in k s  o f  a s  being known by us. As I  w rite  on th is  paper, f o r  example,
-  43 -
I  am responding to  f e l t ,  white sen se -q u a litie s  which a c t  a s  s tim u li to  ray 
w ritin g ; hut I  am no t aware o f  them a s  q u a li t ie s  in  a  knowing sense. I
simply have them. I  simply respond to  them qua s tim u li. But i f  I  r e f le c t
on what has been happening a s  I  w rite  th i s ,  then I  do become aware o f  the 
stim ulus, but no longer qua stim ulus, f o r  I  am no longer responding. Now 
the stim ulus i s  bracketed; we should perhaps put the  word in  quotes. For 
i t  i s  now lik e  mentioning a  word as opposed to  using i t .
Philosophers lik e  R u sse ll, who claim th a t  cognition i s  involved even
in  th is  most elem entary kind o f perception , a re  g u il ty  o f importing th e i r  
a t t i tu d e ,  as engaged in re f le c t iv e  a n a ly s is , back in to  the o r ig in a l exper­
ience. In re f le c tin g  on the  stim ulus and our response to  i t ,  we of course 
know i t .  But t h i s  was n o t the  way in  which i t  was o r ig in a lly  perceived.
What Dewey i s  suggesting with regard  to  the proper way to  discover, 
what our experience i s  l ik e  a t  th is  le v e l o f most elementary perception 
can perhaps be c la r i f ie d  by considering an account which i s  s im ila r  in  
some re sp ec ts , v iz . ,  th a t  o f  S a rtre  in  Transcendence o f the  Ego. In  th is  
essay S a rtre  i s  concerned w ith the question  o f  what s ta tu s  the ego o r I  
has in  our experience, and he claims th a t i t  i s  n o t presen t a t  a l l  in  
c e r ta in  kinds o f experience which we have, v iz . ,  what he c a l l s  "unre­
f le c te d  consciousness" o f  the  world, "When I  run a f t e r  a s t r e e tc a r ,  when 
I  look a t  the tim e, when I  am absorbed in  contem plating a  p o r t r a i t ,  th e re  
i s  no I .  There i s  consciousness o f  th e  s tree tca r-h av in g -to -b e-o v ertak en . 
e t c . , "  bu t no consciousness o f  the ego o r I  to  which th is  s t r e e tc a r  might 
be presumed to  be appearing. I t  is  the a c t o f re f le c tio n  upon th a t  o rig ­
in a l ,  n o n -re flec tiv e  experience of th e  s t r e e tc a r  which g ives r i s e  to  the
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I  o r ego, S a rtre  says. But there  i s  a lso  a  mode o f access to  the o rig in a l
experience as i t  was liv e d . This, S a rtre  says, i s  possib le  because o f  a
"n o n -re flec tiv e  memory" which i s  l e f t  o f  i t  in  our consciousness. This
kind of "n o n -re flec tiv e  apprehension" shows us what experience was ac tu -
q
a l ly  l ik e ,  whereas " re f le c tio n  m odifies the spontaneous consciousness,"7
S im ila rly , Dewey i s  arguing th a t  the kind o f r e f le c t iv e  an a ly s is  upon 
our experience which philosophers lik e  R ussell engage in  p ro jec ts  in to  the 
o rig in a l experience an element th a t  was no t th e re  a t  a l l ,  v iz . ,  cogn ition .
To recover experience as  i t  was o r ig in a lly  liv e d , th e re fo re , i t  i s  no t 
enough ju s t  to  look a t  i t{  one must look a t  i t  in  the r ig h t  way. In the 
case o f  the  paper on which I  am w ritin g , th is  involves no t looking a t  how 
the paper appears to  me now as I  am engaged in  re f le c tin g  on i t  in  r e la ­
tio n  to  a  problem in to  the so lu tio n  o f which i t  en ters  as  a  datum, but
ra th e r  to  look a t  th is  "n o n -re flec tiv e  memory" o f the o r ig in a l perception 
which p e r s is ts  a f t e r  the experience i t s e l f  has ended.
A second reason why Dewey denies th a t  fe e lin g  i s  cognitive  i s  th a t
i t  i s  (and th is  i s  tru e  even fo r  R ussell) the presence o f q u a li t ie s  s tand­
ing alone and in  re la tio n  to  nothing e lse ;  not even in  re la tio n  to  them­
se lv e s , But cognition i s  always a  re la tio n a l kind o f consciousness. One 
cannot s tand  in  a  know ledge-relatlon to  q u a l i t ie s  which a re  not themselves 
re la te d  to  o ther q u a l i t ie s  o r  to  e v e n tu a litie s  which they suggest. I f  
nothing e ls e , knowledge involves re la t in g  th is  o r  these blue q u a lia  to  
the word "b lue." But n o t even th a t  is  involved in  th is  most elementary 
kind of perception . Q u a litie s  simply a re , to ta l ly  w ithout re la tio n s . To 
be, a s  R ussell says he i s  in the passage quoted above, "immediately conscious"
o f the co lo r, shape, e tc ,  o f  the ta b le , w ithout re la tin g  them even to  
the word "co lo r,"  "shape," e tc ,  i s  not to  know, but simply to  have.*®
F in a lly , Dewey argues th a t  the view th a t  even the most p rim itive  
kind o f  perception i s  cognition o r knowledge leads to  idealism ,** I f  
we assume, with R ussell and so many o ther philosophers, th a t  the most 
prim itive kind of presented m ateria l i s  in  any sense cognized, we a re  
caught in  the Cartesian tra p  o f an encapsulated s e l f  which cannot ever 
find  a  ground fo r b e liev ing  in  the existence o f o ther th ings than i t s e l f .  
D escartes, i t  w ill be remembered, held th a t a l l  p resen ta tions o f q u a li­
t ie s  a re  cognitions, ob jects  o f  thought. And, having assumed th i s ,  he 
had upon h is  hands, and bequeathed to  those o f subsequent th in k e rs , the 
monumental task  o f ju s tify in g  our common-sense b e l ie f  th a t  we a re  aware 
o f a world th a t l i e s  outside o f, and i s  independent o f, our own minds.
Dewey th inks th a t  one can never succeed in  showing the p o s s ib il i ty
o f a  cognition o f the ex te rn a l world (the  problem o f what i s  to  him an
unnecessary d isc ip lin e  ca lled  "epistemology"—unnecessary because, as
we s h a ll  see, i t  i s  founded on a  fa lse  assumption) i f  he s t a r t s  with
the assumption th a t a l l  presented m ate ria l, a l l  q u a li t ie s  which in  any
sense "appear" to  us, a re  cognized o r known. In an in te re s tin g  analogy
which he uses in a very d i f f i c u l t  essay ca lled  "Naive vs. P resen tative
12Realism," in  Essays in  Experimental Logic, Dewey says th a t  the  p h ilo s­
opher who argues fo r  realism  ( th a t we are  aware o f an independently e x is t ­
ing w orld), but who begins with the assumption th a t each o f our percep­
tio n s  o r  sensations i s  "an in t r in s ic  case o f knowledge o r o f presen ta­
tion  to  a  mind o r knower . . . l e t s  the nose of the id e a l i s t  camel in to
-  i*6 -
the te n t .  He has then no g re a t cause fo r  su rp rise  when the  camel comes
13in and devours the  te n t ."
What Dewey means, I  b e liev e , i s  th i s .  I f  we assume th a t ,  fo r  example, 
the ra ilro a d  track s  as convergent and the ra ilro a d  track s  as p a ra l le l  (o r 
the pencil a s  one and the pencil as doubled) a re  ob jects  o f thought occur­
rin g  in s id e  a  mind o r, in  some sense, to  a  knower, then the problem of 
deciding which cognition o r opinion i s  co rre c t i s  incapable o f so lu tio n .
For we have nothing to  turn  to  to  t e s t  one o r another o f  them save another 
cognition . But how do we know th a t th is  l a t e s t  cognition o r  opinion has 
anything to  do w ith re a l i ty ?
But a l l  o f th i s  i s  unnecessary, Dewey says, because our most prim i­
tiv e  kind o f presented m ateria l i s  not cognitive a t  a l l .  I t  i s  a  re a l  
event in. na tu re . The co lo r- , sound-, shape-, e tc , - q u a l i t ie s  which con­
s t i tu t e  my experience a t  i t s  most p rim itive  le v e l ( v iz . ,  fee lin g ) are  
outside  mind and cognition to  s t a r t  w ith . They a re  not opinions about 
or p u ta tiv e  cognitions "of" n a tu re , which we then have to  prove "corre­
spond to" n a tu re . They a re  p a rt of na tu re .
There i s ,  then , a  kind o f  overlapping o f the world o f nature and 
the world o f perception  in  the  event c a lled  fe e lin g —i . e . ,  the  bare pres­
en ta tion  o f un in te rp re ted  q u a l i t ie s .  In  the essay, "The Experimental
i h
Theory o f  Knowledge" in  The Influence o f  Darwin on Philosophy. Dewey 
puts i t  th is  wayt
To be a  sm ell (o r  anything e lse ) i s  one th in g , to  be known as sm ell, 
another; to  be a  "feeling" one th in g , to  be known as a  " fe e lin g ,"  
another. The f i r s t  i s  thinghoodj ex istence in d u b itab le , d ir e c t ,  . , • 
The second i s  re f le c te d  being, th ings in d ic a tin g  and c a ll in g  fo r  
o th e r th in g s—something o ffering  the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f tru th  and hence 
o f  f a l s i ty .
-  if? -
And in  the rep ly  to  R u sse ll 's  c r itic ism s  in  the Schilpp volume, Dewey 
answers R u sse ll 's  remarks about Dewey's view o f  th ings an s ich  o r in  
themselves as  follow s: Things in  our d ir e c t ly  had experience (fee lin g )
a re  events, a re  th in g s-in - th ea se lv e s . And these th in g s , f a r  from being 
unknowable, are  the m ate ria l which, when a  s i tu a tio n  becomes problem atic, 
"produce p rec ise ly  th a t  which i s  to  be known by being inquired  in to ,"
Now to  ta lk  about what we d ir e c t ly  experience o r  fe e l  a s  being th ings 
in  themselves may seem to  commit Dewey to  a  kind o f idealism  with fe e lin g - 
experiences as  those to  which idea-experiences must conform—both o f these 
types o f  experience nevertheless  being experience and th e re fo re  " id e a l,"  
But such a  c r itic ism  would f a i l  to  take aocount o f  Dewey's view th a t a t  
the  le v e l o f  fe e lin g , event and experience a re  one. F e lt q u a l i t ie s ,  a s  
I  haw  been try in g  to  argue above, a re  no t occurrences "in  a  mind," bu t 
a re  re a l  events in na tu re .
This overlapping o f experience and nature  in fee lin g  helps to  explain  
Dewey's contention in  the  "In troduction" to  Experience and Nature th a t 
experience i s  both "in" nature and "of" n a tu re . ^  And i t  i s ,  in  Dewey's 
view, the only way th a t  we can avoid the  impossible ta sk  o f epistemology 
—to  show th a t  the mind can have knowledge o f , o r access to ,  r e a l i ty .
For we do n o t begin, in  in q u iry , with "ideas" in  our mindsi we begin w ith 
events which a re  re a l presented m a te ria l.
17The epistem ological problem a ro se , Dewey b e liev es , because i t  was
assumed th a t  what i s  " 'g iv e n ' in  a  prim ary, o r ig in a l  way" i s  mental in
n a tu re . Consequently, the fa c ts  about
genuine primary experience, in which n a tu ra l [non-m ental] th ings 
a re  the  determining fa c to rs  o f a l l  change, were regarded e i th e r  a s
-  4 8  -
not-given dubious th ings th a t  could be leached only by endowing the 
only c e r ta in  th in g , the  m ental, with some miraculous power, o r  e lse  
were denied a l l  ex istence  save a s  complexes o f mental s ta te s ,  o f  
im pressions, sen sa tio n s , fe e lin g s .
Not to  recognize, then , th is  con tinu ity  o f experience in  general and
perception in  p a r t ic u la r  w ith n a tu ra l events, no t to  see th a t in  fee lin g
perception and event overlap  and experience i s  both in  and o f  n a tu re , has
led  to  the dualism according to  which the "universe i s  s p l i t  in to  two
18separa te  and disconnected realms o f ex is ten ce ."  To assume th a t  these
two realm s, "one psych ical and the o ther p h ysica l, . . .  in  s p i te  o f
th e i r  to t a l  d is ju n c tio n  s p e c if ic a lly  and m inutely correspond to  each
19o th er . . . p resen ts the acme o f in c re d ib i l i ty ."
Such a  dualism p o s tu la te s  a  m iracle to  account f o r  knowledge, v iz . ,
the "m iracle o f a  mind th a t  g e ts  outside  i t s e l f  to  lay  i t s  ghostly  hands
20upon the  th ings o f  an ex te rn a l w orld." There i s  a  k ind  o f "Deus ex
Machina, whose mechanism i s  preserved a  sec re t"  which i s  assumed by the
"transcendental ep istem ologist" to  account fo r  the way in  which "mental
21s ta te s  g e t o b jec tive  re fe ren ce ,"
Both id e a l is ts  and p resen ta tiv e  r e a l i s t s  s t a r t  w ith the  assumption 
th a t  a l l  appearances, a l l  p resen ta tions a re  p resen ta tio n s  to  a conscious­
ness o r  a  knower. They assume, th a t  i s ,  th a t  we begin with appearances 
which may o r may not have anything to  do with the world as  i t  i s  in  i t s e l f .  
The id e a l i s t  concludes th a t  we can have no knowledge o f  the world in  i t ­
s e l f ,  th a t  indeed we cannot possib ly  have any evidence o f  the ex istence  
o f  such a  world, since  a l l  our evidence i s  n ece ssa rily  o f  ideas in  our 
own minds. The p resen ta tiv e  r e a l i s t  concludes th a t  through the ideas in 
our minds we can somehow, m iraculously, o f  course, in  Dewey’s view, come
- i t .9 -
to  have knowledge o f  the world in  i t s e l f ,  Dewey c a l l s  h is  own view a  kind 
o f naive rea lism , since fo r  him, a s  we have seen, what i s  d ire c t ly  p re­
sented i s  i t s e l f  r e a l ,  n o t id e a l a t  a l l ,  although i t  i s  necessary to  make
22c e r ta in  d is tin c tio n s  among these  re a l  th in g s .
For Dewey, the  episteraological question—i . e . ,  the question whether 
presented q u a l i t ie s  have th is  a p p l ic a b i l i ty  o r  correspondence to  the re a l 
world—a r is e s  only because o f the fa ls e  assumption th a t  a l l  appearances 
o r  p resen ta tio n s  a re  cognized. I f  we recognize th a t  th e re  a re  fe e lin g s , 
and th a t  these a re  not cognitions but r e a l  occurrences o r  events, then the 
epistem ological problem never a r i s e s .  We are  in  the  world to  begin w ith.
The re a liz a tio n  th a t  appearances o r  p resen ta tio n s  a re  re a l  occur­
rences a lso  so lves the problem o f the r e l a t iv i ty  of sense-perception—i . e . ,  
the problem o f how one o b jec t can appear in  many d if f e r e n t  ways to  many 
d if fe re n t  observers, and to  d if fe re n t  po in ts  o f  view of any one observer. 
For since  these p resen ta tio n s  a re  p e rfe c tly  n a tu ra l and r e a l  events occur­
ring  in  n a tu ra l th ings c a lle d  organisms, they admit o f the same explana­
tio n  a s  the r e la t iv i ty  o f  appearances upon the film  in  a  camera, fo r  
example. Nobody i s  su rp rised  a t  the d iffe ren ces  in  the appearances o f 
an o b jec t from the  d if f e r e n t  po in ts  o f  view o f  the same camera, because 
th is  i s  ju s t  the  way a  n a tu ra l o b jec t e f fe c ts  changes in  ano ther o b jec t 
under varying cond itions. But the convergence o f the  p resen ta tions o r
appearances o f  the th ing in  us "follow s from the  physical p ro p ertie s  o f 
23l ig h t  and a  le n s ,"  ju s t  a s  i t  does in  the  case o f  a  camera. And i t  i s  
su b jec t to  the same p e rfe c tly  n a tu r a l i s t ic  exp lanation .
We seem to  see convergent ra ilro a d  track s  and the  camera re g is te r s
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converging tracks on i t s  film . And the physical exp lanation , in  terms 
o f  the behavior o f  l ig h t  ray s , app lies  in  the case o f the eye ju s t  as i t  
does in  th a t  o f the camera. The problem o f r e la t iv i ty  a r is e s  only i f  we 
assume th a t the various appearances o f the ra ilro a d  tra c k s , e t c . ,  a re  not 
r e a l  events, but appearances to  a  mind o r a  knower. I f  we assume in s te ad , 
as the em p irica lly  observed fa c ts  suggest to  us anyway, th a t  the presen­
ta tio n s  a re  a l l  r e a l  events in  n a tu re , re su ltin g  from the in te ra c tio n  o f  
an organism and i t s  environment, then a l l  the p resen ta tions a re  re a l  and 
the  only question i s  which appearance i s  most f r u i t f u l  fo r  our purposes.
I s  i t  more f r u i t f u l ,  fo r  example, to  regard, the track s  as p a ra l le l  o r as 
convergent? And i f  one’s in te r e s t  i s  in  tra v e lin g  along them in  a t r a in ,  
f o r  example, the assumption o f th e i r  being p a ra l le l  i s  the b e t te r  one.
But th is  does not imply th a t the p resen ta tion  o f the  track s  a s  convergent 
i s  "mental"? i t  simply im plies th a t  the  assumption o f them a s  convergent, 
on the b a s is  o f the  p e rfe c tly  re a l  and n a tu ra l event o f convergent-track-  
p re sen ta tio n , i s  no t the more usefu l assumption.
The an a ly s is  given here o f  Dewey's view o f what he c a l l s  fee lin g  i s  
based on h is  work up to  and including Experience and Nature, which was 
published in  1925. From Essays in  Experimental Logic to  Experience and 
Nature he seems to  have taken the view I  have presented above. But in  
an a r t i c l e  published in  1930» ca lled  "Q ualita tive  'Thought" (rep rin ted  in  
Experience. Nature, and Freedom, ed ited  by B ernstein , L ibera l Arts P ress) , 
and in  Logic? The Theory o f Inqu iry , published in  1935» Dewey's view has 
changed s ig n if ic a n tly .
In Experience and Nature and e a r l ie r  works, a s  we have seen, Dewey
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held th a t fe e lin g  i s  the  alm ost to ta l ly  non-cognitive presence o f unin­
te rp re te d , meaningless q u a l i t ie s .  Any in te rp re ta tio n  such q u a li t ie s  may 
l a t e r  receive i s  a l a t e r  a d d itio n , occurring a f t e r  they cease to  be merely 
f e l t .  They a re  dumb, c h a ra c te r- le s s , unlocated, and submerged. But in  
Logic and in  "Q ualita tive  Thought," Dewey uses the term "fee ling" to  r e f e r  
to  a  mode o f awareness in  which one g rasps, o r a t  le a s t  has a  hunch, as 
to  the meaning of a s i tu a tio n . I f  a person su ffe rs  an in s u l t  and becomes 
angry, there  i s  a q u a lity  o f, l e t  us say, obnoxiousness th a t  pervades 
every movement o f  the person who has in su lte d  him, and every person, th ing , 
and occurrence in  the  s itu a tio n  i s  pervaded with a  c e r ta in  "tone, co lo r, 
and q u a lity "  which th i s  in s u lt  has produced. Or, l e t  us suppose, to  take 
ano ther example of th i s  pervasive q u a lity  which colors a  s itu a tio n  and 
makes i t  what i t  i s ,  th a t  one comes back to  h is  apartm ent, fin d s  the door 
thrown open, drawers pulled  o u t, c lo thes and books ly ing  around in  to ta l  
d isa rra y , and c e r ta in  th ings m issing. He then comes to  perceive the s i t u ­
a tio n  as  pervaded by a  q u a lity  o f  having-been-robbed. This q u a lity  co lors 
the to t a l  world o f th ings experienced. Everything is  seen in  the l ig h t  
o f  th is  pervasive q u a li ty . O bjects out o f  p lace , e t c . ,  a re  a l l  viewed 
from the  po in t o f  view o f th is  pervasive hunch—having-been-robbed.
Now such a  pervasive q u a li ty , Dewey says in  "Q ualita tive  Thought," 
i s  f e l t . This kind of awareness i s  l ik e  th a t  re fe rre d  to  by the  word 
in tu i t io n ,  a s  th a t  word i s  sometimes used in  popular usage. For i t  re fe rs  
to  a
s in g le  q u a lita tiv e n ess  underlying a l l  the  d e ta i ls  o f  e x p l ic i t
reasoning. I t  may be re la t iv e ly  dumb and In a r t ic u la te  and y e t
penetra ting j unexpressed in  d e f in ite  ideas which form reasons
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and ju s t i f ic a t io n s  and y e t profoundly r ig h t ,  , . , R eflection  and 
ra tio n a l e laboration  sp ring  from and make e x p l ic i t  a  p r io r  in tu it io n  
[o r  fe e lin g ] , , , , Thinking and th eo riz in g  about physical m atters 
s e t  out from an in tu i t io n ,  and re f le c tio n  about a f f a i r s  o f l i f e  and 
mind co n sis t in  an id e a tio n a l and conceptual transform ation o f what 
begins as an in tu it io n . In tu i t io n , in  sh o r t, s ig n if ie s  the r e a l i ­
zation  o f  a  pervasive q u a li ty  such th a t i t  reg u la tes  the determina­
tio n  o f  re lev an t d is t in c tio n s  o r  o f  whatever, whether in  the way of 
terms or re la tio n s , becomes the accepted o b jec t o f th o u g h t,^
These fee lin g s  o r  hunches o r  in tu itio n  o f  pervasive q u a l i t ie s ,  Dewey
says, "have a  cognitive im port," Even such a seemingly innocuous remark
as " 'G oodl' may mark a  deep apprehension o f the q u a lity  o f  a  piece o f
ac tin g  on the s tag e , o f a deed performed, or o f  a  p ic tu re  in  i t s  wealth
o f c o n te n t ." ^
So i t  i s  on the basis  o f  a  previously f e l t  s itu a tio n  th a t one i s  
ab le  to  make the sp ec if ic  and e x p lic i t  a c ts  of perception which, Dewey 
th in k s , a re  the only kinds o f  perception which philosophers have gener­
a l ly  recognized. Most philosophers, th a t i s ,  th in k  of perception as 
being b a s ic a lly  awareness o f  s p e c if ic , iso la ted  o b jec ts , Dewey, on the 
co n tra ry , th inks th e re  must f i r s t  be the to ta l  q u a li ta t iv e  s i tu a tio n , 
which i s  no t perceived o r thought, but f e l t  o r " in tu ite d ,"  on the basis  
o f  which these sp e c if ic , e x p l ic i t  perceptions can be made. But i f  f e e l­
ing can grasp a q u a lity  lik e  having-been-robbed o r  of a  p e rfec t a c tin g  
ren d itio n  o f  the p a r t o f, l e t  us say, some crabbed old man, fee lin g  is  
now being seen as capable o f  grasping the meaning o f a s ta te  o f a f f a i r s ,  
an accomplishment e x p lic i t ly  denied to  i t  in  the e a r l i e r  works re fe rre d  
to  above.
The view th a t re f le c tio n  (and th e re fo re , o f  course, perception as 
awareness o f s ig n if ic a tio n , th i s  a r is in g  only a f t e r  re f le c tio n )  occurs
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always ag a in s t a  background o f  th ings and ob jec ts  o f  the p ra c tic a l , 
common-sense world—th is  view can be found even in the e a r l ie r  works.
The context o f the perception o f the apartment as having been broken 
in to  and robbed, fo r  example, i s  not a s e t  o f  b ru te , un in te rp re ted  qual­
i t i e s ,  but a whole s e t  o f common-sense ob jects standing in  a re la tio n  to  
each o th e r. Thought and perception cannot occur simply on the b asis  of 
f e l t  q u a l i t ie s  which a re  to ta l ly  devoid o f meaning. I t  i s  necessary th a t 
there  be a lready  some kind o f meaning in  the s itu a tio n  on the b a s is  of 
which to  understand the s itu a tio n  as being one o f having been robbed, or 
as fin e  a c tin g , o r a s  whatever. The "stream of existence" o r o f b ru te ,
c h a rac te r-le ss  q u a li t ie s  " is  no sooner regarded than i t s  to ta l  incapacity
27to  o f f ic ia te  as m ateria l condition and cue o f thought appears."
So, in  these e a r l i e r  works as w ell Dewey th inks o f  inqu iry  as occur­
ring  in  a  context o f a lready  meaningful ob jects  and s i tu a tio n s , funded 
products o f much previous inqu iry . But in  these  works Dewey tended to  
th ink o f the awareness o f  the background involved in  inqu iry  as a  per­
ception o f the sense o f a  s e t  o f q u a l i t ie s .  He even uses an example in  
Experience and Nature which c lo se ly  resembles h is  examples in  the essay, 
"Q ualita tive  Thought":
When we a re  b a ffled  by perplexing conditions, and f in a l ly  h i t  upon 
a  clew, and everything fla ils  in to  p lace , the whole th ing  suddenly, 
as  we say, "makes sense ."  . . . The meaning o f the whole s itu a tio n  
a s  apprehended is  sense. Hie idiom atic usage o f the word sense 
[whereby a  whole s itu a tio n  makes sense, becomes organized by a  cer­
ta in  s ig n ifican ce ] i s  much n earer the em pirical fa c ts  than i s  the 
ordinary  r e s tr ic t io n  o f the word in  psychological l i te r a tu r e  to  a 
sin g le  recognized q u a lity , lik e  sweet o r re d .28
But i t  i s  understandable th a t  Dewey should l a t e r  have come to  regard 
awareness o f sense as a  kind of fe e lin g . For they do both share the
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f being immediate and o f forming the background fo r  the  
mediated perception th a t  occurs in  e x p lic i t  inqu iry . In a t  le a s t  one 
passage in  Experience and Nature he seems to  th ink  of them as being in te r ­
changeable. "The la rg e r  system o f meaning su ffu ses , in te rp e n e tra te s ,
co lo rs  what i s  now and here uppermostj i t  g ives them sense, fe e lin g , a s
29d is t in c t  from s ig n if ic a t io n ,"  7 N evertheless, i t  seems to  me i t  would 
have made h is  view much c le a re r  i f  he had always kept these two notions 
d is t in c t .
I  believe the  l a t e r  works, exem plified by the  essay , "Q ualita tive  
Thought," do po in t to  a  d iffe ren ce  in  emphasis anyway in  Dewey's view o f 
perception . In  these l a t e r  works, th a t  i s ,  Dewey emphasizes th a t  per­
ception as a  cogn itive , r e f le c t iv e  occurrence always takes place ag a in s t 
a  background in  which a  le s s  e x p l ic i t ly  r e f le c t iv e  kind o f thought has 
been going on. I  could no t have perceived as  a  r e s u l t  o f  inqu iry  th a t  
the  sounds I  had grasped the  sense o f as  being sounds, coming from out­
s id e . being obnoxious, e t c .—I  could n o t have perceived them as  being 
produced by a  saw cu ttin g  down a  tre e  i f  th e re  had not a lready  been a 
to t a l  q u a li ta t iv e  s itu a tio n  with a  pervasive sense.
Dewey a lso  uses, in  the l a t e r  works re fe rre d  to , the  term " te r t ia r y  
q u a lity "  fo r  what he sometimes c a l l s  sense. But c le a r ly  the  awareness 
o f  such a  pervasive q u a lity  as having-been-robbed o r superb-acting- 
performance. although i t  does have immediacy and p re - re f le c tiv e  s ta tu s  
in  some in s tan ces , i s  an awareness o f a  meaning ra th e r  than o f  the  b ru te ly  
given ex istence  which a  co lo r o r  a  shape has. And i t  cannot, th e re fo re , 
be sa id , i t  seems to  me, to  be f e l t , a t  le a s t  in  the  e a r l i e r  sense in
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which Dewey used th a t  term.
What seems to  me responsib le  fo r  th i s  change in  use o f  terminology
from sense to  fee lin g  i s  a  fa i lu re  on Dewey's p a r t to  d is tin g u ish  two
kinds o f perception we have, both o f which may be sa id  to  be awarenesses
o f  pervasive q u a l i t ie s .  The f i r s t  o f  these he d iscusses in  Logic> The 
30Theory o f  In q u iry . Here he says th e re  i s  a  d iffe ren ce  between sp e c if ic  
q u a l i t ie s  l ik e  red , hard , and sweet, and a  q u a lity  which, following San­
tayana, he c a l l s  a  t e r t i a r y  q u a li ty . Some examples he g ives o f  te r t i a r y  
q u a l i t ie s  a re  d is tre s s in g , perp lexing , ch ee rfu l, d isco n so la te . Let us 
take the q u a lity  o f  ch ee rfu l. Imagine the way in  which one perceives 
the  b r ig h t cheerfu lness o f a  p e rfe c tly  c le a r  day as an example o f  th is  
kind o f  a ll-p e rv a s iv e  q u a lity . Every th ing  and event does indeed seem 
to  be a ffe c te d  by th is  q u a lity  o f b rig h t cheerfu lness, ju s t  a s  on d u l l ,  
gloomy days everything seems a ffe c te d  by the  q u a lity  o f  d u ll gloominess.
Now th i s  b r ig h t cheerfu lness i s  n o t a  q u a li ty  th a t  i s  contained in  
any one moment o f the  day o r  any one o f  the th ings th a t  one encounters.
I t  I s  a q u a li ty  which comes to  "permeate and co lo r a l l  the ob jec ts  and 
events th a t  a re  involved" in  the  experience. The people one meets and 
even physica l ob jec ts  become in fec ted  with the  q u a lity , "A t e r t i a r y  
q u a li ty  q u a l i f ie s  a l l  the co n stitu en ts  to  which i t  a p p lie s  in  a  thorough­
going fash ion .
Now, I t  seems to  me th a t  th is  kind o f a  q u a lity  i s  indeed f e l t .
For i t  a r is e s  spontaneously and p re - re f le c tiv e ly . We do n o t in f e r  th is  
b r ig h t cheerfu lness a s  belonging to  a  day. I t  ju s t  happens. Of course, 
to  use the  term "cheerfu l" i s  to  make an in fe ren ce , to  in te rp re t  the
s i tu a t io n . But p r io r  to  re f le c t io n , one i s  ju s t  confronted w ith a  b r i l ­
l i a n t ,  sunny, cheerfu l day. But such a  q u a lity  has to  be d is tingu ished  
from another s o r t  o f  pervasive q u a lity  which Dewey, in  these  l a t e r  w rit­
in g s , seems to  regard  as  occurring in  the same way. Ihus, in  both Logic 
and "Q u alita tiv e  Thought" he says th a t  sometimes we apprehend the s ig ­
n ifican ce  o r ch arac te r o f a  s i tu a tio n  in  a  kind o f " in tu i t iv e ,"  "hunch"- 
lik e  fbshion, and such an apprehension i s  a lso  a case o f fe e lin g  a  per­
vasive q u a lity . One might, fo r  example, come to  apprehend, a f t e r  a  few 
moments with a  person, th a t  he i s  a  very b i t t e r ,  s p i te fu l  person. And 
th is  q u a lity  would be f e l t  a s  permeating the whole o f  o n e 's  experience 
o f th a t  person. But c le a r ly , to  experience a  person a s  being b i t t e r  o r 
s p i te fu l ,  l ik e  experiencing o n e 's  apartm ent as having been robbed, i s  an 
in fe re n t ia l  kind of experience. I t  i s  g e ttin g  the  sense o f a  s itu a tio n  
and thereby l i f t i n g  i t  out o f  the immediacy o f the  p resen t with a  view 
to  what has been and can be expected w ith re sp ec t to  i t .  Granted, there  
may be such in te rp re ta tio n  and inqu iry  th a t  i s  no t e x p l ic i t ly  so . Never­
th e le s s ,  one i s  here grasping the  meaning o f a  s i tu a t io n ,  no t ju s t  f e e l­
ing i t  as  one fe e ls  a d ay 's  cheerfu lness.
As I  ind ica ted  above, fe e lin g  can be the mere having o f q u a li t ie s
32as a  kind o f "surplusage" which i s  n e ith e r  in te rp re te d  nor reacted  to , 
and i t  can a lso  be the having o f q u a l i t ie s  (w ithout any e x p l ic i t  a tten d an t 
in te rp re ta tio n )  toge ther w ith a h a b itu a l, u n re flec ted  response to  these 
q u a l i t ie s .  I f  a  backwoodsman i s  on h is  way back to  town to  s e l l  the  fu rs  
he has trapped during the week, he w il l  have various kinds o f perception 
along the  way. He w ill  probably fe e l  c e r ta in  q u a l i t ie s  which he w il l
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n e ith e r  re a c t to  nor in te r p r e t .  His gaze w ill  doubtless wander, fo r  
example, over many t r e e s ,  e t c . ,  along the way, th ings which a re  on the 
frin g e  o f h is  percep tual f ie ld  and which he w il l  not even respond to , 
much le s s  in te rp re t .  But he w ill  respond to  some c lu s te rs  o f  q u a l i t ie s .  
When, fo r  example, he comes to  a  p o in t where the  path he has been on 
ends and he must make h is  way through v irg in  fo re s t  in  order to  g e t to  
the nex t path , he w ill  respond to  c e r ta in  c lu s te r s  o f  t re e -q u a l i t ie s  
and o th e r q u a li t ie s  which he has learned (having taken th is  route  count­
le s s  times before) as  in d ic a tio n s  a s  to  how to  proceed. But he w ill  not 
have to  stop and r e f le c t  about these  q u a l i t ie s .  He has been through a l l  
th a t  severa l times in  the p a s t and h is  reac tio n s  a re  now autom atic. He 
probably does no t even th ink  about i t  a t  a l l ,  anymore than we th ink  about 
the c lu tch  and the s t i c k - s h i f t  before going from f i r s t  to  second gear.
Now the fee lin g  o f  these  q u a l i t ie s  and the  immediate reaction  to
them Dewey does sometimes c a l l  perception . Indeed, i t  i s  h is  view th a t
th is  k ind o f non-cognitive response to  q u a l i t ie s  i s  the most common kind
of perception in  which we engage in  our l iv e s . My perception o f the  pen
with which I  am now w ritin g  i s  o f  th i s  s o r t .  I t  i s  n o t the ob ject o f  a
33"cognitive  regard ,"  o r  the  "theme o f an in te l le c tu a l  g e s t u r e . I t  i s  
a  s e t  o f q u a l i t ie s  to  which, as a  r e s u l t  o f  h a b it ,  I  respond w ithout 
r e f le c tio n .
Dewey d iscusses th i s  kind o f  perception a t  various places in  h is
3/ l
w ritin g s . In  Essays in  Experimental Logic he describes i t  as a  kind 
of experience in  which the  o b jec ts  o f  our awareness axe ob jects  no t o f 
knowledge o r observation , but of
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esteem o r  av ersion , o f decision , o f u se , o f  su ffe rin g , o f endeavor 
and re v o lt .  When, in  a  subsequent re f le c t iv e  experience, we look 
back and find  these  th ings and q u a l i t ie s  (quales would be a  b e tte r  
word o r values, i f  the l a t t e r  word were no t so open to  m isconstruc­
tio n ) , we a re  only too prone to  suppose th a t they were then what 
they a re  now-- . . . known o b je c ts .35
But in  Essays in  Experimental Logic Dewey says th a t  i t  i s  perhaps 
an exaggeration to  say th a t a l l  o f  these p rim arily  non-inqu iring , non- 
cognitive experiences a re  to ta l ly  devoid o f  in te l le c tu a l  components.
I t  i s  more l ik e ly  th a t  they contain a t  le a s t  some in te l le c tu a l  elem ents.
And t h i 3 he e x p lic a te s  a s  "a c e r ta in  tak ing  o f some th ings as represen-
37ta t iv e  o f o th e r th in g s .' Otherwise there  would not seem to  be any d i f ­
ference between human experience and th a t o f  "an o y s te r  o r  a growing 
bean v in e ." ^
But elsewhere Dewey seems to  deny th a t  any in te l le c tu a l  o r cog­
n i t iv e  element i s  involved in our ordinary , non-cognitive perception,
3 o
Thus, he says in  Logici The Theory of Inquiry^7 th a t  " e i th e r  an imme­
d ia te  overt response occurs, l ik e  using the ty p ew rite r o r picking up 
the  book (in  which cases the s itu a tio n  i s  n o t a  cogn itiona l one), o r 
, . . the o b jec t d ire c t ly  noted i s  p a rt o f an a c t  o f in q u iry ."  To say 
th a t  "an immediate o v ert response occurs" seems to  me c le a r ly  to  make 
o f non-cognitive perception a  purely non-cognitive kind o f experience, 
w ith no elements a t  a l l  in  which some th ings a re  taken as  rep resen ta tive  
o f o th e rs .
In the essay , "The Logic o f  Judgments o f  P ra c tic e ,"  the l a s t  essay 
in  Essays in  Experimental Logic. Dewey expands on what he ca lled  in  the 
"In troduction" experience o f ob jec ts  in  a  non-cognitive way, whereby 
they a re  o b jec ts  o f esteem, aversion , enjoyment, and so on. Here he
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says th a t  such experiences a re  " d ire c t experiences o f  good and bad," a
kind o f experience he c a l l s  sometimes "p riz in g ,"  Such experiences of
"finding  a th ing  good a p a rt from re f le c t iv e  judgment" involve "simply
tre a tin g  the  th ing  in  a  c e r ta in  way, hanging on to  i t ,  dwelling upon i t ,
welcoming i t  and a c tin g  to  perpetuate i t s  presence, taking d e lig h t in  i t .
I t  i s  a  way o f behaving toward i t .  a  mode o f  organic a c tio n ."  together
i+Owith the fee lin g s  which a lso  form p a rt o f the organic reaction  to  i t .
This desc rip tio n  would a lso  apply to  ob jects which a re  simply used 
in  an u n re flec tiv e  way, lik e  the pen I  am w riting  w ith, although, of 
course, such an ob jec t i s  no t found good o r  bad in  the way th is  pipe I  
am smoking i s .  I t  i s  nevertheless  perceived in  th is  behavioral way, a s  
an ob ject not o f cognitive regard o r observation, but o f organic reac tio n .
I t  seems to  me th a t  in  h is  g re a t concern to  draw a d is tin c tio n  be­
tween o b jec ts  which e n te r  in to  contexts o f  inqu iry  and those which are 
perceived non-cognitively , Dewey drew the d is t in c tio n  much too r ig id ly .
For th e re  seem to  be many experiences in  which, although our main in te r e s t  
i s  no t in  g e ttin g  knowledge o r warranted a s s e r t ib i l i t y ,  we a re  neverthe­
le ss  engaged in  some in te l le c tu a l  a c t iv i ty ,  i . e . ,  taking some th ings to  
be rep resen ta tiv e  of o thers . And, indeed, th is  may even fig u re  ra th e r  
ex tensively  in  our experience. I f  one i s ,  f o r  example, involved in  an 
ordinary  conversation with a  fr ien d  ("the  enjoyment o f so c ia l converse 
among fr ie n d s" ) , he i s  using and lis te n in g  to  language. And language 
here i s  n ecessa rily  being used a s  rep resen ta tiv e  o f  o ther th in g s . For 
one i s  n o t, lik e  the anim als, merely responding to  the sounds being made 
by h is  fr ien d s : ra th e r  he i s  understanding them.
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So, although c e r ta in ly  some perception i s  indeed o f  an alm ost, i f  
n o t exclusively , non-cognitive s o r t ,  a  mere response to  q u a l i t ie s ,  o th e r 
perception , even when n o t p a r t o f  a  prim arily  cogn itive , inqu iring  s o r t  
o f  experience, i s  nevertheless  in te l le c tu a l  in  na tu re . My perception o f 
the sidewalk I  am walking on when I  am walking along the s t r e e t  i s  indeed, 
a s  i t  u sually  occurs, merely overt response to  merely f e l t  q u a l i t ie s .  But 
my perception o f the meaning o f  the words th a t  a  frien d  u t te r s  in  d esc rib ­
ing , say, a  scene he w itnessed, i s  o f an in te l le c tu a l  o r  cognitive  n a tu re , 
Dewey was, I  b e liev e , led  to  th is  u n d e r- in te lle c tu a liz a tio n  o f  o rd i­
nary experience in  reac tio n  ag a in s t the  view o f those philosophers who 
had made a l l  experience a  cognitive  a c t iv i ty .  We have a lready  seen above 
th a t  he believed such a  view leads in ev itab ly  to  idealism . This i s  so 
because i t  r e s u l ts  in  the view th a t  na tu re  i s  fundamentally b ifu rca ted  
between a  known experience and an unknowable r e a l i ty  in  i t s e l f .  And, in  
h is  zeal to  avoid th i s  conclusion, Dewey overlooked the fa c t  th a t  i n t e l ­
le c tu a l a c t iv i ty  i s  r e a l ly  very widespread even in  our ordinary  experience.
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CHAPTER I I I
PERCEPTION AS AWARENESS OF SIGNIFICATION 
AND AS PRESENCE OF SENSE
I  have already  re fe rre d  a number o f  times in  the previous two chap­
te r s  both to  perception o f s ig n if ic a tio n  and to  perception o f sense, since 
i t  i s  im possible to  d iscuss fee lin g  w ithout making a t  le a s t  some reference 
to  the kinds o f  perception which i t  i s  no t. I  s h a ll  now take up percep­
tio n  o f  sense and o f s ig n if ic a tio n  in  more d e ta i l  and system atica lly .
In gen era l, what both o f  these types o f perception involve which 
fee lin g  does not possess i s  meaning. Feeling is  i t s e l f  involved in  both 
o f these . I t  i s  what has a  meaning. Sense and s ig n if ic a tio n  a re  the 
" q u a lit ie s  o f  fee lin g  [having]] become s ig n if ic a n t o f  ob jective d i f f e r ­
ences in  ex te rn a l th ings and o f episodes past and to  come."* But fe e l­
ing i s  u su a lly  not even c a lled  perception by Dewey because o f the fa c t 
th a t  i t  lacks meaning. The sp e c if ic  way in  which fe e lin g  has meaning 
determ ines whether one i s  perceiving s ig n if ic a tio n  o r sense. I f  the 
meaning i s  possessed immediately and d ire c tly  by a  q u a lity  o r a  s e t  o f 
q u a l i t ie s ,  in  re a l ly  much the  same k ind  o f  immediate and uninquiring, 
un in ferred , non-cognitive way in  which fee lin g  i t s e l f  occurs, then i t  
i s  perceived as  awareness o f  sense. But i f  the meaning is  a  product 
o f  conscious in q u irin g , cognitive  in fe ren ce , then i t  i s  perceived as 
awareness o f  s ig n if ic a tio n .
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Since perception as  awareness o f s ig n if ic a tio n  and as presence o f 
sense a re  d is tingu ished  from fee lin g  by the presence of meaning, we must 
now g e t c le a r  p rec ise ly  what Dewey means by meaning. Dewey th inks o f 
meaning a s  o rig in a tin g  in  the communication s itu a tio n  between human be­
ings. What i s  p e cu lia r  to  the human communication s itu a tio n  i s  th a t  i t
i s  " p a r tic ip a tiv e ."  A human being "puts h im self a t  the standpoin t o f  a
2s itu a tio n  in which two p a r tie s  sh are ."  I f  a  person A is  poin ting  out
a  flow er to  a  person B with the in ten tio n  o f having B bring  him the flow er,
the  c h a ra c te r is t ic  th ing  about B 's  understanding o f  A 's movement and 
sounds i s  th a t  he responds to  the thing from the standpoin t o f  A.
He perceives the th ing  as i t  may function in  A 's experience, in stead  
o f ju s t  eg o -cen tr ica lly . S im ila rly , A in  making the  request con­
ceives the th in g  not only in  i t s  d ir e c t  re la tio n sh ip  to  h im self, 
but a s  a  th ing  capable o f being grasped and handled by B. He sees 
the  th ing  as i t  may function in  B 's experience. Such i s  the  essence 
and import o f communication, signs and meaning. Something i s  l i t e r ­
a l ly  made common in a t  le a s t  two d if fe re n t  cen tres  o f  behavior. To 
understand i s  to  a n tic ip a te  to g e th er, i t  i s  to  make a  cross-reference  
which, when acted  upon, brings about a  partaking in a  common, in ­
c lu siv e  undertak ing ,3
Animals, according to  Dewey, do no t possess communication, language,
o r  meaning, because they do no t engage in  th i s  p a r tic ip a tiv e  experience
in  which two o r more organisms share in  an undertaking. For animals a re
k"eg o -cen tric ."  Ihey engage in  what Dewey c a l l s  "signaling  a c t iv i ty ."
This i s  a  necessary but n o t s u f f ic ie n t  condition fo r communication and 
meaning. What i t  involves, Dewey says, quoting Max Meyer, i s  a  re fle x  
a c t iv i ty ,  l ik e  th a t  o f the  peacock in  spreading i t s  t a i l ,  " 'th e  lig h tin g  
o f  a f i r e - f l y ,  the  squeezing out o f  a  black l iq u id  from the  ink bladder 
o f a  c u t t l e - f i s h , '" ^  These a c t i v i t i e s  stim ula te  on some occasions, "by 
some preformed mechanism,"*’ a  response th a t  may be sexually  o r  protec­
tiv e ly  u sefu l to  the agent o r  to  the sp ec ie s . But i t  i s  no t a  signal
-  66 -
th a t  the hen o r the peacock o r  the c u t t le - f is h  performs from the po in t 
o f view o f the o th er. Indeed, i t  o ften  performs what functions on occa­
sion as  s ignaling  a c ts  even in  the absence o f the o th e r anim als. I t  i s  
in  th is  sense th a t Dewey c a l l s  the s ig n a lin g  a c ts  o f  animals "eg o -cen tric ," 
"The h e a rt o f language," then, fo r  Dewey, i s  th i s  p a rtic ip a tiv e  a c t iv ­
i ty  in  which there  occurs "the establishm ent o f cooperation in  an a c t iv i ty  
in  which there  a re  p a rtn e rs ."  Language i s  no t the "expression" o f  some 
an tecedently  e x is tin g  s ta te  o f  a f f a i r s  o r s ta te  o f  mind to  which i t  a t ­
tempts to  correspond. I t  i s  ra th e r  th is  cooperative a c t iv i ty ,  through 
the use o f s igns, o f  two o r  more persons whereby they work toward some 
consummatory experience. "A proposes the consummatory possession o f  the 
flow er through the medium or means o f  B 's  a c tio n ; B proposes to  cooperate 
- - o r  a c t  adversely—in  the fu lf il lm e n t o f  A 's p roposal."  Language, then , 
involves the  s ig naling  a c t iv i ty  o f  A by means o f  motions and sounds, and
•7
"the movements o f B, which a re  signs to  A of B 's  cooperation o r r e fu s a l ," ' 
Understanding what ano ther person means i s  not a m atter o f "grasping" 
an antecedent s ta te  o f a f f a i r s  th a t  he proposed to  make h is  language cor­
respond to , bu t the occurrence o f tin a c t iv i ty  in  which A and B a re  work­
ing harmoniously to g e th e r, an en te rp rise  in  which "the  a c t iv i ty  o f  each 
i s  modified and regu lated  by p a rtn e rsh ip ."  Correspondingly, " to  f a i l  to  
understand i s  to  f a i l  to  come in to  agreement in  a c tio n ; to  misunderstand
g
i s  to  s e t  up ac tio n  a t  cross purposes." Dewey's view o f  understanding 
and misunderstanding here i s  s im ila r  to  th a t  o f W ittgenstein in  Logical 
In v e s tig a tio n s . To grasp the  meaning o f  a  sentence i s  to  do o r to  be 
ab le  to  do the appropria te  th in g . Understanding i s  not then an a c t  o f
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a disembodied o r  passive in te l l e c t  reaching out to  an an tecedent, pre­
e x is tin g  s ta te  o f  a f f a i r s .  This i s  the epistem ological o r  sp ec ta to r  
theory ag a in s t which Dewey animadverts so o ften . No, to  understand i s  
to  do, o r  to  be prepared to  do, something) i t  i s  therefo re  fu tu re -o rien ted  
ra th e r  than p a s t-d ire c te d .
Meaning, we a re  now in  a  p o sitio n  to  see , i s ,  a s  th a t  which i s  under­
stood, a  property  belonging to  the signs used both by, fo r  example, A and 
B, whereby they expect c e r ta in  th ings to  happen upon the  performance o f 
c e r ta in  a c tio n s . The meaning o f  the  poin ting  gestu re  i s  the a c t iv i ty  
th a t A i s  c a ll in g  fo r , v iz . ,  tak ing  the flower to  him, and the s o r t  o f 
expected consummation o f  A 's in te n t in  performing the a c t iv i ty .  But not 
only do peop le 's  movements and sounds come to  take on meaning, but so do 
th ings themselves. HThe th ing  pointed to  by A to  B gains meaning. I t  
ceases to  be ju s t  what i t  i s  a t  the  moment, and i s  responded to  in  i t s  
p o te n tia l i ty ,  a s  a  means to  rem oter consequences,"^ Having served in  an 
a c t iv i ty  o f being taken from one place to  ano ther, as  a means to  the r e a l i ­
zation  o f  the in te n t th a t  A meant, the flow er now comes to  take on the 
meaning o f p o r ta b i l i ty . At f i r s t  and "p rim arily ,"  Dewey says, i t  has 
i t s  meaning a s  p a rt o f  the cooperative a c t iv i ty  which A and then B en­
visage and achieve, but then , "secondarily ,"  i t  comes to  have the mean­
ing o f p o r ta b il i ty  on i t s  own, as  something th a t  can fig u re  in  many ac­
t i v i t i e s  o f tra n sp o rt from one place to  another. As a r e s u l t ,  i t  i s  
l i f t e d  out o f  i t s  b ru te  ex isten ce , which i t  has a s  a  s e t  o f  q u a l i t ie s  
merely f e l t  o r  perhaps perceived in  a  very prim itive  way as  ju s t  a  th ing  
of some s o r t ,  and i t  comes to  have a  meaning, to  be responded to ,  th a t
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i s ,  not ju s t  a s  a  b ru te  s e t  o f  q u a l i t ie s ,  bu t as  something having poten­
t i a l i t i e s ;  responded to ,  then , K ith an eye to  the  fu tu re , to  what can be 
done with i t ,  ra th e r  than th a t  dumb absorp tion  in  the p resen t and the 
p a r tic u la r  which ch arac te rizes  fe e lin g .
Meanings, Dewey say s , a re  " ru le s  fo r  using and in te rp re tin g  th ings; 
in te rp re ta tio n  being always an im putation o f p o te n tia l i ty  fo r  some con­
sequence."*^ The meaning th a t  a  q u a lity  o r  a  s e t  of q u a l i t ie s  takes on
when they a re  perceived in  the modes o f  s ig n if ic a tio n  o r o f sense, then,
11“i s  a  method o f  a c tio n , a  way o f using th in g s ."  And th is  use o f  th ings 
i s  o r ig in a lly  "as a  means to  a shared consummation," although, a s  we have 
seen, th ings such as roses can come to  take on meanings o f , say, po rta ­
b i l i t y  which do not n ecessa rily  have to  do with a  shared consummation, 
but presumably to  some consummation one envisages fo r  o n ese lf. Neverthe­
le s s ,  meaning, in  Dewey's view, c le a r ly  o rig in a te s  in  a  so c ia l context.
I f  one perceives something as being p o rtab le , th is  meaning which he 
in fe rs  as belonging to  i t  ( s ig n if ic a t io n ) .  o r  which i s  now inheren t in  
i t  because o f  funded habitudes (sen se ), has to  do w ith what one can do 
with i t .  To perceive p o r ta b il i ty  as a  c h a ra c te r is t ic  o r meaning o f  a 
te le v is io n  s e t  i s  to  expect th a t  i t  can be e a s ily , o r  re la t iv e ly  e a s ily , 
moved about; i t  i s  to  expect th a t  c e r ta in  ac tio n s  one might take would 
r e s u l t  in  c e r ta in  consequences.
Dewey th in k s  the t r a d i t io n a l  account o f  the way in  which meanings 
a r is e  i s  absurd . This theory  ho lds, in  a  c h a ra c te r is t ic a l ly  unem plrical, 
a  p r io r i  manner, th a t  "general ideas o r  meanings a r is e  by the comparison 
o f  a  number o f  p a r t ic u la rs , eventuating  in  the recognition  o f something
12common to  them a l l . "  Dewey ho lds, in  a  view th a t  seems to  me much 
c lo se r  to  the  fA cts, th a t  we take the meaning to  th e  th ings and see i f  
they f i t  i t ,  r a th e r  than to  see i t  in  the f a c ts .  We see a  fea tu re  in  a  
th ing  not because i t  happens to  have i t  and i t s  having i t  impresses i t ­
s e l f  upon u s . Ib is  l a t t e r  i s  the contem plative theory  o f knowledge again . 
We a re  sp ec ta to rs  reading o f f  the  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  r e a l i ty  ju s t  f o r  the 
sake o f knowing what they a re . Roses a re  p o rtab le , and th a t fa c t  ju s t  
comes across to  our minds which a re  busy Inspecting  r e a l i ty  and picking 
out i t s  c h a ra c te r is t ic s —fo r  i t s  own sake. In  f a c t ,  Dewey b e liev es , we 
have something we have to  do, v iz . ,  in  the case under considera tion , to  
take something over to  A, who wants i t .  And th is  p ro je c t, th i s  proposed 
course o f  a c tio n , i s  what leads us to  n o tice  th a t the rose i s  p o rtab le . 
Except a s  i t  r e la te s  to  something we have to  do, a  rose l i e s  hidden in  
n a tu re , born to  blush unseen and waste i t s  p o r ta b il i ty  on the  garden a i r .
Furthermore, when the meaning, p o r ta b i l i ty ,  which has been discovered 
as  belonging to  a  ro se , i s  generalized  to  o th e r th in g s , i t  i s  no t because 
we see something common between the rose and something e ls e , say , a  d o l­
l a r  b i l l  discovered ly in g  on the  s t r e e t .  Rather i s  the meaning "ca rried
13
spontaneously a s  f i r  a s  i t  w il l  p lausib ly  go." We have discovered a  
new meaning and we apply i t  to  a l l  kinds o f  new th in g s . We look fo r  por­
t a b i l i ty  in  every th ing , o r  many th ings anyway, th a t  we come acrosB, o ften  
to  many more than those to  which i t  leg itim a te ly  a p p lie s . "A newly ac ­
quired  meaning i s  forced upon everything th a t  does no t obviously r e s i s t  
i t s  ap p lic a tio n , as  a  c h ild  uses a  new word whenever he g e ts  a  chance o r 
as  he plays w ith a  new toy . Meanings a re  self-m oving to  new cases."
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Of couzse( i f  we a re  no t i r r a t io n a l ,  we w ill  have to  d is c ip lin e  our a p p li­
cation  by observation and experim ent. But the  observations a re  t e s t s  fo r  
an ap p lica tio n  o f  meaning th a t  precedes them and i s  spontaneous. We do 
not f i r s t  see the  fea tu re  and then apply the meaning to  the  new th in g , 
which we previously  found to  belong to  the ro se . We apply  the meaning 
f i r s t  and then see i f  i t  r e a l ly  belongs.
Dewey's a n a ly s is  o f  meaning ap p lie s  a lso  to  the term " id ea ,"  which 
he o ften  uses interchangeably  w ith the  term " m e a n i n g . T h u s  he says 
th a t  " ideas a re  a n tic ip a te d  consequences (fo re c a s ts )  o f  what w ill  happen 
when c e r ta in  opera tions a re  executed under and w ith re sp ec t to  observed 
conditions."*^
But to  re tu rn  to  the  su b jec t o f  meaning, the  meanings which ob jec ts
come to  have and which c o n s ti tu te  them as  what they a re  (sense) o r  what
they imply ( s ig n if ic a t io n ) ,  a re  o b je c tiv e . They a re  no t p ro p e rtie s  o f
17"ghostly  psychic e x is ten ces ."  They a re  p a r t o f  r e a l i ty .  By saying 
which Dewey does n o t mean to  imply th a t  a l l  meanings a re  equally  v a lid . 
Some a re  more le g itim a te ly  meanings than o th e rs . For example, " the  cere­
monial sp rin k lin g  o f  water" does no t portend the  imminence o f  ra in  a s  i t
18i s  thought to  by c e r ta in  p rim itiv e  c u ltu re s . But th a t  meaning, as sug­
gested o r  in d ica ted  by the ceremony in  qu estio n , i s  nev erth e less  an ob­
je c t iv e ,  re a l  occurrence, n o t an "idea" in  the  "minds" o f  the  people who 
be lieve  in  i t .  Of course, fo r  Dewey, i t ,  l ik e  everything e lse  th a t  i s
r e a l ;  i s  no t a  se lf-en c lo sed , independently e x is tin g  r e a l i t y .  I t  i s  a
19product o f  the in te ra c tio n  o r  tran sac tio n  '  o f the  organism and i t s  en­
vironment. But i f  the f a c t  o f  i t s  r e l a t iv i ty  made i t  su b je c tiv e , i t
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would make everything su b jec tiv e . There would be no meaning o f ra in , as
imminently suggested by the  ceremony in  question , i f  there  were no t human
beings and th e i r  customs and expecta tions. But th is  is  tru e  o f  a l l  re a l-
20i ty :  i t  i s  a l l  a product o f  th ings in  re la tio n  to  o th e r th ings.
The only d is t in c t io n , then , among the  meanings contained in  o r  im­
p lied  by a  s e t  o f  q u a l i t ie s  i s  th a t some a re  a c tu a lly  borne out by sub­
sequent experience and experiment and some a re  n o t. Imminence o f  ra in  
is  as much a  meaning of the sp rin k lin g  ceremony a s  f i r e  i s  a  meaning of 
smoke. But to  a c t  on the assumption o f the imminence o f ra in  in  the 
sp rin k lin g  ceremony w ill  probably not re s u l t  in a s  g rea t a  frequency o f  
subsequent ra in -experiences as  ac ting  on the assumption of f i r e  on the 
basis  of the suggestion o f i t  by smoke w ill  r e s u l t  in  subsequent f i r e -  
experiences.
Dewey d is tin g u ish es  c a re fu lly  between those meanings which work and
those which do n o t. A meaning may no t have
the  p a r t ic u la r  o b je c tiv ity  which i s  imputed to  i t ,  as w h istling  
does not a c tu a lly  portend wind, no r the ceremony o f w ater in d ica te  
ra in .  . . .  I t  req u ires  the  d is c ip lin e  o f ordered and d e lib e ra te  
experim entation to  teach us th a t some meanings, d e lig h tfu l o r  hor­
rendous as  they  a re , a re  meanings communally developed in  the  proc­
ess  o f communal f e s t iv i ty  and c o n tro l, and do not rep resen t the  
p o l i t i e s ,  and ways and means o f natu re  a p a r t from so c ia l a r t s .  
S c ie n tif ic  meanings were superadded to  e s th e tic  and a f fe c t io n a l 
meanings when ob jects in s tead  o f  being defined in  terms o f th e i r  
consequences in  so c ia l in te ra c tio n s  and d iscussion  were defined in  
terms o f t h e i r  consequences w ith respec t to  one another. This 
d iscrim in a tio n  perm itted e s th e tic  and a ffe c t iv e  ob jects to  be 
freed  from magical im putations, which were due to  a t t r ib u t in g  to  
them in  rerum na tu ra  the  consequences they had in  the transm itted  
cu ltu re  o f the group.21
22Meaning i s  a lso  u n iv e rsa l. For i t  i s  a  method o r a "way o f  using 
23th in g s ,"  and methods a re  u n iv e rsa l. I t  i s  a  general way o f dealing
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with a l l  s itu a tio n s  o f a  general s o r t ,  A method o f checking f in g e rp r in ts , 
f o r  example, i s  a general way o f dealing  w ith general fe a tu re s  common to  
marks l e f t  on guns, fu rn itu re , e tc . Even the  no tion  o f  a  f in g e rp rin t 
i t s e l f  i s  a  general meaning te l l in g  what one may expect i f  one performs 
c e r ta in  operations on th is  mark l e f t  on the  gun. D etectives who come 
in to  a  room where a  crime has been committed and d iscover a  f in g e rp rin t 
a re  f i r s t  apprehending in  the  mode o f fe e lin g  a c e r ta in  3 e t o f  q u a li t ie s  
and then a re  reading those q u a li t ie s  as in d ic a tiv e  o f c e r ta in  operations 
th a t can be performed, comparing the mark here to  a  s e t  o f  marks on f i l e  
ifi the  crime lab o ra to ry , and consequences th a t  may be expected, e .g . ,  cor­
re la tio n  w ith some known crim inal whose id e n tity  and whereabouts can then 
perhaps be determ ined. And these operations and consequences, the mean­
ing o f the marks th a t  make them f in g e rp r in ts  and n o t, say , p a rt o f the 
design o f the ch a ir , a re  genera l, ap p licab le  to  any number of q u a lita tiv e  
s i tu a t io n s ,
Let us t r y  to  g e t c le a re r  now about th is  d is t in c tio n  between the two 
ways in  which f e l t  q u a l i t ie s  can take on meaning, v iz . ,  a s  having s ig n i­
f ic a t io n  and a s  having sense. So f a r ,  I  have ta lked  ra th e r  generally  and 
sk e tc h ily  about the  two kinds o f meaning as  being e i th e r  inheren t in  the 
q u a l i t ie s  and immediately and d ire c tly  experienced (sen se ), and as being 
im plied by them, consciously in fe rred  a s  a  fu tu re  ev en tu a lity  th a t  a c tin g  
on them in  a  c e r ta in  way w il l  lead to  ( s ig n if ic a t io n ) .
Let us look a t  these now more c lo se ly .
Perception as awareness o f  s ig n if ic a tio n  occurs when a  s e t  o f q u a li­
t i e s  o r  a th in g  (a th in g  being a  s e t  o f  q u a l i t ie s  w ith a  sense already
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inheren t in  i t  from previous in q u ir ie s )  i s  consciously taken as  a  sign
2I f .o r  index o f  something e lse . Consider the  following example« I  am 
d riv ing  in Mexico and have gotten  o ff  the  road I  was supposed to  take 
to  g e t to  Guanajuato. So I  consu lt my Mexican road map. I  look a t  the 
lin e s  on the map u n t i l  I  find  th e  one I  am on now, v i z . , Route 25. I  
follow the red lin e  rep resen ting  Route 25 u n t i l  i t  comes back to  the 
highway I  was supposed to  be on, v iz . .  Route 95. Now the perception of 
the red lin e  w ith 25 on i t  as in d ica tin g  th a t ,  i f  I  go back 25 kilom eters 
and tu rn  r ig h t  on Route 95» I  w il l  be on the road to  Guanajuato again— 
th is  perception i s  an example o f  perception as awareness o f  s ig n if ic a tio n . 
I t  i s  perception of s ig n if ic a tio n  in  th a t  i t  i s  an in f e re n t ia l  awareness 
of q u a li t ie s  o r  a  th ing  as  a  sign  o f something e lse  th a t  needs to  be done 
to  g e t to  a consummatory experience I  wish to  have, v iz . ,  a rr iv in g  in  the 
fa m ilia r  town o f Guanajuato. S ig n if ic a tio n , then, denotes an in fe rred  
operation to  be performed subsequent to  the perception and a  consummatory 
experience which bne expects w il l  re s u l t  from performing th a t operation. 
The meaning o f  the red lin e  i s  then a s e t  o f  fu tu re  operations and th e i r  
consequences. This meaning i s  e x tr in s ic  to  the lin e  i t s e l f .
When I  looked a t  th e  map, I  perceived i t s  red l in e s  as meaning high­
ways, and i t  was on the basis  o f  th is  perception o f them as  highways th a t 
I  was ab le to  in fe r  what I  had to  do to  g e t back on the  road- I  wanted to  
be on. But th is  perception o f the  l in e s  as meaning highways was not a 
perception which had to  be in fe rre d . I t  was an immediately and d ire c tly  
noted meaning o f the l in e s  th a t  they represented highways. That the 
lin e s  represented  highways was therefo re  perceived as  the  sense of the
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l in e s .  This kind o f meaning i s  in t r in s ic  to  the  l in e  i t s e l f .
This d is t in c t io n  between s ig n if ic a tio n  and sense i s  i l lu s t r a te d  in  
innumerable experiences which we have. Take the  card, th a t  comes in  the  
s a i l  informing one th a t  a  c a r  he has ordered has a rr iv e d . The card i s  
perceived a s  meaning ( in  the sense o f s ig n if ic a tio n )  th a t  one may now go 
to  the d ea le rsh ip  and pick up h is  c a r . What i s  meant by the card , then , 
i s  a  fu tu re  operation  th a t  one must perform i f  he i s  to  have a  consum­
matory experience which he wishes to  have, v i z , , the  possession and enjoy­
ment o f the  c a r . But the perception o f  the  word "car" a s  i t  appeared on 
the  card was no t i t s e l f  perceived in  the  same way. The meaning o f the 
word Ncar" was perceived d i r e c t ly  and immediately, on the b a s is  o f much 
fa m ilia r i ty  w ith th e  word. And th is  immediate grasping o f the  sense o f 
th e  words and sentences on the  card served a s  th e  evidence o r data  on the 
b a s is  o f which i t  was possib le  to  make the  in fe re n t ia l  kind o f perception 
o f  s ig n if ic a tio n  which enabled one to  know what to  do to  g e t the  consum­
matory kind o f  experience which he wished to  have.
Perception of s ig n if ic a t io n , then , occurs in  response to  a  problem­
a t i c  s i tu a t io n , l ik e  th a t  o f  being lo s t ,  and i t  i s  o f  something o r  some 
q u a l i t ie s  which in d ica te  a  course o f a c tio n  which w il l  so lve th a t  prob­
lem. Since one i s  in  a  problem atic s i tu a t io n ,  i t  i s  c le a r  th a t  one does 
n o t perceive immediately and d ire c t ly  what course o f  a c tio n  one should 
ta k e . One has to  s to p  and r e f le c t .  I f  one had no t been in  a  problematic 
s i tu a t io n , th e re  would have been no consciousness a t  a l l ,  according to  
Dewey, but ju s t  immediate response to  fa m ilia r  s tim u li .  For th is  reason, 
Dewey’s  view seems to  be th a t  n e ith e r  perception o f  sense no r perception
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o f  s ig n if ic a tio n  occur except in  those cases in  which one has a  problem 
to  deal w ith . When a  problem does occur, consciousness a r is e s  as  a  device 
fo r  dealing  w ith the  problem. P r io r  to  th a t  tim e, one has f e l t  q u a l i t ie s  
and perhaps responded to  them; but one has not been conscious o f  meanings.
Consider the  follow ing example as  an i l lu s t r a t io n  o f the way in  which 
perception o f sense and o f s ig n if ic a t io n  a r is e  ou t o f  a  previously  e n tir e ly  
non'■cognitive kind o f  experience when th a t  s i tu a tio n  becomes problem atic,
I  am d riv in g  my ca r along the Kennedy Expressway here in  Chicago, a  route 
I  have taken many times before in  o rd er to  g e t to  my apartm ent b u ild ing . 
Since the route  i t s e l f  i s  e n t i r e ly  fh m ilia r , and d riv ing  in  general i s  
very fa m ilia r  to  me; and th e re  a re  no unusual t r a f f i c  Jams o r  detours 
today, I  am re a lly  d riv in g  along in  a  more o r  le s s  unconscious way. I  
am, o f  course, having o r  fe e lin g  q u a l i t i e s ,  some o f  which I  am responding 
to  in  accordance with h a b its  I  have developed, l ik e  my tu rn -o ff  a t  the 
Montrose S tre e t  e x i t ;  o thers  o f which a re  mere "su rp lu sag e" --q u a litie s  
which axe had but n e ith e r  noted n o r responded to , l ik e  the banal nonsense 
coming from my ra d io , to  which I  have long since  stopped paying any a t te n ­
tio n  whatsoever. Ib is  i s  the  kind o f  experience in  which, a s  P ro fesso r 
Browning pu ts i t ,  we a re  merely "coasting  along on our p resen t equipment 
o f  h a b it and in s t in c ts  ( i f  th e re  a re  any) un in terrup ted  by any challeng­
ing n o v e lty ."2**
But then suddenly my c a r  begins to  lo se  speed, and I  am wrenched 
from my dogmatic slumber in  non-cognitive co astin g  in to  an anguish o f 
thought and re f le c t io n . For, I  note w ith te r r o r ,  cars  a re  bearing  down 
upon me from behind. What to  do? The s itu a tio n  has become problem atic,
and mind, which was slum bering, suddenly i s  c a lled  on to  rescue me from 
d is a s te r ,
Vhen he says th a t  a  s i tu a t io n  i s  problem atic, Dewey means th a t  i t  
i s  indeterm inate with re sp ec t to  i t s  outcome. " 'T here is  something the 
m a t t e r , a n d  when we look more c lo se ly  a t  the  s i tu a t io n ,  we f in d  th a t 
t h i s  something " is  found to  sp ring  from the fa c t  th a t  th e re  i s  something
lack ing , w anting, in the e x is tin g  s itu a tio n  as i t  s tan d s , an absence which
27produces c o n f l ic t  in  the elements th a t  do e x is t ."  And th i s  c o n f l ic t  
co n s is ts  in  the  fa c t  th a t  the  s i tu a tio n  “tends to  evoke d iscordan t re -
2Q
sponses," as con trasted  w ith the  immediate and sure responses evoked
29when " th ings a re  going completely smoothly." 7
What i s  lack ing  in  the  s i tu a tio n  on the  expressway i s  the  power o f  
a c c e le ra tio n . My c a r  i s  lo s in g  speed. And, as  a  r e s u l t ,  I  do no t know 
what to  do, A s e r ie s  o f c o n f lic tin g  courses o f  a c tio n  occur to  mes l e t  
my c a r  come to  a  stop  and make a  break fo r  the shoulders a ttem pt to  g lide  
to  the  shoulders fumble around w ith the  ig n itio n  sw itch to  t r y  to  ge t the 
e a r  s ta r te d  ag a in , e tc .  In  ad d itio n  to  considering various possib le  sug­
g estio n s  as  to  how to  r e c t i fy  the s i tu a t io n ,  I  begin to  look around and 
examine the fh c ts  o f  the  s i tu a t io n .  For the proper course o f a c tio n  w il l  
be the  one th a t  i s  app rop ria te  to  th e  fa c ts  o f  the case.
Now the  way in  which I  perceive the fa c ts  o f  the  case , when those 
fa c ts  a re  such fa m ilia r  th ings a s  c a rs  bearing  down upon me from behind, 
th e  shoulder a  couple o f lanes over to  my r ig h t ,  my a c c e le ra to r  pedal
f l a t  on the  f lo o r ,  e t c . ,  i s  c a lled  by Dewey apprehension. This i s  the
30word he uses in  Logic fo r  grasping the  seuse o f q u a l i t ie s  and th in g s .
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These meanings axe grasped immediately and d ire c t ly  in  the sense th a t  
they a re  grasped sim ultaneously w ith the  q u a l i t ie s  them selves, in  the  
same moment o f  awareness. There i s  n o ty th a t  i s t f i r s t  the perception 
o f the q u a l i t ie s  o f the cars  approaching, and then the  inference to  th e i r  
meaning a s  cars-approaching-portending-danger, To say th a t they a re  ap­
prehended d ire c t ly  and immediately i s  p rec ise ly  to  say th a t no inference 
from q u a l i t ie s  f e l t  in  one moment to  a  meaning apprehended in  a  subsequent 
moment i s  involved. Due to  previous experience and the funding o f i t s  
r e s u l t s ,  I  am able to  grasp  c e r ta in  key f a c ts  about the s itu a tio n  imme­
d ia te ly  in  th e  form o f  apprehension. A ll o f  these sensed o r  apprehended 
fh c ts  o f  the  case a re  then perceived in  the o th e r sense o f  meaning, as 
having the  s ig n if ic a tio n  of* I f  I  g e t over to  the shoulder on what re ­
mains o f my rap id ly  waning power, I  w ill  be sa fe . One i s  not cogn itive ly  
aware o f the  ob jects o f  h is  apprehension. He i s  cogn itive ly  aware o f  the 
s ig n if ic a tio n  o f, o r  what can be done w ith , what he apprehends o r g e ts  
the  sense o f . I f  one had to  be "observantly" and consciously aware o f 
everything th a t  i s  re le v an t to  the  so lu tio n  o f  a  problem atic s i tu a t io n , 
one would n o t be ab le  to  a c t  f a s t  and e f f ic ie n t ly  enough to  g e t i t  solved. 
The "p o te n tia l consequences" o f  a  th ing  lik e  a  c a r  o r a  p la n t, when 
they a re  repeated  in  our experience many times and when they a re  re lev an t 
to  our aims and needs, come to  "mark" the th ing  a s  the  so r t  o f th in g  th a t  
i t  i s .  They come to  form the essence o r  defin ing  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  th a t  
th in g . This e s s e n tia l  meaning which q u a l i t ie s  come to  have comes to  be 
apprehended o r  recognized a f t e r  much dealing  w ith a  th in g  o f some s o r t .
The essence i s ,  however, not the  e s s e n tia l  make-up o f  the th ing  a s  i t  i s
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in  i t s e l f .  I t  i s  the  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  a  th in g  th a t  a re  most important 
to  us in  the  l iv in g  o f  our l iv e s ,  A th in g  lik e  a  o a r has innumerable 
consequences upon o th e r th ings and upon u s , but we ignore those th a t  do 
no t r e la te  v i ta l ly  to  our in te r e s t s .  The n a tu re  o f  the  th ings o f  our 
world i s  thus in tim a te ly  tie d  up with our in te r e s t s .  We forge "objects" 
out o f  the in f in i te ly  r ic h  and inexhaustib ly  complex world o f n a tu ra l 
even ts. These ob jec ts  a re  "p o te n tia l consequences" o f a  th in g  as  i t  re ­
la te s  to  o th e r th in g s . Since, however, in  doing so we a b s tra c t  from many
o th e r c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  a  th in g , i t  i s  perhaps b e t te r  to  say th a t  we
31c rea te  ra th e r  than d iscover the ob jec ts  and world o f  our experience.
Dewey's a n a ly s is  o f  essence and o b jec t is  suggestive , i t  seems to  
me, o f  what c o n s ti tu te s  one o f the  main d iffe ren ces  between peoples o f 
d if f e r e n t  ages in  h is to ry . Since the in te r e s t s  and aims o f  people in  d i f ­
fe re n t ages a re  d if f e r e n t ,  i t  would follow  th a t  they would not even per­
ceive c e r ta in  f a c ts  about the world th a t  might figu re  very im portantly 
in  the  experience o f o th e rs . So th a t am an c ien t Athenian and a  modern 
New Yorker, f o r  example, would d i f f e r  n o t only in  th e i r  behavior, but in 
the world o f t h e i r  perception a s  w ell. I f  they could (p e r im possible) 
come to  be in  the  same place a t  the same tim e, th e re  would re a l ly  be two 
p laces , not one, since they would perceive ( i . e . ,  forge out o f  the given 
q u a li ta t iv e  s i tu a tio n )  to ta l ly  d if fe re n t  o b je c ts .
Dewey recognizes ano ther way in  which perception o f  sense occurs,
32 33He c a l l s  th i s  sometimes contemplation and sometimes ap p rec ia tio n ,
Such a perception of sense occutb when one i s  no longer s tru g g lin g  to  g e t
a  d if f ic u l ty  so lved , b u t can r e s t  in  the  ap p recia tion  o r  "savoring"
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o f  something. In  the previous example, upon reaching ay l i t t l e  refuge,
the  shoulder, I  might w ell r e s t  f o r  a  t in e  in  an ap p rec ia tio n  o r savoring
o f i t .  And, a t  th i s  p o in t, the shoulder i s  n o t a  th in g  en tering  in to  a
re f le c tiv e  con tex t, hut one th a t one re lis h e s  as having saved one 's  l i f e ,
34I t  i s  apprecia ted  fo r  a  meaning th a t  has now come, to  be Inheren t in  i t .
The d ifference  between perception of sense which i s  ap p recia tion  and 
perception o f  sense which i s  apprehension seems to  l i e  in  i t s  position  
v is -a -v is  the in q u irin g  s i tu a t io n . When one grasps the sense o f a  th ing  
in  the course o f  Inquiry  and as  a  p a r t  o f  the  inquiry  process, he i s  per­
ceiving in  the mode o f apprehension. His perception a t  such tim es i s  
re a lly  a  shorthand version o f  a  cognitive  percep tion , i . e . ,  perception 
a s  awareness o f s ig n if ic a tio n . But i f  h is  perception o f sense comes a t  
the  c lose o f  inqu iry  as an app rec ia tio n  o f a  s a tis fa c to ry  term ination o f 
the re f le c tiv e  process, then i t  i s  perception  in  the  mode o f ap p rec ia tio n . 
The shoulder perceived while I  was coming gradually  to  a  stop  in  the mid­
d le  o f  the  Kennedy Expressway was apprehended a s  something re lev an t to  
the possib le  so lu tio n  o f my urgent problem) but the  shoulder as  perceived 
when I  re a liz e d  I  had escaped d is a s te r  was perceived in  the mode of 
ap p recia tion .
Perception o f  sense in  the sense o f apprehension dominates the  d is ­
cussion o f sense in  Loglct The Theory o f In q u iry . Here sense i s  regarded 
in  an e n tire ly  p ra c tic a l  o r  u t i l i t a r i a n  way. I t  i s  th a t  system o f mean­
ings which gives a  people the
power to  d iscrim inate  the  fe c to rs  th a t  a re  re lev an t and im portant in  
s ig n ifican ce  in  given s i tu a tio n s )  i t  i s  power o f  discernment) in  a 
p roverb ia l phrase i a b i l i ty  to  t e l l  a  hawk from a  hemshaw, chalk from
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cheese, and to  b ring  the  d isorla in& tions made to  b ear upon what i s  
to  be done and what I s  to  be absta ined  from, in  the "ord inary  a f ­
f a i r s  o f l i f e . "35
There a re  two kinds o f such meanings which c o n s ti tu te  what i s  here c a lled
the  "common sense" o f  a  c u ltu re , and
they a re  both o f  them connected w ith the conduct o f l i f e  in  re la tio n  
to  an e x is tin g  environmenti one o f them in  judging th e  s ig n ifican ce  
o f th ings and events w ith reference to  what should be done; the  o th e r, 
in  the ideas th a t  axe used to  d ire c t  and ju s t i f y  a c t i v i t i e s  and
judgments,36
But elsewhere Dewey focuses on the kind o f  perception o f sense which 
he c a l l s  ap p rec ia tio n . In  Essays in  Experimental Logic, fo r  example, he 
says th a t
such terms a s  "meaning," " s ig n ific an ce ,"  "value,"  have a  double sense. 
Sometimes they mean a  function* the  o ff ic e  o f  one th in g  rep resen ting  
ano ther, o r  poin ting  to  i t  a s  Im plied; the opera tion , in  s h o r t ,  o f 
serving a s  s ig n . In the word "symbol" th i s  meaning i s  p ra c tic a lly  
exhaustive. But the terms a lso  sometimes mean an inheren t q u a li ty , 
a  q u a lity  in t r in s ic a l ly  ch arac te riz in g  the th in g  experienced and 
making i t  worth w hile. The word "sense,"  as in  the phrase "sense 
of a  th in g ,"  (and non-sense) i s  devoted to  th i s  use a s  d e f in i te ly  
as a re  the  words "sign" and "symbol" to  the  o th er, In  such a  p a ir  
a s  "import" and "im portance," the f i r s t  tends to  s e le c t  the reference 
to  another th in g  while the  second names an in t r in s ic  con ten t. In 
r e f le c tio n , the  e x tr in s ic  reference i s  always prim ary. . . . In  the 
s itu a tio n  which follows upon re f le c t io n , meanings a re  i n t r in s i c *3? 
they have no Instrum ental o r  subserv ien t o f f ic e , because they have 
no o ff ice  a t  a l l .  They a re  a s  much q u a l i t ie s  o f the  ob jec ts  in  the 
s itu a tio n  a s  a re  red and b lack , hard and s o f t ,  square and round.
And every re f le c t iv e  experience adds new shades o f such in t r in s ic  
q u a lif ic a tio n s . In  o th e r words, while re f le c tiv e  knowing i s  in s tru ­
mental to  gain ing  co n tro l in  a  troub led  s itu a t io n  (and thus has a 
p ra c tic a l o r  u t i l i t a r i a n  fo rce ) , i t  i s  a lso  instrum ental to  the  en­
richment o f  the  s ig n ifican ce  o f subsequent experiences.38
And then Dewey concludes, in  re fu ta tio n  o f the  c r itic ism  o f those 
philosophers who m istakenly regarded h is  view o f experience as mere busi­
n e ss , w ith no place fo r  enjoyment, ap p rec ia tio n , o r  r e s t f u l  contemplation* 
"And i t  may w ell be th a t  th is  by-product, th is  g i f t  o f  the gods, i s
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incomparably more valuable fo r  l iv in g  a  l i f e  than i s  the  primary and in ­
tended r e s u l t  o f  c o n tro l, e s s e n tia l  a s  i s  th a t  co n tro l to  having a  l i f e  
to  l iv e ." 39
Let me summarize now Dewey's view o f perception in  the  following 
o u tlin e t
A, Perception as  Feeling (w ithout presence o f  meaning).
1 . Here fe e lin g  o r having o f q u a l i t ie s ,
2. Having q u a l i t ie s ,  and responding in accordance w ith h ab its  
p rev iously  developed, to  those q u a l i t ie s .
B, Perception o f  Meaning,
i .  C ognitive, r e f le c t iv e  perception o f meaning! perception 
o f  s ig n if ic a t io n ,
C, Perception o f  Sense.
1. Apprehension.
2. A ppreciation o r contem plation.
I t  seems to  me th a t  th i s  d is t in c tio n  between perception o f  s ig n i f i ­
ca tion  and perception a s  apprehension, on the  one hand, and perception 
a s  app recia tion  on the  o th e r can be b e t te r  understood by seeing i t  in  the
l ig h t  o f  the two modes o f  re la t io n  in  which Dewey th in k s  we stand  to  the
L q
world. He c a l l s  these consummatory and p repara to ry . A consummatory 
experience i s  one in  which we enjoy o r  s u f fe r  d ire c t ly  an a c t iv i ty  o r  an 
o b jec t, and the a c t iv i ty  o r  o b jec t so enjoyed o r su ffe red  i s  immediate, 
f in a l ,  and absorbing. He a re  absorbed in  our a c t iv i ty  o r the o b jec t o f  
our a tte n tio n  ra th e r  than dealing  w ith i t  as  a  means to  some end which 
we a re  concerned to  b rin g  about. For th is  reason, Dewey c a l l s  i t  a  f in a l
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r a th e r  than a  p reparatory  kind o f experience. He uses as  an example o f
an o b jec t so regarded the  f la g  a s  perceived by a  person in  a  moment o f 
41p a t r io t ic  fe rv o r. The f la g  h e re , in  such an experience, i s  n o t a  sign
o r  in d ica tio n  o f something e ls e , some a c t iv i ty  th a t one a n tic ip a te s  in
the  way th a t ,  in  my previous example about the  road map, the  l in e  one
sees on the map rep resen ts  ano ther and separa te  th in g , v iz . ,  a  road and
an action to be taken. Rather, Dewey says, i s  the flag  something like
a  totem in  th a t  i t  embodies c e r ta in  th ings ( in  the  case o f the  totem a
whole so c ia l o rg an iza tio n ). Such symbols a re  "oondensed s u b s ti tu te s  o f
a c tu a l th ings and events^ which embody a c tu a l th ings w ith more d i r e c t  and
enhanced import than do the  th ings themselves w ith t h e i r  d is t r a c t io n s ,
42im positions, and ir re le v a n c ie s ,"
Now the way in  which the  whole s o c ia l organization  i s  contained in  
the  totem, and the  meaning o f  the f la g  in  the f la g  a s  experienced by the 
p a t r io t  in  a  moment o f  p a t r io t ic  fe rv o r, i s  the way in  which the  sense 
o f a  th ing  o r a  s e t  o f  q u a l i t ie s  i s  perceived in  ap p re c ia tio n . In  both 
cases the meaning i s  in h eren t in  the  th in g , and th e  experience i s  one o f 
absorp tion  in  something f in a l  and se lf-co n ta in ed .
A preparatory  kind o f  experience i s  one in  which, r a th e r  than being 
absorbed in  an o b jec t o r  a c t iv i ty  and i t s  in t r in s ic  meaning, we regard 
th in g s  as p o ssib le  means to  a  fu tu re  ev en tu a lity . I f  one has lo s t  h is  
way and i t  i s  growing l a t e ,  he has no time to  look a t  f lag s  p a t r io t ic a l ly ,  
o r  to  have any o th e r such consummatory experience} he has to  look around 
f o r  signs o f th e  way home. He th e re fo re  regards th in g s  a s  means to  the 
so lu tio n  o f h is  problem/ being lo s t  and needing to  g e t home. He looks
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f o r  road s ig n s , people he n ig h t ask fo r  d ire c tio n s , and so on, in  order 
to  g e t some in d ica tio n  o f the  proper course o f  a c tio n , the b e s t means fo r  
th e  so lu tio n  o f h is  d i f f i c u l t i e s .
The way in  which these  s igns a re  experienced i s  the way in  which we 
perceive both in  the sense o f  apprehension and in  the sense o f  awareness 
o f  s ig n if ic a t io n . I t  i s  perception  which i s  a  p reparato ry  kind o f  exper­
ience—an experience in  which one i s  looking forward to  the  occurrence of 
fu tu re  events ra th e r  than re s tin g  in  the  consummatory enjoyment o r  “su f­
fe ring" o f a  p resen t one.
Now these  two kinds o f  experience—v iz , , the  consummatory and the 
p reparato ry—a re  no t ju s t  two kinds o f  experience th a t  occur independently 
o f  each o th e r in  our experience. They a re  re a lly  c lo se ly  t ie d  up with 
each o th er. For s ig n if ic a t io n j  Dewey says, “denotes the  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f 
a  l a t e r  f u l f i l l i n g  sense o f  th ings in  immediate ap p ro p ria tions and enjoy­
ments, So involved in  the very notion o f s ig n if ic a tio n  (and we may 
add, I  b e lie v e , apprehension) i s  i t s  capac ity  to  lead  us to  a  consummatory
ii ) i
experience o f  "sen se-fu l"  awareness o f  th in g s . Furthermore, the  appre­
c ia tio n  o f the sense o f  a  th ing  i s  enhanced by the  p reparatory  a c t i v i t i e s  
th a t  have le d  up to  i t .  This i s  tru e  both in  the sense th a t ,  f o r  example, 
one ap p rec ia te s  a  th in g  more i f  he has had to  s tru g g le  to  g e t i t ,  and in  
the  sense th a t  i t  takes on a  new and r ic h e r  meaning as  a  r e s u l t  o f  th a t  
very p reparatory  a c t iv i ty .  Take the  f la g  th a t  was p lan ted  a top  Iwo Jima 
a s  an example. I t  i s  app recia ted  more because o f the agony, bloodshed, 
and death th a t  went in to  p u ttin g  i t  th e re , bu t i t  a lso  means, contains 
immanently in  i t ,  th a t  very f ie rc e  f ig h tin g  and dying th a t  occurred in
I-  81* -
o rd er th a t  i t  n ig h t f ly  th e re . Thus Dewey says, a s  we have seen above, 
th a t  the  ob jec ts  o f  perception gradually  acqu ire  a  richness and depth o f 
neaning (which i s  appreciated) which nay w ell be nore valuable than the 
re so lu tio n  o f a  d i f f ic u l ty  which inqu iry  and preparatory  a c t iv i ty  (and 
th e i r  a tten d an t apprehensions and perceptions o f s ig n if ic a tio n )  o r ig in a lly  
a rose  to  e f f e c t .
Let ae emphasize the po in t th a t  not a l l  perception o f sense has th is  
consummatory ch arac te r o f  absorp tion  in  the contem plation o f  an ob jec t 
which we saw to  be the  case w ith the p a t r io t  and h is  f la g . There i s  a lso  
an immediate grasping o f the  sense o f  a  th ing  which i s  not o f  th is  appre­
c ia t iv e  or a e s th e tic  ch arac te r, but i s  n ev ertheless  the apprehension o f 
a  neaning th a t  i s  contained in  the  o b jec t o r  the q u a l i t ie s .  My awareness, 
f o r  exanple, o f  an American f la g , in  a  n o n -p a tr lo tic  noaent, i s  such a  
perception o f  the  sense o f a  th in g . I f  someone s e ts  ne the problem of 
picking out the French f la g  from a group o f f la g s , I  w il l ,  in  the course 
o f coning acro ss  th e  French f la g , n o tice  th a t  a  p a r t ic u la r  one i s  the 
American f la g , and th e re fo re  not the one I  an looking fo r . This percep­
tio n  o f a  p a r t ic u la r  f la g  as  the American f la g  w ill  be a  d i r e c t  and imme­
d ia te  one o f  i t s  sense) I  do no t have to  r e f le c t  o r  e x p l ic i t ly  to  apply 
c r i t e r i a  in  o rder to  id e n tify  i t  a s  the American f la g . I t  i s  th e re fo re  
perceived in  the  mode o f  apprehension.
But the perception o f  the French f la g , which i s  one I  am not fa m ilia r  
w ith , w ill  req u ire  re f le c tio n  and Inqu iry . I  n ig h t have to  consu lt a  
manual o r  ask sone questions, and then apply the r e s u l ts  o f  these  inves­
t ig a tio n s  to  the  se le c tio n  o f the appropria te  f la g . In  such a  case, then .
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perception would be in  the  mode o f  s ig n if ic a tio n  ra th e r  than o f sense.
For i t  i s  perceiving by in ference , ra th e r  than immediately o r d ire c tly
( ra th e r  than , then , n o n -re f le c tiv e ly , non -cogn itive ly ), and i t s  meaning
i s  th e re fo re  e x tr in s ic  to  i t ,  not immanent to  o r  inheren t in  i t .
Because o f previous experience with o b jec ts , Dewey says, we come to
recognize some o f them
on s ig h t. I  see o r  note d ire c t ly  th a t  th is  i s  a  typew rite r, th a t 
i s  a  book, the o th e r th ing  i s  a  ra d ia to r , e tc .  This kind o f d ire c t  
"knowledge" I  s h a l l  o a l l  apprehensions i t  i s  se iz in g  o r grasping, 
in te l le c tu a l ly ,  w ithout questioning . But i t  i s  a product mediated 
through c e r ta in  organic mechanisms o f  re ten tio n  and h a b it, and i t  
presupposes p r io r  experiences and mediated conclusions drawn from 
them.^5
Apprehension i s  p a rt o f the preparatory  kind o f experience which i s  
inqu iry . The o th e r kind o f  immediate grasping o f meaning occurs a f t e r  
preparatory  experience has been completed. I t  i s  the enjoyment o f the 
s a tis fa c to ry  term ination o f  such experience. This, a s  we have seen,
Dewey c a l ls  app recia tion  o r  contem plation. Like apprehension, appreci­
a tio n  o r contemplation involves perceiving something which i s  "funded" 
w ith meaning given to  i t  by previous tran sac tio n s  with i t .  I t  therefo re  
presupposes previous in q u ir ie s  and th e i r  consequent a c ts  o f knowing, but 
i t  i s  not i t s e l f  an a c t  o f knowledge o r  cognition , In  contem plation, 
Dewey says, "knowing has stepped out o f  the picture} the v ision  i s  e s­
th e t ic .  This may be b e t te r  than knowing; but i t s  being b e t te r  i s  no
reason fo r  mixing d if f e r e n t  th ings and a t t r ib u t in g  to  knowledge charac-
46te r s  belonging to  an e s th e tic  o b jec t."
The question  one might w ell ask a t  th i s  po in t i s  whether Dewey could 
r e a l ly  have maintained th a t  app recia tin g  o r contem plating a  th ing  can be
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sa id  to  be -perception o f i t .  One n igh t argue, th a t  i s ,  th a t  sonething 
has to  be perceived before i t  can be appreciated  o r  contenplated , and 
th a t  apprecia tion  i s  a  subsequent and d if fe re n t a c t .  Such perception 
need not be sense-percep tion , o f course. On can ap p rec ia te  o r  contem­
p la te  an o b jec t o f  sense-perception , a s  he does when he apprecia tes  a 
pa in ting  o r  a  fine  build ing  which i s  contemporaneously a ffe c tin g  h is  
sense-organs. But he can a lso  app recia te  an o b jec t perceived by way o f 
r e c a l l ,  f o r  example, savoring the memory o f a  fin e  o ld  church seen in  
Mexico. Or he can apprecia te  an o b jec t perceived by way o f  im agination, 
a s  an a rc h ite c t  might savor the o b jec t o f  an Imagined perception which 
he plans to  b u ild . But i s  there  not f i r s t  the perception o f  the o b jec t 
o f  sense-percep tion , memory-perception, and inag ination -percep tion , and 
th en , a s  ano ther s o r t  o f  a c t ,  the a e s th e tic  enjoyment o r  apprecia tion  o f 
i t ?  A ppreciation, then, would seem no t to  be ano ther kind o f perception 
o f  sense, but ra th e r  a  fu r th e r  a c t ,  follow ing upon a previous perception 
o f  sense, whether sense-perception , in ag ina tion -percep tion , memory- 
percep tion , o r  some o th e r kind of perception.
The issu e  comes, then , to  th is t  Do we f i r s t  perceive the o b jec t, 
l e t  its say R oot's fhmous Monadnock bu ild ing  here in  Chicago, and then, 
in  a  separa te  a c t  o r  group o f  a c ts ,  which a re  non-perceptual in  ch arac te r, 
ap p rec ia te  i t ?  Or i s  the app recia tion  i t s e l f  a  perceptual ac t?
Now i t  seems to  me th a t  to  hold th a t  apprecia tion  i s  a  separate  a c t 
from perception i s  to  take a  view lik e  th a t o f  the em otiv ists  th a t  a l l  we 
a c tu a lly  perceive in  a  work o f a r t  o r  a  person o r  s i tu a tio n  th a t i s  valu­
ab le  a re  purely  fa c tu a l c h a ra c te r is t ic s . A ll th a t  we a c tu a lly  perceive
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in  the Monadnock a re  i t s  shape, co lo r, the th ickness o f  i t s  n a i l s ,  i t s  
undulating hay windows, i t s  s in p le , unadorned w alls , e tc .  And then , when 
we say i t  i s  g racefu l and th a t  i t  i s  a  wonderful balance o f a u s te r i ty  and 
lig h tn e ss , we a re  ju s t  re a c tin g  to  i t  with an e n tire ly  sub jec tive  response. 
These evalua tive  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  a re  no t p a r ts  o f what i s  perceived. They 
a re  in  u s . n o t out th e re . Value i s  su b jec tiv e ; fa c t alone i s  ob jec tiv e .
Such a  view o f apprecia tion  i s  e x p l ic i t ly  denied by Dewey, however.
The grace, charm, balance, and a u s te r i ty  o f the  Monadnock a re  no t in u s i 
they  a re  in  the  Monadnock. Thus he says th a t  such q u a li t ie s  "are  as  much 
q u a l i t ie s  o f the ob jects in  the s itu a tio n  a s  a re  red and black, hard and
hn
s o f t ,  square and round." But to  say th a t they a re  in  the s i tu a tio n  
seems to  me to  imply th a t  we find them th e re , in  some kind o f perceptual 
a c t  th a t  we engage in .
C erta in ly  i t  i s  tru e  th a t  such q u a l i t ie s  a s  a re  appreciated  a re  not 
in  the  o b jec t a s  we perceive i t  i n i t i a l l y . They a re  there  as the  product 
o f  a  study o r  in v e s tig a tio n . A usterity  as th e  meaning o f the unadorned 
w alls and some o f the windows, which a re  p riso n -lik e  in  th e i r  recessed 
p o s itio n s , I s  not obviousi i t  probably must f i r s t  be grasped in  the mode 
o f  s ig n if ic a tio n  a s  a sep ara te ly  meant s ig n ifican ce  o f  the bu ild ing ’s 
more obvious c h a ra c te r is t ic s ,  as something th a t  i s  e x tr in s ic  to  the  q u a li­
t i e s  them selves. A ll a r t-a p p re c ia tio n  would seem to  involve a  period o f 
a n a ly s is  whereby we survey the  obvious fhc ts  o f  the o b jec t; then the nean­
ing  o f those fa c ts  comes to  us; and f in a l ly ,  in  the a c t  o f ap p rec ia tio n , 
a s  the kind o f  perception "which follows upon re f le c t io n ,"  these  meanings 
come to  be in t r in s ic  to  the  th ing  i t s e l f .
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The view, then , th a t  perception cannot ever have (and th a t  Dewey 
cannot mean th a t  i t  has) a s  i t s  o b jec t anything lik e  an a e s th e tic  ob jec t, 
w ith i t s  v a lu e -c h a ra c te r is tic 8 , seems to  me to  r e s t  on the assumption 
th a t  perception i s  always o f f a c ts .  But Dewey, I  th ink r ig h t ly , th inks 
the world o f  our percep tual experience has v a lu e -c h a ra c te r is tic s  as  much 
a  p a rt o f  i t  a s  co lo rs , te x tu re s , and shapes.
There i s  ano ther reason why one might be in c lin ed  to  regard appre­
c ia tio n  a s  some kind o f  a  non-pereeptual o r  post-percep tual a c t .  This i s  
an In c lin a tio n  on the  p a rt o f  some philosophers to  l im it  perception to  
such simple and mundane th ings a s  t r e e s ,  ru g s , c h a irs , e t c . ,  and these 
a s  they e n te r  in to  one’s o rd inary , ru n -o f-th e -m ill a f f a i r s .  But in  f a c t ,  
f o r  Dewey, perception i s  the grasping o f any meaning e i th e r  im plied by 
o r contained in  a  s e t  o f q u a l i t ie s  o r  an o b jec t. Perception can th e re ­
fo re  be the apprehension no t merely o f the  f a c t  th a t  th i s  i s  a  c h a ir , but 
o f an immensely r ic h  and complex meaning. I t  can be something a s  compli­
cated  a s  a  g e n e ra l 's  grasping o f  the  e n tire  s tra teg y  o f h is  opposing gen­
e ra l  from the  configura tion  o f the  enemy's troops as  sym bolically spread 
out on a  tab le  in  fro n t o f  him.
Now I  do n o t mean to  claim th a t  Dewey regards the  whole experience
o f apprecia tion  o r  contem plation a s  being e i th e r  percep tual o r lim ited
to  one p a r t ic u la r  kind o f perception . E specially  when one i s  involved
in  th e  kind o f app recia tio n  in  which he "savors a  th ing  fu lly —as  Arnold
48B en n e tt's  heroines a re  wont to  do ,"  would i t  seem th a t  more than mere 
sense-perceptlon i s  involved. Dewey would probably want to  say th a t  such 
an experience goes beyond ju s t  sense-perceptlon  and involves o n e 's  own
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emotional response. And i t  might a lso  involve some propriocep tive  per­
ception o f  the  meaning o f  one*s own in te rn a l  fe e lin g s . Also i t  might 
involve some purely  conceptual elements—"having meanings and ro l l in g  
them over as sweet m orsels under the tongue,"  7 he says in  Experience 
and N ature. And i t  might a lso  involve memory-perceptions and im agination- 
pereep tions.
N evertheless, I  th ink  he does mean to  say th a t  a t  le a s t  p a rt o f the 
"enhanced and in te n s if ie d  experience o f  an object"**0 i s  some kind o f per­
cep tion . And th is  no t in  th a t  some kind o f  perception provides the  mate­
r i a l  on the b asis  o f  which one performs subsequent ap p rec ia tiv e  a c ts ,  but 
ra th e r  th a t  th e re  i s  a  k ind o f  perception which i s  i t s e l f  a p p rec ia tio n .
For the  o b jec t o f perception  i t s e l f ,  and n o t ju s t  o n e 's  sub jec tiv e  re ­
sponse, i s  enriched and enhanced by the  funding o f  o n e 's  previous exper­
iences w ith i t .
Most o f our experience i s  n o t exclusive ly  e i th e r  o f  the  consummatory 
o r  o f  the  p reparatory  type. We a re  n o t u su a lly  involved purely  in  con­
tem plative o r  ap p rec ia tiv e  savoring o f an o b jec t o r  an a c t iv i ty ,  o r  in ­
volved in  a  purely lab o rin g , working kind o f experience in  which the mean­
ing o f  everything perceived l i e s  beyond i t  in  a  fu tu re  ev en tu a lity  which 
our a c t iv i ty  i s  p ro jec ted  toward achieving . In s tead , most experience i s  
o f  a  dua l s o r t ,  involving both consummatory and p reparatory  elem ents. 
Indeed, a t  times Dewey seems to  believe th a t  there  i s  never an experience 
which i s  purely  the  one o r  the o th er.
A ll experienced ob jec ts  have a  double s ta tu s .  They a re  ind iv idu­
a liz e d , consummatory, whether in  the  way o f enjoyment o r  o f  s u f fe r ­
in g . They a re  a lso  involved in  a  c o n tin u ity  o f  in te ra c tio n s  and
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changes, and hence a re  causes and p o te n tia l neans o f  l a t e r  exper­
iences. Because o f  th i s  dual capac ity , they become problem atic. 
Immediately and d i r e c t ly  they a re  ju s t  what they  a re j but a s  tra n ­
s it io n s  to  and p o s s ib i l i t ie s  o f  l a t e r  experiences they  a re  uncer­
ta in ,  There i s  a  divided response t p a r t  o f  th e  organic a c t iv i ty  
i s  d ire c ted  to  then fo r  what they ism edlately  a re , and p a rt to  them 
as t r a n s i t iv e  neans o f  o th e r experienced o b je c ts . We re a c t to  then 
both as  f i n a l i t i e s  and in  preparato ry  ways, and the two reactions 
do n o t harm onize,51
The answer to  the question  of whether experience i s  always o f th is  
dual na ture  would seen to  depend on how th ic k ly  o r  th in ly  we s l ic e  exper­
ience . C erta in ly  th e re  a re  occasions when we a re  completely absorbed in  
contem plation. One might ju s t  savor the Parthenon, fo r  example, o r  a  
landscape, w ithout any kind o f inqu iry  o r  p reparatory  a c t iv i ty  in  general 
going on. But such an experience doubtless soon g ives way to  some kind 
o f  preparatory  a c t iv i ty ,  e i th e r  inqu iry  in to  such a  question  a s  why they 
b u i l t  i t  here on th is  h i l l ,  and as they d id  b u ild  i t ,  o r  where one s h a ll  
have h is  d inner to n ig h t, o r  from what perspective  he can g e t the b est 
photograph o f  i t .
So the  t o t a l  experience o f viewing th e  Parthenon one fin e  Greek 
afternoon w il l  include both perception o f sense in  the  mode o f appreci­
a t io n , a  p a r t  o f  consummatory experience, and perception o f  s ig n if ic a ­
t io n ,  a  p a r t o f  p reparato ry  experience. But w ithin  the t o t a l  experience 
th e re  a re  su re ly  s tre tc h e s  th a t  a re  purely  the one o r the o th er.
Dewey c h a ra c te r is t ic a l ly  re la te s  h is  metaphysics o f experience to  
v a lu e-considera tions. He sees here in  th i s  d iv is io n  between consummatory 
and preparatory  experience the  source o f  one o f th e  basic  o o n flic ts  o f 
l i f e .  I t  i s  the  c o n f l ic t  one sees running throughout Thomas Mann's w rit­
in g s , f o r  example, between the  d esire  fo r  work and the longing fo r  ju s t
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stopping and enjoying th in g s , "Each o f  us, "Dewey says, "can re c a l l  many
occasions when he has been perplexed by disagreement between th ings d ire c t ly
present and th e i r  p o te n tia l value a s  signs and means? when he has been to m
between absorp tion  in  what i s  now enjoyed and the need o f a l te r in g  i t  so
52as  to  prepare fo r  something l ik e ly  to  come,"
"The woods a re  lo v e ly , dark , and deep? bu t I  have promises to  keep,
53and miles to  go before I  s leep , m iles to  go before I  s leep .
In A rt as Experience Dewey deplores the separa tion  between consum­
matory and preparatory  a c t i v i t i e s  th a t  ch arac te rizes  so much o f modem 
l i f e .  The a e s th e tic  has been divorced from ordinary human experience and 
re legated  to  the  museum, in stead  of being in tim ate ly  t ie d  in  w ith one’s 
everyday experience, a s  Dewey conceives i t  was o r ig in a lly . And people’s 
work has become humdrum lab o r, unaccompanied by a  s a t is fa c tio n  o f  having 
completed something w ell. We now d iv ide  our l iv e s  in to  work and p lay , 
and f a i l  to  achieve genuine s a t is fa c t io n  even in  the  l a t t e r .  For the 
f in e s t  k ind o f  experience ,  the a e s th e tic ,  which can occur in  any endeavor, 
whether in te l le c tu a l ,  p ra c t ic a l ,  o r  s t r i c t l y  a r t i s t i c ,  i s  an experience 
th a t  l i e s  between, on the one hand, "the humdrum" with i t s  "submission 
to  convention in  p ra c tic e  and in te l le c tu a l  procedure," i t s  " r ig id  a b s t i ­
nence, coerced submission"? and, on the o th e r hand, "d is s ip a tio n , inco-
eh.
herence, and aim less indulgence."-^  And these  two re a lly  seem to  char­
a c te r iz e  the  l i f e  o f  modem man, a  humdrum performance o f h is  job, which 
he does mechanically and sem i-consciously, and aim less, unconscious d is ­
s ip a tio n  which he c a l l s  enjoyment.
The a e s th e tic  experience, in  which one i s  most a l iv e ,  v i t a l ,  and
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p e rc e p t iv e ,^  has both p reparatory  and consummatory elements in  i t ,  in te ­
g ra lly  joined and a ffe c tin g  each o th er. The a n tic ip a te d  consummation 
c a r r ie s  over in to  the p reparations themselves and g ives them a consumma­
te ly  elem ent, and the p reparations a re  c a rrie d  over in to  the consummation 
and become p a rt o f  i t s  meaning in  the a c t  o f  ap p rec ia tiv e  perception . I t  
i s  a  lab o r o f  love and an enjoyment th a t  contains in  i t  a  richness and 
d iv e rs ity  made possib le  by th a t  very lab o r which preceded i t .
Dewey pokes fun a t  the  ph ilosoph ical account o f  enjoyment and p leas­
u re . I t  i s ,  l ik e  the ph ilosoph ical account o f percep tion , cu riously  re ­
mote from enjoyment as i t  i s  a c tu a lly  experienced.
Even philosophers who have conceived th a t  p leasure  i s  the so le  motive 
o f  man and the  atta inm ent o f  happiness h is  so le  aim, have given a 
curiously  sober, drab account o f the working o f  pleasure and the 
search fo r  happiness. Consider the u t i l i t a r i a n s ,  how they to i le d , 
spun and wove, but who never saw man arrayed in  joy a s  the l i l i e s  
o f  the  f i e l d .56
This in a tte n tio n  to  the way in  which the joy o f  consummation can carry  
over to  the p reparation  o f  the  b e au tifu l o b jec t o r  the consummatory exper­
ience in  general led  P la to  to  a  disparagement o f p ra c tice  and lab o r. And 
A ris to tle  defines p leasure a s  the  completion o f an a c t .  Dewey i s  here 
po in ting  to  the f a c t  th a t ,  as  men a re  "arrayed in  joy" out in  the f ie ld ,  
in s tead  o f as  seen in  the  ph ilo sopher's  study , they a re , a t  b e s t, joyous 
in  lab o r a s  w ell a s  in  completion o f lab o r. Thus Dewey says th a t
a t  the  o u tse t the hunt was enjoyed in  the f e a s t ,  o r  in  the calm 
moments o f  shaping sp ea rs , bows and arrow s. Only l a t e r  was the  
content o f  these  experiences ca rr ie d  over in to  hunting i t s e l f ,  so 
th a t  even i t s  dangers might be savored. la b o r , through i t s  s tru c ­
tu re  and o rder; lends play i t s  p a tte rn  and p lo t (^otherwise i t  would 
be the  unrefined , unsophistica ted  "enjoyment" o f  d issipation]]t play 
then re tu rn s  the loan w ith in te r e s t  to  work, in  giving i t  a  sense 
o f beginning, sequence and climax. 5?
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Ibus we see th a t  the kind o f perception o f sense which Dewey c a l l s  
"appreciation" occurs not only a t  the  completion o f  an a c t  o f  inqu iry .
Bather i s  i t  the case th a t  app recia tion  occurs even before the  consunaa-
*58tio n  i s  reached. In  A rt a s  Experience Dewey expresses th i s  point in 
th i s  way: " Ib is  consummation, moreover, does not w ait in  consciousness
fo r  the  whole undertaking to  be f in ish e d . I t  i s  an tic ip a te d  throughout 
and i s  re c u rre n tly  savored with sp ec ia l in te n s i ty ."
Dewey i s  ta lk in g  here about those experiences which have a e s th e tic  
q u a li ty . Such q u a lity  can belong to  a l l  kinds o f experience, no t ju s t  
" d is tin c t iv e ly  e s th e tic "  o n e s ,^  I t  c o n s is ts  in  a  re la tio n sh ip  among 
the  p a rts  o f the  experience which Dewey c a l l s  " linkage,"  a  re la tio n sh ip  
such th a t  the various p a r ts  look forward to  th e i r  successors and back­
ward to  th e i r  antecedents r a th e r  than simply succeeding one ano ther. In 
l is te n in g  ap p rec ia tiv e ly  to  music, fo r  example; one does n o t hear one 
sound o r  even a  group o f sounds and then fo rg e t i t .  Bather does one keep 
previous sounds in  mind and a n tic ip a te  (e sp ec ia lly  on l a t e r  hearings) 
fu tu re  ones. And in  co n structing  a  proof in  symbolic lo g ic , to  take a  
n o n -aesth e tic  experience which nevertheless  has a e s th e tic  q u a li ty , one 
must, in  the m idst o f h is  proof, be aware o f  p r io r  s tep s  and be looking 
ahead toward subsequent ones and, o f  course, u ltim ate ly  to  the  f in a l  one, 
the  one a f t e r  which he can w rite ; Q. E. D.
Dewey's view seems to  me suggestive , a s  h is  views u su a lly  a re , but 
nevertheless  questionab le . I  ag ree , th a t  i s ,  th a t ,  a s  he claim s, the 
f in e s t  experiences we have a re  those " in te g ra l"  ones in  which a e s th e tic  
q u a lity  o r  linkage i s  p re sen t. But I  do not agree with him th a t  the a c t
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o f ap p rec ia tio n , when i t  occurs in  such an experience^ always co n sis ts  
in  an a n tic ip a tio n  o f the consusuaation o f the experience as  a  whole.
One can a p p rec ia te , fo r  exanple, a  p a r t ic u la r  passage in  the course o f 
a  musical work no t because i t  i s  perceived in  any way as con trib u tin g  to  
a  f in a l  consummation o r re so lu tio n , bu t ju s t  in  i t s e l f .  I t  i s  appreci­
a ted  as being ju s t  the lovely  group o f sounds th a t  i t  i s .  Of course, a l l  
o f  these must be experienced to g e th e r a s  one in te g ra l  group, but they can 
form an o b jec t o f  apprecia tion  independent o f  the  consummation o f the 
work as a  whole.
I f  one i s  engaged in  a  p ra c tic a l  kind o f undertaking, l ik e  th a t  o f  
fix in g  a  f l a t ,  then perhaps each s te p  i s  savored as being an tic ip a to ry  
o f the consummation, v iz . ,  having a  t i r e  a t  f u l l  pressure th a t  one can 
d riv e  on again . But d is t in c t iv e ly  a e s th e tic  experiences, although they 
a re  perhaps id e a lly  d irec ted  towards ob jects which have a  kind o f a l l -  
pervasive u n ity  which the  u ltim ate  consummatory experience w ill  appre­
c ia te —these experiences seem nevertheless to  have components th a t  a re  
appreciated  and y e t involve no reference  a t  a l l  to  th a t  u ltim ate  con­
summatory in s ig h t.
Dewey'3  a n a ly s is , in  A rt a s  Experience, o f  a e s th e tic  perception o r  
apprecia tion  ra is e s  some questions about the previously formulated scheme, 
according to  which I  have been try in g  to  in te rp re t  h is  theory o f percep­
tio n .  I t  w il l  be re c a lle d  th a t  I  described app recia tion  th e re  as a  kind 
o f  sense-perception o f  sense in  which one experienced, l e t  us say, the 
reaching o f the  shoulder o f  the expressway a s  being the  s a tis fa c to ry  
re so lu tio n  o f  a  problematic s i tu a t io n , But h e re , in  the d is t in c tiv e ly
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a e s th e tic  kind o f experience, we have no t been sense-perceiv ing , since 
Dewey l i n i t s  h is  use o f the term "sense-perception" to  p ra c t ic a l  contexts 
in  which overt a c tio n  i s  re le v an t. In "dramatic o f  l i t e r a r y  o r  p layfu l" 
co n tex ts , however, no such overt a c tio n  i s  ever c a lled  fo r  o r  re lev an t.
So i t  would seem th a t  the kind o f perception th a t  goes on in  d is t in c t iv e ly  
a e s th e tic  experiences i s  a  non-cognitive kind of perception o f  a  meaning 
which i s  n o t re lev an t to  a c tio n  now o r  ever, (Perception o f a  meaning 
which e n ta i ls  the relevance o f a c tio n  in  the fu tu re  he c a l l s  "conceptual 
p e rcep tio n .”) Rather i s  i t  a  meaning on which we a c t  only in  a  p lay fu l 
o r  im aginative way.
There i s  a  fu r th e r  d i f f ic u l ty  w ith Dewey's theory o f a e s th e tic  per­
ception which we need to  consider now. This i s  the problem o f whether 
a e s th e tic  perception i s  cognitive  o r  non-cognitive. I t  i s  undeniable,
I  b e liev e , and Dewey admits t h i s , ^  th a t  th ink ing  goes on in  a r t .  (And 
I  be lieve he would say th a t  i t  goes on in  the experience o f  the appre- 
c ia to r  a s  w ell a s  in  th a t  o f  the  a r t i s t . )  For the p a in te r , fo r  example, 
c e r ta in ly
must co nstan tly  undergo the e f fe c t  o f  h is  every brush stroke  o r  he 
w ill  n o t be aware o f what he i s  doing o r where h is  work i s  going. 
Moreover, he h a s .to  see each p a r t ic u la r  connection o f doing and 
undergoing in  re la t io n  to  the whole th a t he d e s ire s  to  produce.
To apprehend such re la tio n s  i s  to  th in k , and i s  one o f the most 
exacting modes o f thought.
But i f  th inking  goes on in  a r t ,  then i t  would seem th a t  the aes­
th e t ic  experience i s  a  cognitive  and not a  non-cognitive one. I t  would 
seem, th a t  i s ,  th a t  in  d is t in c t iv e ly  a e s th e tic  experience the a r t i s t  as 
w ell as the  responsive viewer o r  l i s t e n e r  i s  a c tu a lly  involved in  some­
th in g  lik e  a  problem atic s i tu a tio n . Dewey seems, th e re fo re , to  be
committed to  the  view th a t  a e s th e tic  perception  i s  a  cognitive  kind o f 
percep tion» a  view th a t  i s  con trary  to  the  view o f a e s th e tic  perception 
he holds in  Experience and Nature, fo r  example.
Let me suggest, however, the follow ing in te rp re ta tio n  o f Dewey's 
view which w i l l ,  I  b e liev e , rescue him from th is  seeming co n trad ic tio n  in  
h is  view. I  th ink  what he means might be th a t the a r t i s t  and the appre- 
c ia to r ,  when they a re  th ink ing , e .g . ,  tra c in g  ou t re la tio n sh ip s  between 
component p a r ts  o f  a  p a in tin g  o r a  m usical composition, a re  n o t appre­
c ia t in g . They a re  n o t, th a t  i s ,  having an a e s th e tic  experience a t  a l l  
a t  such tim es. Gather they a re  having an experience lik e  th a t  o f  the 
person involved in  any o th e r problem atic s i tu a tio n !  they a re  responding 
to  a  d i f f ic u l ty  w ith hypotheses o r  id eas  ( e .g . ,  "suppose I  p a in t th i s  a  
s l ig h t ly  darker shade o f re d " ) , and they  a re  then te s t in g  these  ideas 
w ith experim ents. Then, a f t e r  the  perception  o f th e  su ccessfu l reso lu ­
tio n  o f  the problem, do they have the a e s th e tic  experience, which, l ik e  
my ap p rec ia tiv e  perception a f t e r  reaching the shoulder o f  the expressway, 
i s  indeed a  non-cognitive savoring o f a  completed performance. So the 
th ink ing  th a t  the  a r t i s t  and the  ap p re c la to r  engage in ,  although i t  i s  
a  necessary condition o f a t  le a s t  some a e s th e tic  experiences, i s  no t a  
p a r t o f  the  a e s th e tic  experience.
Let me re tu rn  now to  a  d iscussion  o f  the th ree  general k inds o f  per­
ception which Dewey recognizes, v iz . ,  fe e lin g , perception  o f  s ig n if ic a ­
tio n , and presence o f sense. The th ree  c o n s ti tu te  a  kind o f  evolu tion  
as  w ell as a  temporal development. For no t only i s  s ig n if ic a tio n  a  l a t e r  
stage tem porally than fe e lin g , and sense than s ig n if ic a t io n , bu t each o f
-  97 -
those i s  an improvement over i t s  immediate predecessor. S ig n ific a tio n  
narks the b ir th  o f  mind in  human experience, w ith  the p ra c tic a l  resource­
fu lness  th a t  only mind can provide to  a  liv in g  c rea tu re t hu t sense, in  
add ition  to  providing immense p ra c tic a l  value in  the  form o f apprehension, 
i s ,  even more im portantly  in  Dewey's view, the source, through apprecia­
tio n , o f  the enjoyment o f  the richness and d iv e rs ity  o f our experience 
and o f the world. T his, a s  we have a lready  seen , Dewey regards a s  a  " g i f t  
o f the gods" perhaps even "more valuable fo r  l iv in g  than i s  th e  intended
62r e s u l t  o f  c o n tro l, e s s e n t ia l  a s  i s  th a t  co n tro l to  having a  l i f e  to  l iv e ."
But th e  development can be seen in  ano ther sense as a  kind o f  Hegelian 
d ia le c t ic .  Feeling in  i t s  immediacy and indeterm inateness i s  the  th e s is .  
S ig n if ic a tio n  i s  the  a n t i th e s is .  I t  in troduces determ ination and the 
p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  co n tro l. Sense then syn thesizes the two, preserv ing  the  
b e st o f  each—the immediacy and d irec tn ess  o f  fe e lin g , and the  determ ina­
t io n , s tru c tu re , and p ra c t ic a l  u t i l i t y  o f  s ig n if ic a tio n .
I t  i s  im portant to  d is tin g u ish  between the  experience we have o f  an 
o b jec t a s  i t  occurs in  a  to ta l ly  non-cognitive context and the  experience 
we have o f  I t  when we a re  engaged in  some s o r t  o f  inqu iry . I f  one i s  
walking down the s t r e e t  w ith no problems whatsoever on h is  mind, simply 
engaged in  an experience which P ro fesso r Browning c a l ls  co astin g , can he 
be sa id  to  be perceiv ing  e i th e r  in  the sense o f  awareness o f  s ig n if ic a ­
tio n  o r  o f  awareness o f  sense? I  be lieve  Dewey's view i s  th a t  he p e r­
ceives in  n e ith e r  sense o f  the  term perception . For Dewey, we perceive 
in  these two ways only when we a re  e i th e r  involved in  in q u iry , o r  ju s t  
a f t e r  in q u iry  has been completed and we a re  savoring o r  contem plating
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i t s  re s u l ts .  So in  the case in  question , viss., th a t  o f  non-cognitively
coasting  along the  s t r e e t ,  we do not perceive the  sidewalk o r the  passing
c a rs , even in  the sense o f being aware o f  the sense o f the  sidewalk. He
simply respond to  the  sidew alk-stim uli, o r  simply have the  passing-car
and o th e r q u a li ta tiv e  s tim u li.
In the essay , “Q u a lita tiv e  Thought," Dewey d iscusses th is  m atter in
connection w ith the experience o f waters
When w ater i s  an adequate stim ulus to  ac tio n  o r  when i t s  reac tio n s  
oppress and overwhelm us, i t  remains ou tside  the scope o f  knowledge. 
When, however, the bare presence o f the  th in g  (say , a s  o p tic a l stim ­
ulus) ceases to  operate  d ire c t ly  as  stim ulus to  response and begins 
to  operate in  connection w ith a  fo recas t o f  the  consequences i t  w ill  
e f fe c t  when responded to , i t  begins to  acqu ire  meaning—to  be known, 
to  be an o b je c t. I t  i s  noted as  something which i s  w et, f lu id ,  
s a t i s f i e s  t h i r s t ,  a l la y s  uneasiness, e tc .  . . .  As long as  the v isu a l 
stim ulus operates as  a  stim ulus on i t s  own account, th e re  i s  no ap­
prehension, no n o tin g , o f co lo r o r  l ig h t  a t  a l l .  To much the  g re a te r  
portion o f  sensory s tim u li we re a c t in  p re c ise ly  th i s  wholly non- 
.cognitive way. In  the a t t i tu d e  o f suspended response in  which the 
consequences a re  a n tic ip a te d , the d ire c t  stim ulus becomes a  sign o r 
index o f  something e ls e —and thus m atter o f no ting  o r apprehension 
o r  acquaintance.63
For Dewey, then, a s  I  have sa id  above, even perception a s  presence 
o f sense occurs only in  cognitive  con tex ts, in  connection w ith some in ­
qu iry  we a re  engaged in .  I f  my c a r  breaks down on the  expressway, I  per­
ceive the sense o f  the q u a l i t ie s  which c o n s ti tu te  the  cars  behind me, by 
way o f  try in g  to  s iz e  up the s i tu a tio n  and fin d  a  way out o f  i t .  But, 
un less I  am in  a t  le a s t  some degree engaged in  Inqu iry , o r  have ju s t  f in ­
ished doing so , I  g rasp  no meaning whatsoever. I  f e e l  a  to ta l  q u a li ta ­
t iv e  s itu a tio n  and I  respond to  i t ,  o r , a s  he says above, I  am overwhelmed
by i t ,  o r , a s  the  d iscussion  o f  "surplusage" in  Essays in  Experimental 
64Logic in d ic a te s , I  simply have i t ,  w ithout e i th e r  responding to  i t ,
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being overwhelmed by i t ,  o r , le a s t  o f a l l ,  in te rp re tin g  i t .
I  spoke above about the immediate grasping o f  the sense o f  the  q u a li­
t i e s  c o n s titu tin g  my ty p ew rite r, lamp, books, and so on, which Dewey c a l ls  
apprehension* But such apprehension and i t s  grasping o f sense does not 
occur a p a r t from some cu rren t inq u iry . And the kind o f grasping o f the 
meaning o f q u a l i t ie s  and th ings which i s  involved in  contemplation does 
no t occur a p a rt from some in q u iry  o f which i t  i s  the completion. At o th e r 
tim es, the ty p e w rlte r-q u a litie s  may be responded to ,  o r merely had, but 
not perceived even as  awareness o f sense.
In  the passage in  Logic in  which Dewey d iscusses the  kind o f aware­
ness o f  sense which he here c a l l s  apprehension, he says about i t  th a t  i t  
i s  a  kind o f  awareness in  which
a f t e r  considerable experience . . .  we come to  reoognize ob jects  on 
s ig h t .  I  see o r  note d ire c t ly  th a t  th is  i s  a  ty p ew rite r, th a t  i s  a  
book, the o th e r th ing  i s  a  ra d ia to r , e tc .  Ib is  kind o f  d ire c t  
"knowledge" I  s h a l l  c a l l  apprehension. I t  i s  se iz in g  o r grasping, 
in te l le c tu a l ly ,  w ithout question ing , , . . But the im portant point 
fo r  the purpose o f  the  p resen t top ic  i s  th a t  e i th e r  an immediate 
overt response occurs, l ik e  using the  typew rite r o r picking up the 
book (in  which case the  s i tu a tio n  i s  not a  cogn itiona l one), or 
th a t  the o b jec t noted i s  p a rt o f  an a c t  o f  inqu iry  d irec ted  toward 
knowledge o r warranted a s s e r t i o n . ® 5
Now th is  claim th a t our perception in  a  non-cognitive s itu a tio n  is  
e n tire ly  o f un in te rp re ted  q u a l i t ie s ,  u n in te rp re ted  e i th e r  as q u a li t ie s  
o f  a  c e r ta in  nature  o r  as  o b je c ts , perhaps seems im plausib le. Surely , 
one i s  in c lin ed  to  o b jec t, th e re  i s  more involved in  even a coasting  ex­
perience than the  mere fe e lin g  o f a  q u a li ta t iv e  s i tu a t io n . I t  would seem 
th a t in  our o rd inary , waking, but not prim arily  cognitive  experience we 
a re  aware o f o b je c ts . I f  I  am walking down the s t r e e t ,  no t exercised by 
any problem, bu t ju s t  coasting , do I  not perceive more than mere "submerged"
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and "obsessive" q u a li t ie s ?  Do I  not experience, even though no t obser­
vantly  o r  concentrated ly , c a rs , people, s to re s , c a ts , shadows on the 
s t r e e t ,  s igns on windows, and so on? And do these no t appear to  me not 
ju s t  when I  am being a  l i t t l e  curious about the way th ings a re  looking 
today, say , on the f i r s t  warm, b rig h t day in  q u ite  a while (which is  
re a lly  a kind o f inqu iry  in  which I  s e t  myself a  problem), but even when 
I  am not in q u irin g  a t  a l l ?  Even when I  am coasting  along, w ith no prob­
lem occupying ray a tte n tio n , ju s t  ly ing  on the beach s ta r in g  a t  the  sea 
and soaking up the sun, fo r  example, and even on the fringe  o r horizon 
o f my perceptual f ie ld  when I  am re f le c t in g , there  seems to  be a  percep­
tio n  o f o b jec ts . Now, as I  w rite  th i s ,  I  am engaged in  a  r e f le c t iv e , 
Inqu iring  kind o f experience. On the  horizon o f my perceptual f ie ld ,  
meantime, there  a re  the sounds and shapes and co lo rs  o f people s i t t in g  
a t  the  counter o f  the re s tau ran t where I  am. Am I  not aware o f  these 
people and the counter and the s to o ls  on which they a re  s i t t i n g ,  not 
merely as c lu s te rs  o f u n in te rp re ted  q u a l i t ie s ,  bu t as q u a l i t ie s  with the 
meaning ( in  the form of sense) of human beings, s to o ls , counter, conver­
sa tio n , lau g h te r, and so on—meanings funded and made autom atic by pre­
vious In q u iries?
I t  i s  te r r ib ly  d i f f i c u l t  to  perform the phenomenological o r  "empir­
ic a l ,  denotative" experiment required  to  answer these  questions. To do 
so req u ires  looking a t  an experience which was n o n -re flec tiv e  and non- 
cognitive from a  re f le c t iv e  and cognitive  point o f view. And doing th is  
seems in ev itab ly  to  turn  th a t  o r ig in a l experience in to  a  re f le c t iv e  ex­
perience, so th a t the  f ie ld  o f perception does indeed become one o f
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o b jects  r a th e r  than one o f c lu s te rs  o f u n in te rp re ted  q u a l i t ie s .  Never­
th e le ss !  armed ag a in s t such a  danger, i t  seems to  me th a t one can recap­
tu re  the p re -re f le c tiv e  experience a s  i t  was liv e d . As I  re f le c te d  on 
th is  problem, fo r  examplej I  was looking in  the d ire c tio n  o f the d raperies  
of the re s ta u ra n t in  which I  was s i t t i n g ,  I  had o r f e l t  the q u a l i t ie s  o f 
these  d rap e rie s , but no t as red o r  o f  a  c e r ta in  shape o r tex tu re j in  f a c t ,  
no t a s  anything a t  a l l .  They were ju s t  b a re , dumb q u a l i t ie s .  The kind 
o f re f le c tio n  I  am involved in ,  when d irec ted  a t  a  p r io r  experience, does 
indeed tu rn  the content o f th a t  experience in to  o b je c ts . P r io r  to  such 
r e f le c t io n , the con ten t, the tha t-w hich-is-experienced , i s ,  I  b e liev e , a 
s e t  o f  q u a l i t ie s  submerged in  the general q u a li ta tiv e  s i tu a tio n .
One may, however, respond to  these u n in te rp re ted  q u a l i t ie s ,  I  may 
wince and grimace because o f the b i t t e r ly  cold wind blowing in  my face 
w ithout even bothering to  id e n tify  i t  as wind o r b i t t e r ly  cold . And, 
while coasting  down the s t r e e t ,  I  fe e l  the  q u a l i t ie s  o f  the sidewalk 
under my fe e t  and, k in e s th e tic a lly , my own movements, and I  respond to  
these v isu a l and k in e s th e tic  cues in  such a  way as  to  co n s titu te  walking. 
But these cues a re  responded to  no t a s  ob jec ts  o r meaningful cues, but 
as  unnoted, dumb q u a l i t ie s ,
I  do, however, take exception to  Dewey's a s se r tio n  th a t f a r  the 
g re a te r  p a r t o f our experience i s  o f th is  s o r t .  I  b e liev e , as I  in ­
d ica ted  above (p , 59)» th a t we a re  engaged in  some s o r t  o f  simple in ­
q u iry  about the  q u a l i t ie s  th a t  we a re  experiencing much more o ften  than 
Dewey seems to  recognize. I t  seems to  me, th e re fo re , th a t  Dewey under- 
in te l le c tu a l iz e s  experience. In the experience which he mentions in  the
I102
"In troduction" to  Essays in  Experimental Logic, fo r  example, in  which we 
a re  "paying a tte n tio n  to  a  young woman" and not in q u irin g  about whether, 
l e t  us say, she would make a good w ife, I  be lieve we might nevertheless 
be tak ing  note o f fe a tu re s  o f the  young lady in  connection with some s o r t  
o f a  question which has come up in  our minds. I  cannot imagine a s tre tc h  
o f  experience much longer than perhaps f iv e  minutes in  which we do no t 
encounter some question o r o th e r, and th e re fo re  perceive the meaning o f 
q u a l i t ie s .  So, although I  agree with Dewey th a t  what i s  on the edge o r 
horizon o f our perceptual f ie ld  i s  n o t i t s e l f  perceived with meaning, i t  
seems to  me th a t  in te llig e n c e  and inqu iry  come in to  our experience and 
our perception much more frequen tly  and ex tensively  than Dewey seems to  
allow  fo r , a t  le a s t  in  such l a t e r  works a s  Logic: The Theory o f Inquiry
and "Q ualita tive  Thought.
Dewey recognizes a  kind o f experience, which he a lso  c a l ls  " fe e lin g ,"  
and which i s  a  kind of perception which l i e s  in  between the  purely  non- 
cognitive  perception to  which he u sually  ap p lie s  the  term "fee ling" and 
the  perception of ob jects  which occurs in  perception o f  s ig n if ic a tio n  and 
o f sense. The use o f the  term I  am re fe r r in g  to  occurs in  the very in te r ­
e s tin g  essay, "Q ualita tive  Thought," and a lso  in  Logic: The Theory of
69In q u iry . A consideration  o f  the use o f  the  term "fee lin g "  in  these 
works w ill  not only b ring  to  our a tte n tio n  ano ther kind o f experience o r 
perception which Dewey recognizes in  these  l a t e r  works, but a lso  provide 
fu r th e r  c la r i f ic a t io n  o f Dewey's view o f how the cognitive  kinds o f per­
ception r e la te  to  the non-cognitive background out o f which they develop,
i . e . ,  fe e lin g .
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What Dewey says in  these works i s  th a t  in  a t  le a s t  some o f the cases
o f our fe e lin g  o f  a  q u a li ta t iv e  s i tu a t io n , th a t  s i tu a t io n , though " re la -
68t iv e ly  dumb and in a r t ic u la te ,"  nev erth e less  involves a re a liz a tio n  o f
something bordering on s ig n ific a n ce . This re a liz a tio n  i s  not e x p l ic i t ,
60but i t  i s  a  "hunch" 7 which provides the b a sis  fo r  the e x p l ic i t  percep­
tio n s  th a t occur l a t e r  to  r e f le c t io n . Dewey uses a s  an example o f what 
he means the background o f the  perception of a  lump o f  sugar o r  perhaps
some honey a s  th a t which one can use to  sweeten something, one 's  coffee 
70perhaps. What happens in  such a  case i s  th a t  one has a problem o f fin d ­
ing something to  sweeten h is  co ffee . He i s  in  a  problem atic s i tu a tio n .
The s itu a tio n  would n o t be problem atic i f  the source o f a sweetener fo r  
h is  coffee were ready a t  hand in  i t s  usual p lace . There would then be 
simply the h ab itu a l response to  the f e l t  sugar-bowl q u a l i t ie s  over in  
th e i r  usual place on the b reak fas t ta b le . But in  the instance  in  ques­
tio n  something i s  awry, and th i s  o u t-o f - jo in t  q u a lity  o f the s itu a tio n  
causes i t  to  become problem atic. Let us suppose the sugar bowl i s  empty, 
and one must th e re fo re  find  an a l te rn a t iv e  way o f sweetening h is  co ffee .
So he looks around and esp ies a  j a r  o f honey. The j a r  o f honey i s  then 
perceived as  th a t  which w ill  s u b s t i tu te  as a  sweetener fo r  h is  coffee.
The sense o f  i t  as  a  j a r  o f honey i s  perceived in  the mode of apprehen­
sio n ; i t s  u s a b il i ty  fo r  sweetening th is  cup o f  coffee in  the mode o f  s ig ­
n if ic a t io n . But before i t  i s  so perceived th e re  i s  a  p r io r  fe e lin g  of
the  whole s i tu a tio n . This whole f e l t  s itu a tio n  Dewey, following James,
71describes as  a  "b ig , buzzing, blooming confusion." But i t  i s  not 
merely th i s ,  fo r  i t
-  10J* -
buzzes to  some e f fe c t ;  i t  blooms toward some f ru ita g e . That i s ,  
the q u a li ty , although dumb, has as  a p a r t o f  i t s  complex q u a lity  
a movement o r t ra n s it io n  in  some d ire c tio n . I t  can, th e re fo re , be 
in te l le c tu a l ly  symbolized and converted in to  an ob ject o f thought. 
This i s  done by a statem ent o f l im its  and o f  d ire c tio n  o f t r a n s i ­
tio n  between them. "That" and "sweet" define the lim its  o f the 
moving q u a lity , . . . P u tting  the  nature o f  the two lim its  b r ie f ly  
and w ithout any attem pt to  ju s t i f y  the statem ent here, the su b jec t 
rep resen ts  the pervasive q u a li ty  as means o r oondition and the  pred­
ic a te  rep resen ts  i t  as  outcome o r e n d .72
There i s ,  then, in th is  f e l t  bu t uncognized s itu a tio n  a complex qua l­
i t y  which c o n s ti tu te s  the p o te n tia l i ty  fo r an e x p l ic i t  perception o f the 
honey as th a t which w ill  sweeten o n e 's  coffee. Before one has th is  ex­
p l i c i t  percep tion , one has am im p lic it "hunch" o r " in tu itio n "  o f the whole 
s itu a tio n  a s  allow ing fo r  the p o s s ib il i ty  o f  using honey as  a  sweetener. 
But such a  hunch, such " th in k in g ,"  i s  done purely in  connection with the
q u a l i t ie s  them selves, w ithout the employment o f any symbols o r  meaning.
73Dewey says in  an in te re s t in g  footnote th a t  even animals might be 
sa id  to  engage in  th is  kind of p re -re f le c tiv e  hunching. This, he specu­
la te s ,  could account fo r
what the G esta lt psychologists c a l l  " in s ig h t."  That to ta l  q u a lity  
operates with animals and sometimes secu res, as  w ith monkeys, re ­
s u l ts  l ik e  those which we obtain  by re f le c t iv e  an a ly s is  cannot, i t  
seems to  me, be doubted. But th a t  th is  operation of q u a lity  in  
e ffe c tin g  r e s u lts  then goes in to  symbolization and an a ly sis  i s  qu ite  
ano ther m atter.
What i s  given to  perception , then , is  p re c ise ly  th is  q u a li ta t iv e  
s i tu a t io n . I f ,  because o f  a  problem I  have, and upon re f le c t io n , I  s ing le  
out from the to ta l  s i tu a t io n  some c lu s te r  o f q u a l i t ie s  ( e .g . ,  the j a r  of 
honey), th is  i s  an a c t  o f taking and making something out o f the  given 
q u a li ta tiv e  s i tu a tio n . The o b jec t, a  ja r  o f  honey, i s  not given, e i th e r  
to  th e  ch ild  o r  to  the  seasoned perceiver s e t t in g  out to  drink a  cup o f
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co ffee . Each o f us goes through, with each a c t  o f re f le c tiv e  perception , 
a re p e ti t io n  o f the h is to ry  o f our o rie n ta tio n  process, the h is to ry  o f 
d iscovery-creation  o f the ob jec ts  th a t  c o n s ti tu te  our world. I t  i s  not 
a m atter o f having to  go through the same re f le c t iv e  inqu iry  v is -a -v is  
every o b jec t. Some can be d ire c t ly  apprehended as having the meaning 
( th e i r  essence) th a t  they have. These a re , o f  course, those th a t are  
perceived in  the mode of. sense. But the perception o f a  possib le new 
re la tio n sh ip  between these  o b jec ts  ( e .g . ,  using honey to  sweeten one 's  
coffee) does requ ire  new re f le c t io n —and th a t perception i s  therefo re  
in  the  mode o f s ig n if ic a tio n .
There i s  something involved, then, in  the development of a world o f
ob jec ts  out o f the pervasive q u a li ta tiv e  s itu a tio n  which is  analogous to
the re p e titio n  by ontogeny o f phylogeny. For, as Dewey says, the to ta l
q u a li ta tiv e  s itu a tio n  with i t s  submerged, dumb, blooming, and buzzing
q u a l i t ie s  i s  "not only the s ta te  o f a  baby 's experience but the f i r s t
stage and background o f a l l  th ink ing  [[and we can add percep tion] on any 
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su b jec t,"  So ju s t  a s  the in d iv id u a l, in  i t s  embryonic development, 
reproduces the whole development o f h is  ra c e , so does percep tion , in  
each o f i t s  emergences out o f  mere fe e lin g , reproduce the h is to ry  o f 
i t s  development from the inchoate confusion of the c h i ld 's  experience.
We see , then, th a t ,  in Dewey's view, perception i s  not o f iso la te d , 
independently and an tecedently  ex is tin g  ob jec ts  th a t p resen t themselves 
as such to  us. Nor, as  we s h a l l  see in  the next chap ter, i s  i t  by an 
iso la te d , independently and an tecedently  ex is tin g  s e l f  th a t  they are 
perceived. Both the o b jec t and the  s e l f  a re  d is tin c tio n s  introduced
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7*5In to  the given, e x is tin g  th ing  which is  th e  to ta l  q u a li ta tiv e  s i tu a t io n , '^  
and a re  ju s t i f ie d  in  th a t  in troduction  not by v ir tu e  o f  th e i r  supposed 
rev e la tio n  o f antecedent r e a l i ty ,  hu t by v ir tu e  o f  t h e i r  u t i l i t y  in  ac­
complishing our desired  re s u l ts .
This perception o f  q u a l i t ie s  and o b jec ts  th e re fo re  occurs w ith in  a 
" f ie ld ."  They a re  s in g led  out o f  a  to ta l  q u a li ta tiv e  s i tu a tio n . And 
they r e f e r  back to  i t ;  i t  i s  the  su b jec t-m atte r to  which they r e fe r .  The
" th is"  and the "sweet" a re  "c o rre la tiv e  determ inations o f . . .  an unde-
76termined and dominant complex q u a lity ,"
One p a rt o f  Dewey0s  theory o f  perception which seems to  me most 
revealing  and innovative i s  h is  view o f the spatia l-tem poral spread- 
outness o f the  q u a li ta t iv e  s i tu a tio n  as w ell as o f the  re fined  ob jec ts  
o f  perception of sense and s ig n if ic a tio n . This i s  a  c h a ra c te r is t ic  of 
Dewey0s  view th a t  I  re fe rre d  to  in  the In troduction  to  th is  d is s e r ta tio n  
when I  quoted a  passage from Experience and Nature in  which Dewey r i d i ­
cu les the  ty p ic a l ph ilosoph ical account o f , say, O thello*s perception o f 
the handkerchief as con sis tin g  "o f  a  co lo r under c e r ta in  conditions o f  
l ig h t  and shapes seen under c e r ta in  angular conditions o f v is io n . But 
the a c tu a l experience was charged with h is to ry  and prophecy! f u l l  o f
love; je a lo u s ly , v i l la in y ,  f u l f i l l in g  p ast human re la tio n sh ip s  and mov-
77ing f a ta l ly  to  tra g ic  d e s t in y ." "
Dewey d iscusses the  s p a t ia l  and temporal spread-outness o f  th e  f e l t  
q u a li ta tiv e  s i tu a tio n  in  Logic a s  w ell. Here he a c tu a lly  re fe rs  to  the 
p re -re f le c tiv e  experience o f the  q u a li ta tiv e  s itu a tio n  i t s e l f  a s  percep­
tio n , and uses the term observation fo r  what I  have been c a ll in g , in
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accordance with h is  usage elsewhere, perception of sense and s ig n if ic a ­
tio n , (This deviation  in  terminology and even, as  we have seen in the 
case o f fe e lin g , in  d o c trin e , i s  one of the exasperating c h a ra c te r is tic s  
o f Dewey's thought.) He speaks o f  th is  perception a s  being non-cognitive, 
and o f  being o f "objects" which are  no t, however, ob jects  o f knowledge o r 
observation, but of an environment as a "scene o f ac tio n s  performed and 
o f consequences undergone in  processes o f  in te ra c tio n ; only secondarily
do p a rts  and aspects o f  i t  become ob jects o f  knowledge. I t s  co n stitu en ts
7 8a re  f i r s t  o f a l l  ob jects  of use and enjoym ent-suffering,"
Now we could conceivably in te rp re t  th is  kind o f  perception as per­
ception o f sense, fo r  he does say i t  is  o f "o b jec ts ."  However, on p, 1^3 
o f the same work, Logic, he speaks o f  apprehension in  the same way in  which 
he speaks o f perception o f  sense in  Experience and N ature, and there  (in
Logic, th a t  i s )  ta lk s  o f  apprehension a s  occurring only in  cognitive s i tu -
7 9a tio n s  as p a r t ,  then, o f what he here 7 c a l l s  the observational process. 
Otherwise, he says, we do not have apprehension o r e x p l ic i t  cognition , but
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"immediate overt response," fo r  example, to  a  f e l t  ty pew rite r o r  book.
This kind of non-cognitive perception of the ty p ew rite r and the book 
may seem to  c o n s titu te  a  fourth  kind o f perception , but in so fh r as  i t  is  
a  response to  a  f e l t  q u a lity  or c lu s te r  o f q u a l i t ie s  and does no t involve 
the presence o f  symbolization and meaning, I  be lieve i t  belongs in  the 
category of fe e lin g . He may here regard i t ,  however, as having the kind 
o f im p lic it  and p o te n tia l meaningfulness, by v irtu e  o f a  pervasive q u a lity , 
th a t  he recognizes in  the essay, "Q u alita tiv e  Thought." I t  seems a lso  to  
be the  same kind o f experience th a t  he ta lk s  o f  in  the "Introduction" of
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Essays In Experimental Logic as  the so c io -a ffec tio n a l experience o f the 
world.
But to  re tu rn  to  the po in t th a t  in i t ia te d  these observations: Dewey
says o f th is  kind of perception th a t  i t  i s  o f  an "environment" which
"forms an extensive tem p o ra l-sp a tia l f ie ld .  . , . [[For] the maintenance
81of l i f e  i s  a  continuous a f f a i r . "  To respond ap p ro p ria te ly  to  the
environment involves an adap ta tion  "to  fu tu re  conditions o r  death w ill
82speedily  ensue." But i t  a lso  involves continuing to  respond to  a  past 
event, fo r , a s  he says in  the ea rly  essay, "The Reflex Arc Concept in  
Psychology," the occurrence o f a  stim ulus i s  not i t s e l f  s u f f ic ie n t  to  
t r ig g e r  running, fo r  example, as an attem pt to  escape danger. The o rig ­
in a l  "sound experience must p e r s is t  as a value in  the running to  keep i t  
up, to  con tro l i t , " ^  So the continuation o f l i f e  and the  p o s s ib il i ty  
o f p e rs is tin g  in  an in teg ra ted  ac tio n  such as playing a  composition on 
a musical instrum ent or v ir tu a l ly  any o ther kind o f am ac tio n  involves 
a response to  q u a l i t ie s  th a t  a re  p a s t, p resen t, and fu tu re , both here in  
th is  place amd in  some o th e r p lace.
And those q u a li t ie s  which re f le c t iv e  an a ly s is  focuses on w ithin the 
to ta l  q u a li ta tiv e  s i tu a t io n , amd forges in to  o b jec ts , a re  a lso  tem porally 
and s p a tia l ly  spread o u t. For an o b jec t i s  n o t ju s t  a  s e t  o f q u a l i t ie s  
now presen t to  a  p e rc ip ien t organism. An o b jec t i s  so "by v irtu e  o f  the 
consequences o f  which the e x is te n t q u a l i t ie s ,  be they few o r many a re
s ig n s, and o f which they a re  the conditions provided operations in s t i tu te
8kc e rta in  in te ra c tio n s  no t then and th e re  occurring ," So what one i s  
aware of when one perceives, fo r  example, the j a r  o f honey i s  what w ill
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happen, v iz . ,  sweetened coffee even in  the absence o f  sugar today i f  the 
ac tio n  o f  s t i r r i n g  some o f  the honey in  the coffee i s  undertaken. The 
ob ject th e re fo re  involves in  i t s  veiy nature  fu tu re  ac tio n s  and th e i r  
consequences.
Dewey here s in g le s  out the fu tu re  o f q u a l i t ie s  and our ac tio n s  in  
response to  them as  being im plicated  in  the na tu re  o f o b jec ts . But e ls e ­
where, as we have seen, he re fe rs  to  the p a st of the o b jec t as an essen­
t i a l  p a r t o f  what we perceive, Desderaona's handkerchief i s  what i t  i s  
as  perceived by O thello no t ju s t  because o f what i t  means in  the fu tu re , 
but a lso  because o f what i t  has been in  the  p a s t. As perceived by him, 
as Dewey says, i t  i s  charged w ith prophecy and h is to ry .
This recognition  o f the spatio-tem poral spread-outness o f the ob jec ts
86o f our perceptual experience, and i t s  fundamentally dynamic ch arac te r, 
seems to  me perhaps the most s ig n if ic a n t con trib u tio n  Dewey has made to  
our understanding of percep tion . By i t s  "dynamic" ch a rac te r I  mean the 
ftic t th a t  perception o f sense and s ig n if ic a t io n , and perhaps a lso  f e e l­
ing in  c e r ta in  o f  i t s  modes, have an e s s e n tia l  reference to  fu tu re  ac tion  
in  response to  a  problem atic s i tu a t io n  which consciousness has a risen  to  
a ttem pt to  so lve. What i s  e sp e c ia lly  lacking  in  most philosophers' ac­
counts o f perception i s  th is  recognition  o f why perception occurs, th is  
p u ttin g  o f perception in  the con tex t o f experience as  a whole.
What ch arac te rizes  the  account which most philosophers give o f  per­
ception i s  the assumption th a t  we a re  sp ec ta to rs  o f the  world in  our per-
8 7ception o f  i t ,  looking out upon i t  in a  k ind  o f  detached contem plation,
A physica l o b jec t, from such a  view, has two c h a ra c te r is t ic s ,  both o f
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which Dewey den ies i t  has* (a) i t  i s  e s s e n tia l ly  ir r e le v a n t  to  us and 
our p ro je c ts  and needs, and (b) i t  i s  a  se lf-en c lo sed , encapsulated sub­
stance , One f in d s , then , in  most contemporary th e o rie s  o f perception a 
yanking o f perception  out o f i t s  a c tu a l p ra c t ic a l  context and an an a ly s is  
o f  i t  in  terms o f  a  pure contem plative knowing. We a re  to ld  th a t  our 
experience o f the world and o f ourselves i s  a  m atter o f the inspec tion  
of a  complete and fin ish ed  world by a purely  detached in te l l e c t  whose 
only in te r e s t  i s  to  note the  way th ings a re . We may, o f  course, go on 
to  use these  detached observations in  the so lu tio n s  o f  our problems, but 
they themselves a re  not e s s e n tia l ly  re la te d  to  those problems. For 
Dewey, on the co n tra ry , one observes only in  regard, to  o n e 's  problems. 
There i s  no t even a  moment o f d is in te re s te d  inspection  in  percep tion .
Dewey in s i s t s ,  then , th a t  even the p u rest in te l le c tu a l  in q u iry  i s  
never so com pletely detached as  these perception-comm entators would have 
us be lieve  perception  i s .  Even the s c ie n t i s t  examining h is  c a re fu lly  
re fin ed  data  i s  examining them w ith regard to  th e i r  s ig n ific an ce  v is -a -  
v is  a  theory  th a t  he hopes to  prove o r to  d isprove.
An example o f such a  theory  o f perception (a  theory which regards 
perception a s  the d is in te re s te d  inspection  by a  sp e c ta to r  o f  the world 
around him) i s  th a t  of H. H. P rice . The H. H, P rice  o f the  alm ost c la s ­
s ic  work, P ercep tion , th inks o f  perception as  being something l ik e  " in tu ­
i t io n "  in  th a t  the percep tual o b jec t appears d ire c t ly  o r Immediately to  
the p e rce iv e r. We immediately and d ire c t ly  apprehend the house, P rice  
contends, a s  having the f ro n t surface we sense, and as being "a house, 
with four ou tside  w alls  and many in s id e  ones: a l l  th i s  and nothing le s s
-  I l l  -
i s  what I  take to  e x is t .  And not only so i what I  take to  e x is t  i s  o ften  
n o t ju s t  a  house bu t a  p a r t ic u la r  house, with such and such a  p a r tic u la r  
s o r t  o f  back . . . and such and such a  s e t  o f rooms, thus and thus s i tu -
i s  no t an a c t iv i ty .  I t  i s  no t a  "doing" (though o f course i t  may 
and u su a lly  does accompany "doings" o f a p ra c t ic a l  k ind), There i s  
in  i t  no element of fu ss in e ss , no wondering o r question ing . One 
does n o t have to  take troub le  over i t —-it  i s  a b lessed  r e l i e f  from 
the lab o r o f d iscu rsiv e  thought. The only e f f o r t  required  (and o f 
course i t  may be very g re a t)  i s  th a t  o f  g e ttin g  ourselves in to  the 
r ig h t  bodily  o r  mental s ta te ,  a s  when we buy a p a ir  o f sp ec ta c le s , 
o r  climb a  mountain to  see what i s  on the o th e r side . . , , but 
once we have go t in to  the  r ig h t s ta te  o f  body o r  mind there  i s  no 
more to  do. The Ihing (be i t  re a l  o r un real) j u s t  comes, along
i t  ju s t  dawns upon us o f  i t s e l f .  We look
There i s  no c le a re r  and more d e ta iled  statem ent o f the sp ec ta to r  
theory  of percep tion . The house, the canyon, the mountain, and the p a ir  
o f  sp ec tac les  l i e  there  complete and se lf-e n c lo se d , ju s t  what they a re , 
w aiting  fo r  us contem plative observers to  read  o f f  t h e i r  in h eren t q u a li­
t i e s ,  And th a t  a c t  i s  passive recep tio n , in  which no doing o r  a c t iv i ty  
whatsoever i s  involved.
For Dewey, on the  co n tra ry , even when we have go t our bodies and our 
eyes in  p o s itio n  to  look a t  the  sp ec tac le s , the perception  is  an a c t  o f  
tak ing  note o f  q u a li t ie s  v is -a -v is  p ro jec ts  o r  ends-in-view  we have. We 
do no t ju s t  passively  receive the Ih ing , We note i t s  shape w ith respect 
to  whether i t  w ill  be appropria te  fo r  the  s iz e  o f our faces, We note the 
degree of darkness o f  the lenses with resp ec t to  whether they w ill  su f­
f ic ie n t ly  remove the  g la re  from o b jec ts . We note the hinges o f  the stems 
as  they a tta c h  to  the  body w ith respec t to  whether they  a re  s u f f ic ie n tly  
s trong  to  hold w ith much use.
a te d ," 88 And a l l  o f  th i s ,  P rice  adds, i s  in tu i t iv e - l ik e  in  th a t  i t
112
Perception , in  sh o r t, i s  indeed a  doing. I t  i s  not a  mere receiv ing  
o f a  fin ish ed  Thing. I t  i s  tak ing  d a ta  and regarding them from the per­
sp ec tiv e  o f  purposes which we have which have made us look a t  the o b jec t 
in  the f i r s t  p lace. I f  we did  not have any purpose o r end-in-view fo r  
which the perception o f the  o b jec t, e .g . ,  the sp ec tac le s , was re le v an t, 
we would merely receive u n in te rp re ted  q u a l i t ie s  dumbly, in  the mode o f 
fe e lin g . He would not apprehend aui o b jec t; we would simply have q u a l i t ie s ,  
A perceived o b jec t i s  something th a t  can be used, and i t  is  perceived 
p rec ise ly  in  re la t io n  to  th a t  use to  which i t  can be pu t. There i s  th e re ­
fo re , one must re g re t to  suggest to  P rice , no end to  the wondering, ques­
tio n in g , and fussing  which ch a rac te rizes  perception a s  w ell a s  "d iscu rsive  
thought" sh o rt o f no consciousness a t  a l l .  I f  th i s  does not seem reason­
ab le  to the reader, l e t  him ask h im self ju s t  what s o r ts  o f  th ings he per­
ce iv es , and whether th a t  perception i s  n o t always the no ting  o f a charac­
t e r i s t i c  o f  the th ing , say , the s iz e  o f  a  p a ir  o f  sp ec ta c le s , with regard
onto  some end-in-view he has.
NOTES
1. Dewey, Experience and N ature, p. 258.
2. Ib id . .  p. 178.
3. Ib id . .  pp. 178-79.
k .  I b id . ,  p. 177. Dewey tak es  th is  expression from a  book by Max Meyer 
ca lled  The Psychology o f  th e  Other One (1922), a book Dewey p ra ises  
as "a statem ent o f b eh av io ris tic  psychology th a t  has hardly received 
the a tte n tio n  i t  in t r in s ic a l ly  deserves."
5. Quotation from Max Meyer, The Psychology o f the Other One, in  Dewey, 
Experience and N ature, p. 176 .
6 . Dewey, E xp erien ce  and N a tu re , p. 177.
7 . Ib id . .  pp. 179-80.
8 . I b id . ,  p . 179.
9 . Ib id . .  p. 180.
10. Ib id . .  p. 187.
11. Ib id . .  p. 188.
12. Ib id . .  p . 188.
13. Ib id . . p. 188.
1^. Ib id . .  p. 188.
15. Dewey, Logic» The Theory o f  In q u iry , p. 109t "Observation o f fa c ts  
and suggested meanings o r  ideas a r is e  and develop in  correspondence 
with each o th e r ."  ( I t a l i c s  mine.)
16. Ib id . .  p. 109.
17. Dewey, E xp erien ce  and N a tu re , p . 189 .
18. Ib id . .  p. 189.
19. As Dewey came to  c a l l  i t  in  Knowing and the Known (Boston1 Beacon 
P ress, 19^9)•
- 113 -
-  n k  -
20. For more on th i s ,  Dewey's "ob jective  re la tiv ism ,"  see the d iscussion  
o f  Dewey's thought in  A rthur Lovejoy, The Revolt Against Dualism 
(second ed itio n ; La S a l le ,  I l l . i  Open Court Publishing Co., 19^0
[_ f i r s t  published, 1930]), Chapter 3, and below, pp. 137-38.
21. Dewey, Experience and Nature. p. I 89,
22. Ib id . .  p. 187.
23. Ib id . .  p. 187.
2k, Ib id . . p. 261.
25. Dewey, Logic: The Theory o f Inqu iry , p. 1*4-3.
26. P rofessor Robert W. Browning in  a  l e t t e r  to  the au thor,
27. John Dewey, Theory o f  Valuation (Chicago 1 U niversity  of Chicago 
P ress, 1939)# p. 33.
28. Dewey, Logic: The Theory o f  In q u iry , p. 106.
29. Dewey, Theory o f V aluation, p. 33.
30. Dewey, Logic» The Theory of Inqu iry , p. 1^3, In Art as Experience 
(New York: Minton, Balch, and Co., 193*0» and sometimes in  Experience 
and Nature, he uses the  term "recognition" fo r  th is  kind o f  perception. 
See pp. 52-53 o f Art a s  Experience and p. 182 o f Experience and N ature.
31. Dewey, Experience and N ature, pp. 182-83. The term "crea te"  and the
term "d iscover,"  as I  sun using them here , a re  no t taken from Dewey's 
own d iscussion , but a re  my own suggestions based on my in te rp re ta tio n  
o f  h is  d iscussion ,
32. Dewey, A rt a s  Experience, p. 256 .
33. Dewey, Essays in  Experimental Logic, pp. 351-52; Experience and
Nature, p. 376.
J k ,  Dewey, Essays in  Experimental Logic, pp. 16-18.
35. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inqu iry , p. 61.
36 . Ib id . p. 62 .
37. I t a l i c s  mine. Note th a t  i t  i s  the po in t in  inqu iry  a t  which i t  i s  
grasped th a t  determ ines whether perception of sense i s  apprehension 
o r ap p rec ia tio n .
38 . Dewey, Essays in  Experimental Logic, pp. 16-18,
-  115 -
39. I b i d . .  p. 18.
40. Dewey, E xperience  and N a tu re , pp. 81 f f .
41. Ib id . .  pp. 82-83.
42. Ib id . . p. 83.
43. Ib id . . p. 271.
44. I  am indebted to  P rofessor Browning fo r  the  term "se n se -fu l,"
45. Dewey, L o g ic t th e  Theory  o f  In q u ir y , p. 143.
46. Dewey, E xperience  and N a tu re , p. 331.
47. Dewey, Essays in  E x p e rim e n ta l L o g ic , p. 17.
I b id . ,  p. 353.
49. Dewey, E xp erien ce  and N a tu re , p. 331.
50. Dewey, Essays in  E x p e rim e n ta l L o g ic , p. 352.
51. John Dewey, Quest fo r  C erta in ty  (New Yorki G. P. Putnam's Sons, 
Capricorn Books, i 960 (_f i r s t  published, I 929] ) ,  p. 238.
52. Ib id . .  p. 236.
53. R o bert F ro s t ,  "S top p in g  By Woods on a  Snowy E v en in g ,"
54. Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 40,
55. Ib id . .  p. 19.
56. Dewey, E xperience  and N a tu re ,  p. ?8,
57. Ib id . .  p. 81.
58. Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 55.
59* An experience i s  " d is t in c t iv e ly  e s th e tic "  in  which the main in te re s t  
o r purpose th a t  i n i t i a t e s  o r  co n tro ls  i t  i s  to  have th a t  experience 
ra th e r  than to  solve a  p ra c t ic a l  o r  in te l le c tu a l  d i f f ic u l ty  (Art as 
Experience, p. 55)•
60, Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 45,
61. I b id . ,  p. 45.
-  116 -
62. Dewey, Essays In Experimental Logic, p. 18,
63. B ernste in , e d . , John Dewey on Experience. N ature, and Freedom, p. 5k.
I t a l i c s  mine,
6k ,  Dewey, Essays in  Experimental Logic, p. 39k .
65 . Dewey, Logic: The Theory o f  Inqu iry , p, 1^3.
66. For the  e a r l ie r  view, however, see Essays in  Experimental Logic, 
p. 39k ,  footnote 1 .
67 . B e rn s te in , e d . ,  John Dewey on E x p e rie n c e . N a tu re , and Freedom,
pp. 176- 98 ; Dewey. L o g ic : The Theory o f  In q u ir y , pp. 68-70.
68. B ernste in , e d .,  John Dewey on Experience. Nature, and Freedom, p. 18^,
69 . Ib id . .  p. 183.
70. I  an tak ing  the l ib e r ty  o f  am plifying h is  example somewhat. Dewey 
h im self does not ta lk  o f  the  o b jec t a s  being perceived, but ra th e r  
as th e  o b jec t o f an a c t  o f  judgment{ b u t the perception  o f  s ig n i f i ­
c a tio n , a s  we have seen, i s  the  product o f  r e f le c t iv e  thought o r 
inqu iry  as w ell,
71. B ern ste in , e d .,  John Dewey on Experience. N ature, and Freedom, p. 190.
72. Ib id . .  p. 190.
73. I b id . ,  p. 196.
7 k .  Ib id . . p. 190.
75. When Dewey d is tin g u ish ed  between o b je c t, which i s  a  product o f  thought
and in q u iry , and event, the  ac tu a l e x is te n t ,  he means by the l a t t e r  
the  q u a li ta t iv e  s i tu a t io n  i t s e l f .  See Schilpp , e d ,,  Philosophy o f 
John Dewey, p. 5^8, and B ernste in , e d , ,  John Dewey on Experience. 
N ature, and Freedom, p. 189 .
76 . B ernste in , e d .,  John Dewey on Experience. N ature, and Freedom, p. 188.
77. Dewey, Experience and Nature ( f i r s t  e d i t io n ) , p. 56.
78 . Dewey, Logic: The Theory o f In q u iry , p. 150.
79. Ib id . .  p . 150.
80. I b id . ,  p. 1^3.
81. Ib id . .  p. 150.
-  117 -
82. Ib id . . p. 150.
83 . John Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in  Psychology," Psychological 
Review. I l l  (Ju ly , I 896) ,  p . 363 .
8^. Dewey, Logic: The Theory o f  Inqu iry , p. 130.
85 . Dewey, Experience and Nature ( f i r s t  e d i t io n ) ,  p. 56.
86. See John Smith, The S p i r i t  o f  American Philosophy (New Yorki Oxford 
U niversity  P ress , 19^3), p. 119* There i s  in  Dewey's philosophy
"a fundamental tendency" to  " tra n s la te  the  s t a t i c  in to  the  dynamic 
and rep lace substance o r  e n t i t i e s  w ith fu n c tio n s ."
87 . See Dewey, A rt a s  Experience, pp. 52-53* "We are  given to  supposing" 
th a t  perception "merely takes in  what i s  there  in  fin ish ed  form, 
in s tead  o f r e a l iz in g  th a t  th is  tak ing  in  involves a c t i v i t i e s  th a t  
a re  comparable to  those o f the  c re a to r ."
88. H. H. P rice , Perception (London: Methuen and Co., 1950)» PP* 151-52.
89. Ib id . . pp. 152-53.
90. See Essays in  Experimental Logic, p. 392, fo r  Dewey's development
o f  th is  p o in t.
CHAPTER IV
PERCEPTION AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
As I  Ind ica ted  early  in  th is  d is s e r ta t io n , one o f the most in te r e s t ­
ing and s ig n if ic a n t aspects o f  Dewey''s theory o f perception  i s  i t s  import 
fo r  c e r ta in  d i f f i c u l t  problems about the  nature  o f  mind. I  would l ik e  
now to  d iscuss Dewey's theory from th is  po in t o f  view by considering how 
h is  theory o f perception allow s fo r  h is  view o f  "mind" and i t s  re la tio n  
to  the  "body," and by o ffe rin g  a  defense o f th a t  view.
I t  w ill  be noticed  th a t  I  put the terms "mind" and "body" in  quota­
tio n  marks in  the  preceding paragraph. I  did so because, a s  we s h a l l  
see below, Dewey does not regard  mind and body as  independently e x is tin g  
e n t i t i e s  which a re  named by the  two terms re sp ec tiv e ly . Dewey does no t 
th ink o f the world as co n sis tin g  o rig in a lly  and fundamentally of minds 
and bodies. R ather a re  these concepts th a t  we employ, w ith in  a  sp e c if ic  
con tex t, to  accomplish c e r ta in  purposes.
Dewey’s view, which I  s h a l l  be try in g  to  defend, i s  th a t  mind and 
body a re  notions th a t  have o rig in a ted  out o f  a  more fundamental r e a l i ty  
th a t u n d erlies  them. They a re  th e re fo re  not an teceden tly  ex is tin g  r e a l ­
i t i e s ,  which a re  somehow m ysteriously re la te d  to  each o th e r. They a re  
ca teg o ries  employed to  f a c i l i t a t e  dealing  with c e r ta in  d i f f i c u l t i e s  th a t  
a r is e  in  the world th a t antecedes them, which i s  a  world th a t  i s  n e ith e r  
mental nor ph y sica l. His view i s  th e re fo re  very s im ila r  to  Jam es's as 
presented in  "Does Consciousness Exist?"*
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Dewey p re fe rs  to  avoid using the te rn  "mind" to  describe the subjec­
t iv e  s id e  o f  experience. His aversion  to  doing so i s  based on i t s  sug­
gestions o f  transcenden ta l s ta tu s .  He h in s e l fy in  describ ing  the  way in 
which the  d is tin c tio n  between the sub jec tiv e  and ob jective  comes about 
w ithin  the underlying r e a l i ty ,  p re fe rs  to  use the term Morganism" o r 
" s e lf” fo r  the su b jec tiv e  s id e . In  what fo llow s, th e re fo re , i t  may some­
tim es seem th a t  I  am o ffe rin g  Dewey’s theory o f the problem o f the  r e la ­
tio n  o f organism and environment r a th e r  than th a t  o f  mind and body. In  
f a c t ,  however, what Dewey says in  general about the way the ca teg o ries  
o f  sub jec tiv e  and o b je c tiv e , o r  organism and environment, o r ig in a te , and 
about what they mean, he th inks a p p lie s  to  the mind-body ca teg o ries  as  
w ell—except th a t  fo r  him the  sub jec tiv e  side  o f  experience i s  the organ­
ism, n o t the mind, amd the  o b jec tive  side  i s  the  world, no t the body.
In  genera l, however, th is  su b jec tiv e -o b jec tiv e  d is t in c tio n , whether 
one in te rp re ts  i t  a s  re fe r r in g  to  a  mind-body o r  to  an organism-environment 
d is t in c t io n ,  i s  a  fu n c tio n a l, not an abso lu te  one. Philosophers have mis­
takenly  assumed th a t  o b jec ts  and q u a l i t ie s  forged out o f the underlying 
r e a l i ty  and re fe rre d  to  the su b jec tiv e  side r e a l ly  and ab so lu te ly  belong 
th e re , and they have posited  a  mental realm to  hold them. The m ental, o r 
su b jec tiv e , i s ,  in  Dewey's view, simply a  category to  separa te  o f f  from
the  environment q u a l i t ie s  and o b jec ts  which fo r  o th e r purposes one may
2wish to  include in  i t .
In  th i s  chap ter, then, I  s h a l l  attem pt to  show how Dewey's theory  
o f  perception enables him to  develop a  philosophy o f  mind which, I  b e lie v e , 
so lves the  problems which have plagued ph ilosoph ical thought on th i s
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su b jec t a t  le a s t  since  D escartes.
We have a lready  seen how Dewey's view o f  th a t  kind o f  perception 
ca lled  "fee lin g "  allow s fo r  a  so lu tio n  o f  one o f  the  b asic  problems in  
philosophy o f  mind (as w ell as epistem ology). Hie problem I  re fe r  to  
i s  th a t  o f how thought can presume to  have any connection w ith the re a l  
world. How can we know th a t  a  group o f thoughts o r  ideas which we have 
in  our minds has any resemblance to  the world th a t  i s  ou tside  our minds, 
o r , indeed, th a t th e re  i s  any world outside our minds? Hay we n o t, a s  
D escartes supposed p o ssib le , be deceived by an e v i l  demon, be dreaming, 
h a llu c in a ted , e tc .?  Why suppose, on the b asis  o f  an in n e r conviction , 
th a t  our thoughts conform to  d ie  Sachen se lb s t?
Dewey answers by saying th a t th is  sk e p tic a l p o s itio n  i s  indeed in ­
ev ita b le  i f  we g ran t the  premise th a t  our experience i s  exclusively  a 
m atter o f  thoughts o r  ideas in  an iso la te d  mind. I f  experience i s  always 
cognition occurring in  a  mind, then there  i s  no way o f knowing whether 
i t  has any resemblance to  the way th ings a re . But i f  a t  le a s t  some o f 
our experience i s  no t only experience but a lso  r e a l i ty , then the connec­
tio n  o f experience with r e a l i ty  i s  assured .
Feeling i s  p re c ise ly  th a t mode o f experience in  which thought and 
r e a l i ty  in te r s e c t .  Feeling i s  no t the thought o f somethingj i t  i s  the 
something. To f e e l  o r  have a  fo u l odor i s  no t to  th ink  o f  o r  cognize 
th a t  odort i t  i s  f o r  th a t  odor to  be.
This view i s  c lo se ly  re la te d  to  Dewey's view th a t  main i s  continuous 
with n a tu re , n o t a  transcenden tal In te r lo p e r  th e re in . I f  we were d is ­
embodied, transcendental souls somehow contem plating a  world outside us,
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as the tra d it io n  has assuaed (even when n o t re a liz in g  i t  does so assume), 
then the Mproblem o f knowledge" would be In so lub le , There would be no 
conceivable way o f  te s t in g  one claim  o f  the mind over ano ther one. Such 
a  theory , a s  Dewey puts i t ,  l e t s  the  id e a l i s t  camel in  the  r e a l  te n t ,  
which he then devours.
The theory o f a  disembodied, transcenden tal mind, Dewey says, i s  
not derived from an examination of experience. I t  i s  ra th e r  the impo­
s i t io n  o f  a
conception once u n iv e rsa lly  en te r ta in ed  regarding the  su b jec t o r 
b ea re r o r  c en te r o f  experience. The d esc rip tio n  o f experience has 
been forced in to  conformity w ith th is  p r io r  conceptionj i t  has 
been p rim arily  a  deduction from i t ,  a c tu a l em pirica l fa c ts  being 
poured in to  the  moulds o f  the  deductions. The c h a ra c te r is t ic  fea­
tu re  o f  th i s  p r io r  notion i s  the  assumption th a t  experience cen te rs  
in ,  o r  ga thers  about, o r  proceeds from a  cen te r o r  su b jec t which 
i s  outside the  course o f n a tu ra l ex istence , and s e t  over ag a in s t 
i t —i t  being o f no importance, fo r  presen t purposes, whether th is  
a n t i th e t ic a l  su b jec t i s  termed so u l, o r  s p i r i t ,  o r  mind, o r  ego, 
o r consciousness, o r  ju s t  knower o r  knowing subject.^"
Dewey suspects th a t  th is  conception o f experience i s  derived from
c e r ta in  re lig io u s  groundsi
There a re  p lau sib le  grounds fo r  th ink ing  th a t the  currency o f the 
idea in  question  [ th e  transcenden ta l s e l f  o r  knower] l i e s  In the 
form which men's re lig io u s  preoccupations took f o r  many cen tu rie s . 
These were d e lib e ra te ly  and system atica lly  o ther-w orld ly . They 
centered about a  K ill  which was n o t an event in  n a tu re , bu t an 
a b o rig in a l catastrophe th a t  corrupted Nature} about a  redemption 
made possib le  by supernatu ra l means} about a  l i f e  In  ano ther world— 
e s s e n tia l ly , not merely s p a t ia l ly ,  o th e r. The supreme drama o f 
d estin y  took place in  a  sou l o r  s p i r i t  which, under the circum­
stan ces, could no t be conceived o th e r than as  non-natu ra l—ex tra ­
n a tu ra l , i f  n o t, s t r i c t l y  speaking, su p ernatu ra l. When D escartes 
and o thers  broke away from medieval in te r e s t s ,  they re ta in ed  as 
commonplaces i t s  in te l le c tu a l  apparatust Such a s ,  knowledge is  
exercised  by a  power th a t  i s  e x tra n a tu ra l and s e t  over ag a in s t 
the world to  be known.5
This argument i s  o f a  type one o ften  finds in  Dewey. He attem pts
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to  re fu te  an a l te rn a t iv e  view by showing what i t s  o rig in  i s  and then 
po in ting  out e i th e r  th a t  the  ph ilosophical motives fo r  th a t  o rig in  a re  
no longer re le v a n t, axe no longer even held by the philosopher who holds 
the p o s itio n  which d eriv es  from th a t o rig in ; o r  th a t  th e re  are good rea­
sons f o r  doubting the  v a lid i ty  o f  the views c o n s ti tu tin g  th a t o r ig in .
In  th i s  case the  p o s itio n  in  question  i s  th a t  o f  a  transcenden ta l knower 
o r  mind, Ihe o r ig in  i s  a  th eo lo g ica l conception o f  man as  a c rea tu re  
fa lle n  from pure, s p i r i tu a l  s ta tu s  by combination w ith an a l ie n  and s in ­
fu l  body and physica l world, I h is  view of man's o rig in  i s  not even held 
by most o f  the  philosophers who n ev ertheless  do hold to  the  d o c trin e  o f 
the  transcenden ta l s e l f .  I t  i s  th e re fo re  a  v e s tig e , an anachronism.
In  o th e r co n tex ts, a s  I  have in d ica ted , the assumption i s  no t one 
the philosopher in  question  would n ecessa rily  disavow, bu t i s  one never­
th e le ss  n o t e x p l ic i t ly  acknowledged by him. And, having sp e lled  i t  ou t, 
Dewey then seeks to  re fu te  i t .  An example o f  th is  approach can be found 
in  h is  a tta c k  on the  em otiv ist theory  in  e th ic s .  This view m aintains 
th a t  value statem ents cannot be cognitive o r  p rep o s itio n a l because they 
a re  simply expressions o f  emotion, lik e  such expressions a s  "OuchJ” But 
th is  theory , Dewey argues,^  r e s ts  on the assumption th a t  the world i s  
p e rfe c tly  and exhaustive ly  ch arac te rized  by the s c ie n t i f ic  account o f  i t ,  
an account which i s  v a lu e -free , Dewey a tta c k s  th is  view by arguing th a t 
the s c ie n t i f ic  view does no t exhaustively  ch a rac te rize  the  world, but i s ,  
l ik e  any o th er c h a ra c te r iz a tio n , a  perspective  o r device u sefu l f o r  the 
purposes fo r  which i t  i s  designed, v iz , ,  a  c e r ta in  kind o f con tro l. For 
o th e r purposes, the  secondary and t e r t i a r y  (inc lud ing  evalua tive) q u a li t ie s
-  123 -
which the s c ie n t i f ic  view evacuates from the  world have to  "be brought 
back in . Dewey uses the  expression " se le c tiv e  emphasis"' to  ch arac te rize  
the  a b s tra c tio n  o f c e r ta in  q u a l i t ie s  in  primary experience a s  being most 
u se fu l f o r  c e r ta in  purposes. But to  i n s i s t  th a t  q u a l i t ie s  so se lec ted  
a re  the exclu sive ly  r e a l  i s  the source o f the w orst e r ro rs  th a t  occur in  
philosophy.
Now th is  type o f argument i s  objected  to  by many philosophers as  
committing the  genetic  fa lla c y . Such persons argue, th a t  i s ,  th a t  the 
question  o f  the v a lid i ty  o r  in v a lid i ty  o f a p h ilo soph ical p o s itio n  i s  
independent o f  the  motives o r  h is to r ic a l  o rig in  o f  the p o s itio n ; th a t  i t  
i s  simply ir r e le v a n t why a  philosopher holds the view he does. What 
counts i s  h is  argument i t s e l f ,
Dewey does n o t, so  f a r  a s  I  know, speak to  th i s  ob jec tio n . My own 
th ink ing  on th i s  m atter i s  th a t  the  "genetic" argument which i s  so com­
mon in  h is  work i s  not re a l ly  a  case o f  the genetic  fa lla c y  a t  a l l ,  but 
th a t  i t ,  to g e th e r w ith o th e r co n sid e ra tio n s , c o n s ti tu te s  a leg itim a te  
and o ften  very p la u s ib le  form o f argument. What Dewey i s  doing in  such 
cases i s  po in ting  to  a  hidden assumption which he b e liev es  l i e s  in  back 
o f  a  p h ilo so p h e r's—o r even an a g e 's —th ink ing , and which accounts fo r  
what he th inks to  be a  m isreading o f  the  f a c ts .  Thus in  the  case o f the 
" tra d it io n a l"  view o f immediate o r  d ire c t  experience, Dewey fe e ls  th a t  
these  philosophers have been led  in to  d isa s tro u s  e rro rs  by v ir tu e  o f 
t h e i r  assumption th a t  a l l  experience, a l l  percep tion , i s  co g n itiv e . Now 
the  dem onstration of th e  ex istence  o f  th a t  assum ption, to g e th e r w ith an 
examination o f  experience from the  "em pirical, deno tative" po in t o f  view,
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do c o n s ti tu te  a  good argument.
The d iffe ren ce  between Dewey's method and the  g en e tic  fa lla c y  Is  
th a t  Dewey po in ts  to  a  hidden assumption In  a  ph ilo so p h er's  th ink ing , 
whereas those who commit the  gen e tic  fa lla c y  po in t to  an u l te r io r  motive 
o f  a  philosopher. I t  i s  Indeed i r r e le v a n t  to  a  ph ilo so p h er's  argument 
fo r ,  l e t  us say , the ex istence  o f  God, th a t  he would lo se  h is  job  i f  he 
d id  n o t be lieve in  God. But i t  i s  n o t i r r e le v a n t  th a t  he believes and 
assumes in  h is  argument th a t  every event has a  cause. The l a t t e r  i s  a  
do c trin e  th a t  may be lo g ic a lly  involved in  h is  argument, even when i t  i s  
n o t acknowledged to  be so involved. The form er i s  not lo g ic a lly  involved. 
I t  obviously does n o t play any ro le  whatsoever in  the  argument f o r  God's 
ex istence  th a t  one would lo se  h is  job i f  he d id  not b e liev e  in  and defend 
the  ex istence  o f God. But th a t  every event must have a  cause does o r  
could conceivably p lay a  ro le  in  the  lo g ic a l ju s t i f ic a t io n  o f  God's 
ex is ten ce .
I f ,  then , one can show (a) th a t  the  fh c ts  about experience con tra ­
d ic t  a  ph ilo so p h er's  view, and (b) th a t  the  philosopher makes some a s ­
sumption which makes an acknowledgement o f  th e  em pirica l fa c ts  incon­
v en ien t, then one has a  very good argument ag a in s t th a t  philosopher, an 
argument s tro n g e r by v ir tu e  o f  b than by v ir tu e  o f  a  a lone . Moreover, 
i f  one can add another kind o f co n sid era tio n , which we may c a l l  ( c ) ,  th a t  
the  consequences which the p o sitio n  leads to  a re  unacceptable, th a t ;  fo r  
example, they make a  d is t in c tio n  between v a lid  and in v a lid  thought and 
perception  im possible, then m e  has a  very good case indeed.
And th i s  i s  Dewey's technique. One o f  the  consequences o f  the  view
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th a t  th e re  i s  a  mind o r  knower which i s  somehow non-natu ra l ( i . e . ,  the 
C artesian  view) i s  th a t  i t  commits the philosopher e i th e r  to  idealism  o r 
the im p o ss ib ility  o f d is tin g u ish in g  tru e  from fa ls e  judgment. This i s  
an argument o f  type c . A considera tion  o f type b i s  th a t  which po in ts  
to  a  th eo lo g ica l framework long since  abandoned by many o f i t s  in h e r ito rs  
a s  presupposed by C artesian  dualism . What remains to  be discussed a re  
considera tions o f  type a—what the  "em pirical, deno tative  method" reveals  
to  us to  be re a l ly  the  case with regard  to  our experience in  re la tio n  to  
such th ings as minds and bodies. I f  i t  can be shown th a t  the phenomeno­
lo g ic a l  o r  em p irica l-deno tative  da ta  do n o t agree w ith the dual-substance 
hypothesis, then the re ference  to  a  th e o lo g ic a l framework becomes much 
more p lau sib le  than i t  would be a lo n e , fo r  i t  o ffe rs  an explanation o f 
why philosophers have f a i le d  to  see the  fa c ts  a s  they a re .
In  the  sec tio n  o f th i s  chap ter th a t  fo llow s, then , I  s h a l l  t r y  to  
g ive Dewey's own account o f  the em p irica l, denotative  fh c ts  about how 
"mind" and "body" a re  re la te d  to  each o th e r in  our experience. Then I  
s h a l l  o f f e r  a  defense o f  Dewey's view o f  what the  fa c ts  a re  a g a in s t ob­
je c tio n s  th a t  have been o r ,  in  my view, could w ell be ra ised  a g a in s t i t .  
This w il l ;  then , c o n s ti tu te  a  fo u rth  kind o f ju s t i f ic a t io n ,  which I  s h a l l  
c a l l  d , fo r  Dewey's view. F in a lly , a f t e r  p resen ting  these  arguments, I  
s h a l l  re tu rn  to  a  considera tion  o f  p a r t  c o f Dewey's own argument, v iz . ,  
the  consequences o f  a l te rn a t iv e  views.
Dewey d iscusses th i s  question  o f  the  re la t io n , in  our experience, 
o f  s e l f  and o b jec t, o r  o f  mind and body, in  connection w ith the  d iscussion
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o f  the on to log ica l s ta tu s  o f q u a l i t i e s . The most common (the  "t r a d i ­
t io n a l” ) way o f regarding the q u a l i t ie s  which we perceive o r experience 
i s  to  think o f  them a s  belonging to  o r  inhering  in  e i th e r  mind o r  s e l f ,  
on the one hand, o r o b jec t o r th in g , on the o th e r. Thus we commonly and 
" tra d it io n a lly ” th ink o f  such secondary q u a l i t ie s  as  co lors and odors a s  
belonging e i th e r  to  mind o r  body. Ju s t which they  belong to  i s ,  o f  course, 
s t i l l  in  qu estio n . But we a re  convinced th a t the co lo r o f  the rug a c tu ­
a l ly  inheres e i th e r  in  th a t an teceden tly  e x is tin g  rug, o r  in  one 's  a n te ­
cedently  e x is tin g  mind, produced th e re  iy  something th a t  does an tecedently  
e x is t  in  the  rug. The c o rre c t view w ill  be the one th a t  b e st describes 
the an tecedently  e x is tin g  s ta te  o f  a f f a i r s .  I s  the c o lo r , before I  i n t e r ­
a c t  with the  rug, p a rt o f  the rug? Or a re  the secondary q u a l i t ie s  l ik e  
co lo rs , not to  mention te r t i a r y  ones lik e  cheerfu l o r  d u l l , not in  rugs 
in  themselves, but ra th e r  produced in  our an teceden tly  e x is t in g  minds and 
"ejected" from them in to  the ex te rn a l world in  our in te ra c tio n  with the  
an tecedently  e x is tin g  th ing  we come to  c a l l  a  rug?
Against th i s  view Dewey contends th a t  the q u a l i t ie s ,  say, o f  green 
and even o f  ch ee rfu l, do no t e x is t  an tecedently  to  the  a c t  o f perception 
o f s ig n if ic a tio n  o r  perception o f sense e i th e r  in  the world o r  in  the 
s e l f .  "With language" and hence meaning, Dewey says, q u a l i t ie s
a re  d iscrim inated  and id e n tif ie d . They a re  then o b je c t if ie d ; they 
are immediate t r a i t s  o f th in g s . Ih is  "o b je c tif ic a tio n "  i s  not a  
miraculous e jec tio n  from the  organism o r sou l in to  ex te rn a l th in g s , 
nor an i l lu s o ry  a t t r ib u t io n  o f psychical e n t i t i e s  to  physical th in g s . 
Ihe q u a l i t ie s  never were " in"  the organism; they always were q u a li­
t ie s  o f  in te ra c tio n  in  which both ex tra -o rgan ic  th ings and organisms 
partake. When named, they enable id e n tif ic a tio n  and d iscrim ination  
o f th ings to  take place a s  means in  a  fu r th e r  course o f in c lu siv e  
in te ra c tio n . Hence they a re  as  much q u a l i t ie s  o f  th ings engaged as
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o f the  organism. For purposes o f co n tro l they nay be re fe rre d  spe­
c i f i c a l ly  to  e i th e r  the  th ing  o r t e  the organism o r  to  a  sp ec ified  
s tru c tu re  o f  the organism. Urns co lo r which tu rn s  out no t to  he a  
r e l ia b le  sign o f ex te rn a l events becomes a  sign  o f, say, a  d e fec t 
in  v isu a l ap p ara tu s .8
What e x is ts  p r io r  to  the  in s t i tu t io n ,  through language and meaning, 
o f  o b jec tiv e  th in g s , i s  a  f e l t  t o ta l  q u a li ta t iv e  s i tu a tio n . This s i tu a ­
tio n  i s  n e ith e r  s e l f  no r o th e r) n e ith e r  mental nor ph y sica l. There i s
no s e l f  o r  su b jec t o r ego given over he re , and o b jec t given over th e re .
What i s  given i s  a  to ta l  s i tu a tio n  including  numerous q u a l i t ie s  to g e th er 
b u t submerged in  a  general u n ity . And, although th i s  to t a l  q u a li ta t iv e  
s i tu a t io n  i s  what i s  given, i t  i s  m isleading to  say th a t  i t  i s  "given," 
because t h i s  word
suggests something to  which i t  i s  given, mind o r thought o r  con­
sciousness o r  whatever, a s  w ell as  something th a t  g ives. In  tru th
"given" in  th i s  connection s ig n if ie s  only th a t  the  q u a lity  immedi­
a te ly  e x is t s ,  o r  i3  b ru te ly  th e re . In  th is  cap ac ity , i t  forms th a t 
to  which a l l  o b jec ts  o f  thought r e f e r ,  although a s  we have n o ticed , 
i t  i s  never p a r t o f  the  m anifest su b jec t m atter o f  thought. In 
i t s e l f ,  i t  i s  the  b ig , buzzing, blooming confusion o f  which James 
w rote. This expresses not only the  s ta te  o f  a  baby 's experience 
but th e  f i r s t  s tage and background o f  a l l  th ink ing  on any su b je c t.9
This l a s t  po in t i s ,  i t  seems to  me, e sp e c ia lly  im portant. I t  e n ta i ls
th a t  in  much o f our o rd inary  experience ou r world i s  n o t div ided up in to
o b jec ts  ou t th e re  and s e l f  over he re . There i s  in s te ad  ju s t  a  c lu s te r
o r  congeries of q u a l i t ie s ,  q u a l i t ie s  o f  a l l  types—prim ary, secondary,
and t e r t i a r y —and a l l  e x is tin g  to g e th e r in  the way th a t  fe e lin g  in  general
perceives them, v iz . ,  w ithout c la s s if ic a t io n  o r in te rp re ta tio n  o f  any
s o r t .  When engaged, th a t i s ,  in  any p rim arily  non-cognitive a c t iv i ty ,
such a s  sh in ing  my shoes, I  do not experience my shoes as  physica l ob jects
o r  th in g s , and myself a s  a  mind o r  consciousness, to  which the  shoes a re
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given. There i s  th e  sound o f the  music from my h i - f i ,  experienced not 
as  sound o r  a s  music, bu t as  un in te rp re ted  q u a l i t ie s f  the  sounds o f  the 
a irp lan e  passing overhead t sounds o f  children playing in  the s t r e e t  j the 
fou l odor o f  the  Chicago a i r  coming in  my open windowt trucks roaring  on 
the  Kennedy Expressway |  co lo rs  and shapes o f ob jec ts  around me—a l l  per­
ceived merely by fe e lin g  and th e re fo re  w ithout s ig n ifican ce  o r meaning. 
Then l e t  one o f  these sounds g e t p ecu lia rly  o ffensive and u p se ttin g , and 
i t  w ill  become a  su b jec t fo r  in q u iry , Non-eognitive ac tio n  (coasting) 
gives way to  re f le c t io n , and some o f  the sounds and shapes begin to  be 
organized in to  o b jeo ts . Before th e re  was no d iv is io n  between s e l f  and 
o th e r, tru ck s  and a irp la n e s , bathroom faucet and ra in  f a i l in g  ou ts id e . 
Now a  d isequ ilib rium  in  my experience n e c e ss ita te s  c la s s if ic a t io n  a s  a  
means to  e lim in a te , l e t  us say , an offensive ring ing  q u a li ty . What i s  
the  source o f  the sound? What does the sound mean? Does i t  meant an 
alarm clock in  the nex t room has gone o ff?  a  telephone in  ano ther a p a r t­
ment i s  ringing? o r  perhaps th a t  something i s  wrong with my in n e r ear? 
I n i t i a l l y ,  again , the  sound was n e ith e r  bodily  nor m ental, alarm clock 
o r d is ta n t  w h is tle . I t  was ju s t  a  submerged, u n in te rp re ted  q u a lity . 
When, however, the  f e l t  q u a lity  became pa in fu l and obnoxious, though 
not o f  course a s  p a in fu l and obnoxious, then a tte n tio n  and observation 
became necessary . And th e  need to  exerc ise  c o n tro l, s p e c if ic a lly  to  
elim inate  th i s  obnoxious q u a li ty , led  to  employment o f  the  extremely 
u sefu l ca teg o ries  o f  myself and o th e r ,
Ihu3 come in to  play  the ca teg o ries  in  question , i . e . ,  mind-body, 
s e lf -o th e r ,  e tc .  But th ese  ca teg o rie s  a re  n o t names o f e n t i t i e s  th a t
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e x is ted  an tecedently  to  the  in q u iry  to  e lim ina te  the  sound. They axe 
devices fo r  co n tro l o f  the  fh tu re , I f  I  want to  elim inate  the sound( 
what course o f a c tio n  would i t  he b e t te r  to  employ--an ac tio n  on the  
th in g , th a t  s e t o f q u a l i t ie s  now id e n tif ie d  a s  an alarm clock, o r  on 
the  body, th a t  s e t  o f  q u a l i t ie s  now given the  in te rp re ta tio n  o f  myself?
In Experience and Nature Dewey puts the  po in t w ith regard to  the
u t i l i t y  o f  the s e lf -o th e r  c a teg o rie s  in  th is  wayt
I t  i s  obvious th a t  a  t o t a l ,  unanalyzed world does not lend i t s e l f  
to  c o n tro l; th a t ,  on the  co n tra ry , i t  i s  equ ivalen t to  the  subjec­
tio n  o f man to  whatever occurs, as  i f  to  f a te .  U n til some a c ts  
and th e i r  consequences a re  d isc rim in a tin g ly  re fe rre d  to  the  human 
organism and o th e r energ ies  and e f fe c ts  a re  re fe rre d  to  o th e r  
bod ies, th e re  i s  no leverage , no purchase, w ith which to  reg u la te  
the  course o f  experience. The a b s tra c tio n  o f c e r ta in  q u a l i t ie s  o f  
th in g s  as  due to  human a c ts  and s ta te s  i s  the  pou s to  o f a b i l i ty  
in  con tro l.!-0
But the re s u lta n t  su b jec tiv e -o b jec tiv e  d is t in c t io n  became hyposta- 
t iz e d  in to  a  d esc rip tio n  o f  the  o r ig in a l  and fundamental s tru c tu re  o f  
r e a l i ty .  In stead  o f  philosophers* keeping th e i r  a tte n tio n  upon the " o r i­
g in  o f  the 'su b jec tiv e*  out of primary experience" fo r  use as a
function  o f  d iscrim in a tin g  what i s  usable in  the  management o f  ex­
perienced ob jec ts  . . • , th e  r e s u l ts  o f  psychological inqu iry  were 
conceived to  form a  sep a ra te  and is o la te d  mental world in  and o f 
i t s e l f ,  s e l f - s u f f ic ie n t  and se lf-e n c lo se d . Since the  psychological 
movement n e ce ssa rily  coincided w ith th a t  which s e t  up physica l ob­
je c t s  a s  correspondingly complete and se lf-en c lo sed , there  re su lte d  
th e  dualism o f  mind and m a tte r, o f  a  physical and a  psychical world, 
which from the day o f  D escartes to  th e  p resen t dominates th e  formu­
la t io n  o f  ph ilosoph ical problem s.!!
The world i s  no t in  I t s e l f ,  noumenally, organized in to  s e l f  and 
o th e r. I t  i s  n o t even, noumenally, organized in to  organism and environ­
ment, a  d iv is io n  Dewey sometimes seems to  recognize a s  basic  and noumenal. 
Thus in  Logic he in d ic a te s  th a t  even th i s  d is t in c t io n  between organism
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and environment i s  an Instrum ental one, a r is in g  to  deal w ith a  problem and 
ju s t i f i e d  in  terms o f  i t s  success o r  f a i lu re  in  reso lv ing  i t  and no t in  
terms o f  some supposed "correspondence** with o b je c tiv e , noumenal r e a l i ty .
A ll o f  these term s—s e l f ,  o th e rj mind, body* organism, environment— 
a re  l ik e  th e  "simples" and "elements" th a t f ig u re  in  the th ink ing  o f  phys­
i c i s t s ,  They a re  r e a l ly  fu n c tio n a l, not abso lu te  in  n a tu re . They a re , 
th a t  i s ,  devices fo r  e ffe c tin g  a  co n tro l w ith in  experience. To regard 
them a s  having independent e x is te n t ia l  stand ing , Dewey says, " is  one more 
case o f  h y p o sta tiza tio n  o f an instrum ent."  ^ "There i s  nothing in  nature  
th a t  belongs ab so lu te ly  and exclu siv e ly  to  anything e lse j  belonging i s  
always a  m atter o f  reference  and d is tr ib u tiv e  assignm ent, ju s t i f ie d  in  
any p a r t ic u la r  case a s  f a r  as  i t  works out w e ll,"
To help  c la r i f y  Dewey's po in t w ith regard to  the fu n c tio n a l charac­
t e r  o f  the  s e lf -o th e r  and oxganism-environment c la s s if ic a t io n s ,  l e t  us 
look a t  ano ther example, v iz . ,  th a t  o f  the p ro v erb ia l bent s t ic k .  The 
question  a r is e s  i Where i s  the ben t s t ic k —in  the  w ater, o r  in  the  p e r- 
c e iv e r o r  sub jec t?  For Dewey; i t  depends on o n e 's  purposes. I f  one i s  
rowing and i s  concerned to  reach ou t and se ize  h is  o a r, the  bentness o f 
the o a r i s  i l lu s o ry  and hence " in  o n e 's  mind." The re a l  o a r i s  s t r a ig h t .  
And th e  reason i s  th a t  to  regard i t  in  th a t  way f a c i l i t a t e s  the  reso lu ­
tio n  o f  o n e 's  problem atic s i tu a t io n , in  th is  case , re tr ie v in g  the oar 
th a t  has s lipped  out o f  o n e 's  hand. But consider the  case o f  an a r t i s t  
whose aim i s  to  d ep ic t in  a  pa in tin g  the  s i tu a t io n  o f  the fisherman in 
h is  boat. For him the  r e a l  oar i s  the  bent one, n o t the  s t r a ig h t  one.
For so regarding i t  i s  the  b e st way o f accomplishing h is  purposes.
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Which oar i s  the  r e a l ly  r e a l  one, the  one th a t  i s  out th e re  indepen­
dent o f  us and abso lu te ly?  There i s  no such oar. "Nothing in  na tu re  . . . 
belongs ab so lu te ly  and exclu siv e ly  to  anything e ls e ,"  Both bentness and
s tra ig h tn e ss  a re  e f fe c ts  o f  a  tra n sa c tio n a l re la tio n sh ip  between organism
15and environment. Both are  th e re fo re  equally  r e la t io n a l  c h a ra c te r is t ic s .  
The only question  i s  th is :  Which way o f regarding the s i tu a t io n  deals
b est w ith ay s p e c if ic  p ro b leaa tic  s itu a tio n ?
The ch a rac te r o f  the  given, o r  th a t  which e x is ts  p r io r  to  thought 
and re f le c t io n  and in te rp re ta t io n , nay be fu r th e r  c la r i f ie d  i f  we con­
s id e r  such q u a l i t ie s  as  sounds and sm ells. These a re  q u a l i t ie s  which 
have never re a l ly  go tten  the  d i f l n i t e  and convenient kind o f  c la s s i f ic a ­
tio n  which most o f  our t a c t i l e  and v isu a l q u a l i t ie s  have go tten . As 1 
look out over my room now, I  f in d  th a t ,  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  previous dealings 
w ith such q u a li ta t iv e  s itu a tio n s^  I  c la s s ify  most o f  the  v isu a l q u a l i t ie s  
in  my percep tual f ie ld  as  o b jec tiv e  o r  e x te rn a l. But when i t  cones to  
sounds and sm ells, I  am no t n early  so c e r ta in  what to  do. For the most 
p a r t ,  I  seem no t to  l i f t  sounds and sm ells out o f  t h e i r  given, p re- 
r e f le c t iv e  submeigence in  the  q u a li ta t iv e  s i tu a t io n  i t s e l f .  The whir­
rin g  sound o f my a i r  co n d itio n e r, fo r  example, I  have been experiencing, 
no t a s  p a r t  o f  the  a i r  co n d itio n er, no r a s  p a r t o f  me, bu t a s  given and 
submerged even when o th e r q u a l i t ie s  a re  l i f t e d  up and o b je c tif ie d  in to  
th in g s . In  d esc rib in g  i t ,  o f course, I  have described  i t  a s  being the  
sound o f  the a i r  co n d itio n e r, and I  might th e re fo re  m istakenly in f e r  th a t  
i t  i s  a s  p a r t o f th e  seen o b je c t, th e  a i r  co n d itio n e r, th a t  I  have always 
experienced i t .  And I  might even, fu r th e r ,  in f e r  th a t  th a t  i s  i t s  r e a l
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s ta tu s ,  v i z . , a s  p a rt o f the  th in g , the  a i r  cond itioner.
Such an in ference would be an example o f  the  assumption which Dewey
16csills  the  su p erio r r e a l i ty  o f  causes. I f  one wanted to  co n tro l the 
sound-qualitle  s , one would want to  make changes in  the a i r  cond itioner, 
no t in  o n e 's  e a r . On the assumption, then , th a t  where the cause i s ,  the 
more r e a l  i s ,  we come to  believe th a t  the r e a l  i s  ob jec tive  o r  physica l. 
And s in c e , fo r  purposes o f  co n tro l, i t  i s  p rim arily  those primary q u a li­
t i e s ,  l ik e  mass and force (which a re  re a lly  r e la t io n a l  in  charac te r) th a t  
a re  u se fu l, th e re  i s  a  tendency to  p o s it  them as  the only genuinely and
independently r e a l  ones, and to  re le g a te  the  o thers  to  the  realm o f the 
17purely  m ental.
But in  f a c t ,  the r e a l ,  in  the sense o f  what e x is ts  p r io r  to  r e f le c ­
tio n , what l ie s  ou tside  o f  thought, i s  the q u a li ta t iv e  s i tu a tio n  which i s  
f e l t .  But we a re  n o t co g n itiv e ly  a t te n tiv e  to  the q u a li ta tiv e  s itu a tio n  
and we th e re fo re  do no t o ften  take note o f  i t .  We take note ra th e r  o f 
the  fin ish ed  products o f  r e f le c t iv e  a n a ly s is , because i t  i s  o f  them th a t  
i t  i s  u se fu l to  take account. And we m istakenly in fe r  from th i s  th a t  
they a re  the o r ig in a l fu rn itu re  o f  our experience and o f  r e a l i ty .
What Dewey means here can perhaps be c la r i f ie d  by re fe rr in g  to  a
passage from Jam es's Psychology which Dewey quotes in  h is  a r t i c l e ,  "The
18Vanishing Subject in  the Psychology o f  James."
Take the  example o f  an a lto g e th e r  unprecedented experience, such 
a s  a  new ta s te  in  the  th ro a t. I s  i t  a  sub jec tiv e  q u a lity  o f  fe e l­
in g , o r  an o b jec tive  q u a lity  f e l t ?  You do no t even ask the  ques­
tio n  a t  th i s  p o in t. I t  i s  sim ply th a t  t a s t e . But a  docto r hears 
you describe  i t ,  and sayst "Hal now you know what heartburn i s , "  
then i t  becomes a  q u a lity  a lread y  e x is te n t e x tra  mentum tuam 
[" o b je c t if ie d " ]  which you in  tu rn  have come upon and learned .
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The f i r s t  spaces, tim es, th in g s , q u a l i t ie s ,  experienced by the 
ch ild  probably appear, l ik e  the f i r s t  heartbu rn , in  th is  abso lu te  
way, a s  simple beings, n e ith e r  in  nor out o f  thought.
Dewey, in  d iscussing  th is  passage, adds th a t
There i s  nothing in t r in s ic a l ly  sensory about red , h o t, r a in . They 
a re  so named because experience has shown the importance o f the 
organic apparatus by which they a re  mediated. That co lo r i s  v isu a l 
and sound au d ito ry  i s  an item o f knowledge gained through the study 
o f  the  conditions o f  the occurrence o f the  q u a lity  t i t  i s  no p a rt 
o f  the q u a l i ty .19
Now th i s  presence o f a f e l t  s itu a tio n  in  which q u a l i t ie s  are  ju s t  
beings and not only a re  not physical o r  m ental, but a re  no t even aud i­
to ry , ta c tu a l ,  v isu a l, o r  whatever—th is  to ta l  f e l t  s i tu a tio n  i s  the 
background o f a l l  thought. I t  i s  what our experience i s  when we a re  not 
co g n itiv e ly  c la s s ify in g  and in te rp re tin g  these  q u a l i t ie s  v is -a -v is  some 
problem we have. For, a s  I  ind ica ted  above, fo r  Dewey, Jam es's charac­
te r iz a t io n  o f the  experience o f  the c h ild  ap p lie s  a lso  to  a l l  our exper­
ience when i t  i s  not e x p l ic i t ly  re f le c t iv e .
But i f  th e  u ltim ate ly  r e a l ,  the th ings in  them selves, a re  the qua l­
i t i e s  o f  our d ire c t ly  had experience (as he puts i t  in  h is  rep ly  to
20R ussell in  the  Schilpp volume), then i s  no t Dewey him self an id e a l is t?  
I s  i t  n o t the case th a t  the d is tin c tio n  between s e l f  and o th e r, mind and 
body, and so on, i s  in s t i tu te d  by v irtu e  o f c e r ta in  fa c ts  ch arac te riz in g  
the  In te r re la t io n s  o f  the  f e l t  q u a li t ie s  w ith in  the su b jec tiv e  andideal 
sphere o f our experience?
This i s  a  kind o f in te rp re ta tio n  o f  Dewey which i t  i s  easy to  f a l l  
in to ,  I  b e liev e , but i t  i s  a  m isin te rp re ta tio n  because i t  neg lec ts  Dewey's 
Id e n tif ic a tio n  o f  the raw q u a li t ie s  o f d i r e c t ,  prim al experience with 
nature  o r  r e a l i ty .  Or; as  I  put i t  e a r l i e r ,  in  the chap ter on fe e lin g ,
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the f&ct th a t  In  fe e lin g  experience and nature  In te rs e c t o r  co incide.
The q u a l i t ie s  which fe e lin g  has, o r  which a re  denoted by the  te rn  " fe e l­
ing , " a re  n a tu ra l even ts , not events in  a  mind o r in  a  s e l f  o r  even in  
an organism. They a re  the  products, Dewey th in k s , o f  n a tu ra l tra n sac tio n s . 
MAs m anifestations o f  in te ra c tio n s  o f  a  n a tu ra lly  e x is te n t organism and
e x is te n t environing conditions a l l  experienced m ateria ls  stand  on exac tly
21the sane le v e l ,"  And these n a tu ra l in te ra c tio n s  o r  tran sac tio n s  had 
been going on long before man came on the scene and began to  g e t involved 
in  them.
But a  fu r th e r  question  a r is e s  i Even i f  there  a re  n a tu ra l tran sac ­
tio n s  which give r i s e  to  fe e lin g s , how are  we to  know what n a tu re  i s  
re a lly  lik e ?  Have we no t got the o ld  epistem ological problem a l l  over 
again? He have various f e l t  q u a l i t ie s  which a re  the products o f n a tu ra l 
tran sac tio n s  o f  some s o r t .  But which o f these  q u a l i t ie s  most accu ra te ly  
rep resen ts  the  way th ings a re?  Or i s  i t  ju s t  im possible to  say? Are we, 
th a t  i s ,  n o t n ecessa rily  lim ited  to  our own po in t o f view?
Dewey answers th is  question in  two ways*
1, That d esc rip tio n  o f the way th ings a re  i s  b e st which works, 
which g e ts  us the kind o f  re s u l ts  which we need to  solve our problems.
And th i s  working i s  not a  working o f  the  b e l ie f  in  the  p roposition  in 
question in  e ffec tin g  c e r ta in  s a lu ta ry  consequences in  our experience, 
but the working o f  the proposition  i t s e l f .  He thus re je c ts  the  Jamesian 
conception o f  "pragmatic" ju s t i f ic a t io n  a s  co n sis tin g  in  a  change which 
the  mere holding o f a  b e l ie f  c re a te s  in  our l iv e s .  There must in stead  
be "ob jective" changes e ffec ted  by the  te s t in g  o f the  hypothesis i t s e l f
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before I t  can be sa id  to  be a  tru e  o r  v e r id ic a l  one. One could no t demon- 
s tz a te  the  innocence o f  L ieutenant C alley , fo r  example, on the ground th a t  
b e l ie f  In h is  innocence would be b e t te r  fo r  o n e 's  own l i f e ,  o r  fo r  Ameri­
can so c ie ty  in  gen era l. I f  he i s  innocent, c e r ta in  fa c ts  and th e i r  r e la ­
tio n s  to  laws w il l  have to  be discovered, and th i s  i s  so ir re sp e c tiv e  o f  
how w ell b e l ie f  in  h is  innocence might work to  improve our l iv e s .  For
22Dewey, then , a  b e l ie f  can be b e n e f ic ia l and f a ls e ,  o r  harmful and tru e .
2. But in  Experience and Nature Dewey d iscu sses  ano ther c r i te r io n  
f o r  determ ining what account o f  the  n a tu ra l tra n sac tio n s  which c o n s ti tu te  
r e a l i ty  i s  the  most a ccu ra te . " I t  i s  reasonable to  b e liev e ,"  he says, 
" th a t the  most adequate d e f in it io n  o f  the  b asic  t r a i t s  o f n a tu ra l e x is ­
tence can be had only when i t s  p ro p e rtie s  a re  most fu l ly  displayed—a 
condition which i s  met in  the degree o f  the  scope and intim acy o f in te r ­
a c tio n s  re a liz e d ."  So, although fo r  purposes o f  c o n tro l, i t  i s  b e t te r  
to  regard n a tu re  in  some o f i t s  " le s s e r ,  more ex te rn a l f ie ld s  o f in te r ­
a c tio n ,"  which a re  the ones which the sciences d esc rib e , the  kinds o f 
q u a l i t ie s  which a re  found in  the more ex tensive and involved in te ra c tio n s
which come in to  play in  human experience a re  "more adequate in d ica tio n s
23o f the n a tu re  o f  na tu re  than a re ” those which f ig u re  in  the  sciences.
Such a  view im plies th a t  no t only a re  the secondary and te r t i a r y  q u a li­
t i e s ,  and th e re fo re  the  v a lu e -c h a ra c te r is tic s , o f  our experience equally  
tru e  o f na tu re  a s  those which fig u re  in  the physica l sc ien ces , bu t th a t  
they a re  even t r u e r  o f  i t  than those o f  the  physica l sc iences.
Parodi, in  h is  essay  in  the  Schllpp volume, "Knowledge and Action
2h.in  Dewey's Philosophy," r a is e s  two very in te re s t in g  questions about
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Dewey's view. I  would l ik e  to  d iscuss these now, both because they and 
Dewey's answers c la r i f y  Dewey's view o f  "mind" and "body," and because 
they ra is e  what seen to  me the most se rio u s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  fo r  Dewey's view.
E aro d l's  f i r s t  ob jection  questions the f e a s ib i l i ty  o f  p u ttin g  the 
phenomena the  p h y s ic is t describes and experienced q u a l i t ie s  l ik e  red on 
the  same level*
For I t  i s  from the ou tside  th a t  we experience both the  v ib ra tio n s  
which c o n s ti tu te  fo r  the  p h y s ic is ts  say , the co lo r red , and the 
m odifications o f  the  nerves which transm it them ( i . e . ,  the impres­
sions) to  the b ra in ; and we would, i f  we could follow i t s  course 
fa r th e r ,  undoubtedly find  in  the b ra in  I t s e l f  a  new s e r ie s  o f phe­
nomena o f a  mechanical o r  chemical nature . . , j bu t nowhere, 
c e r ta in ly , should we meet, from th i s  po in t o f view, the  co lo r red 
a s  something f e l t ,  a s  the  sensation  o r  perception properly so 
c a lle d . I t  seems indeed th a t ,  in  o rder to  apprehend something 
lik e  th a t ,  i t  i s  necessary  to  change one 's  po in t o f  view and to  
place o nese lf in to  the  very c en te r  o f  the consciousness o f  the 
su b jec t who p e rce iv e s .25
Barodi i s  then suggesting here a  d u a lis t ic  theory o f mind and body, 
according to  which some "outside" phenomena e x is t  in  the  sphere o f body, 
and o th e r in te r io r  o r  p riv a te  ones e x is t  in  the sphere o f  mind. He i s  
making the fa m ilia r  po in t th a t—supposedly, a t  l e a s t—a physio log ist 
could probe a  man's b ra in  from now u n t i l  the end o f  time and never d is ­
cover what the man was th ink ing  o f. I f  he were th ink ing , fo r  example, 
o f  the  co lo r re d , the p h y sio log ist would never be ab le  to  know th a t  f a c t  
u n less  he were informed by the man h im self.
Dewey answers th a t  the  q u a lity  red  i s  not an event in  consciousness 
o r  mind, but an event in  the  world. P arodi, he says, takes
a  q u a lity , say re d , to  be . . .  a  "sensation" in  and o f  i t s e l f .  My 
view i s  more r e a l i s t i c a l ly  naive. The q u a lity  occurs ex ac tly , in  
p r in c ip le , a s  any n a tu ra l even t, say  a  thundershower. There i s  no 
passage from the physica l to  the m ental, from an ex te rn a l world to
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something f e l t  o r  o f  the n a tu re  o f  a  psychical consciousness, but 
from o b jec ts  with one s e t  o f  q u a l i t ie s  to  o b jec ts  w ith o th e r q u a li­
t i e s ,  When, however, a  q u a li ty  i s  termed a  "sen sa tio n ,"  o r  i s  ex­
p l i c i t l y  taken in  connection, w ith an a c t  o f  perceiv ing , something 
ad d itiv e  has happened. I t  i s  now placed in  a  s p e c ia lly  se lec ted  
connection, th a t  to  the  organism o r  s e l f .  Fending the outcome of 
an Inquiry  no t y e t completed, one may not know whether a  q u a lity , 
say red , belongs to  th i s  o r  th a t  o b jec t in  the  environment, nor 
indeed whether i t  may no t be the  product o f  In tra -o rg an ic  processes 
a s  in  the case o f "seeing  s ta r s "  a f t e r  a  blow on the head. In  o th e r 
words, the occurrence o f  q u a l i t ie s  upon my view i s  a  purely  n a tu ra l 
even t, , . . [Even]] the  f in a l  reference  o f q u a l i t ie s  to  in t r a -  
organic events i s  i t s e l f  a  reference  to  one kind o f o b jec t in  the 
n a tu ra l  w orld ,2®
B arod i's  view, then , simply assumes th a t  the  red q u a lity  i s  in  the 
mind, and the v ib ra tio n s  and nerve system a re  in  th e  n a tu ra l world, Dewey 
in s i s t s ,  however, and I  th ink  r ig h t ly ,  th a t  the red i s  n o t i n i t i a l l y  ex­
perienced a s  In te rn a l o r  a s  e x te rn a l. I t  i s  ju s t  a  being, a  q u a lity  had
27a s  p a rt o f  a  to ta l  f e l t  s i tu a t io n .  Only l a t e r ,  in  response to  a  prob­
lem atic s i tu a t io n ,  do we lo c a te  i t  a s  being in  the  organism, o r  in  the 
w orld. I t  does no t e x is t  an teceden tly  to  inqu iry  in  e i th e r  p lace.
But now, one can re p ly , in  defense o f Banodi, th a t  su re ly  the  red 
i s  no t a s  good a  candidate f o r  in c lu s io n  in  the n a tu ra l world as  a r e ,  say , 
the  v ib ra tio n s . For the  red  i s  dependent on a  re la tio n sh ip  between the  
v ib ra tio n s  and the organism. I t  i s  n o t a  p a r t o f  the  ap p le , fo r  example, 
in t r in s ic a l ly ,  bu t r e la t io n a l ly ,
Dewey*s rep ly  h e re , I  b e lie v e , would be th a t  i f  nothing i s  p a r t o f  
th e  n a tu ra l world th a t  does n o t e x is t  th e re  ab so lu te ly , then th e re  i s  
nothing a t  a l l  in  the  n a tu ra l w orld. Because a l l  th in g s , including  the  
e n t i t i e s  th a t  physics d e sc rib e s , have th e i r  c h a rac te r  by v ir tu e  o f  r e la ­
t io n s  in  which they stand  to  o th e r th in g s . Modem physics, Dewey says 
in  Quest fo r  C erta in ty , req u ire s  us to  abandon the  view th a t  the  world
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c o n sis ts  o f  "unchangeable substances having p ro p e rtie s  fixed  in  is o la tio n  
and unaffected  by In te ra c tio n s , , , . For not only a re  no such o b jec ts  
found to  e x is t ,  but the  very na tu re  o f  experim ental nethod, namely, d e f i­
n it io n  by operations th a t  a re  in te ra c t io n s , in p lle s  th a t  such th in g s  a re  
no t capable o f  being known."
To c la r i f y  what he means by the  r e la t io n a l  ch a rac te r o f s c ie n t i f ic  
e n t i t i e s ,  Dewey re fe rs  to  EdLdington's statem ent th a t  " 't h e  whole o f  our 
physica l knowledge i s  based on m easures,• and . , . whenever we s ta te  the 
p ro p e rtie s  o f  a  body in  terms o f  physica l q u a n ti t ie s ,  we a re  im parting 
the  responses o f  various m e tric a l in d ic a to rs  to  i t s  presence, and nothing 
m o r e . "^9 He then o ffe rs  a s  an example o f  such a  statem ent o f  a  body's 
p ro p e rtie s  Eddington's a n a ly s is  o f  "what happens when an elephant s l id e s  
dow nhill. , . . The mass o f  the  elephant i s  the reading o f a  p o in te r  on 
a  weighing s c a le » the slope o f the  h i l l ,  the  reading o f a  plumb lin e
a g a in s t the  d iv is io n s  o f a  p ro tra c to r» bu lk , a s e r ie s  o f  readings on the
30sca le  o f  a  p a ir  o f  c a l ip e rs i"  and so on.
Another example o f  the  r e l a t iv i ty  o f  what d u a lis ts  c h a ra c te r is t ic a l ly  
c a l l  primary q u a l i t ie s  (and thus suppose to  be inheren t and ab so lu te ) i s  
th a t  o f  the  length  and shape o f a  body. For, to  the  theory  o f r e l a t i v i t y ,  
the same body
has many d if f e r e n t  len g th s , in  the  d ire c tio n  o f i t s  r e c t i l in e a r  
unaccelerated  motion; depending upon tfte~'state o f  r e la t iv e  no tion  
o f  the  reference-body with re sp ec t to  which i t s  motion i s  defined! 
i t  has th e re fo re  many d if f e r e n t  shapes! and these e f f e c ts ,  the 
L oren tz-F itzgera ld  co n trac tio n s; a re  o ften  described  by p h y s ic is ts , 
not a s  i l lu s o ry  ways in  which the  body merely "appears" to  d i f ­
fe re n t observers, bu t a s  physical p ro p e rtie s  o f the  body, any one 
o f  them a s  " rea l"  as  any o th e r. Thus a  ch arac te r which a  m a te ria l 
th in g  has only in  a  sp ec ia l co n tex t, only in  i t s  re la tio n  to  ano ther
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in d iv idua l th in g , i t  has none the  le s s  o b jec tiv e ly  and ph y sica lly . 
This suggested th a t  a  ch arac te r which e x is ts  only in  re la t io n  to  
an Ind iv idual s e n tie n t o rgan ise , o r  to  an a c t  o f  percep tion , may 
be in  l ik e  manner,' o b jec tive  and even ‘' p h y s i c a l , “31
But now, to  cone to  E a ro d i's  second ob jec tio n , even i f  i t  be granted 
th a t q u a l i t ie s  l ik e  red a re  n a tu ra l even ts , th e re  i s  a  fu r th e r  d iff ic u lty *  
How i s  i t  th a t  a  n a tu ra l even t, l ik e  the  co lo r red , can take on s ig n i f i ­
cance? How i s  i t  th a t  the c o lo r red can meant I  must now stop  ny c a r l 
"He a re  to ld ,"  fttrodi says
th a t  sensations and percep tions, which a re ,  u n t i l  th a t  moaent, 
simple n a tu ra l fa c ts  [[Dewey's dumb, u n in te rp re ted , f e l t  q u a l i t ie s ] ,  
become ob jec ts  o f  knowledge when they serve a s  signs and announce 
o r  suggest o th e r fa c ts  which a re  no t y e t p resen t in  the experience 
o f the senses, b u t, i f  they were in  the beginning only n a tu ra l 
fa c ts  (which means, undoubtedly, th a t  they were not y e t data o f 
consciousness), how could they e n te r  as  terms in to  these conscious 
re la tio n sh ip s  o r  thoughts which c o n s ti tu te  our in ferences and 
which perm it us to  fo resee and to  estim ate consequences? Would 
they n o t suddenly have to  change th e i r  na tu re  in  the most m ysteri­
ous manner?32
The problem B arod i's  ob jection  p o in ts  to ,  i t  seeas to  me, i s  th a t  
o f  how a n a tu ra l event can contain w ith in  i t s e l f  a  reference to  the fu ­
tu re  and to  the p ast. How can the red  q u a lity  "contain" the meaning 
I-m u st-s to p -o r-I-w ill-b e -ru n -in to -b y -an o th e r-ca r? I t  would seem th a t  a  
n a tu ra l event can s iap ly  be what i t  i s ,  what S a rtre  would c a l l  en s o l .
For i t  to  be what i t  i s  n o t, a s  something i t  s ig n if ie s ,  seems su re ly  to  
req u ire  the operation o f ano ther kind o f  ex istence  than n a tu ra l ex istence , 
un less magic o r  "mystery" i s  a t  work in  the un iverse . And th a t  o ther 
kind o f ex istence (S artre  c a l l s  i t  pour so l)  i s  consciousness o r  mind— 
the capacity  to  transcend the  encapsulated being o f the p resen t moment 
and to  p ro je c t in to  the  fu tu re  and the  p a s t.
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Dewey, o f course, agrees th a t  consciousness begins p rec ise ly  w ith 
th is  l ib e ra tio n  from the p resen t. As I  have pointed ou t, Dewey d i s t in ­
guishes between the "b ru te ly  s e r ia l  fashion" in  which animals experience
the world, and the presence o f p ast and fu tu re  which ch arac te rizes  man's
33experience. In  the anim al, Dewey says,
the  sm ell, S, i s  replaced (and disp laced) by a  f e l t  movement, K,
and th i s  i s  replaced by the g r a t i f i c a t io n ,  G. Viewed from w ithout, 
fo r  i t s e l f ,  i t  i s  now S, now G, and so on to  the  end o f  the chap­
t e r .  Nowhere i s  th e re  looking before and a f te r ;  memory and a n t i -
c lra tlo n  a re  no t bora. Such an experience n e ith e r  i s ,  in  whole o r  
in  p a r t ,  a  knowledge, nor does i t  ex erc ise  a  cognitive  fu n c tio n . ^
Now, as  I  be lieve  Rarodi ag rees, Dewey describes experience w ith 
g rea t in s ig h t .  But the  question  Parodi asks i s  whether Dewey does n o t 
uncover some fa c ts  about our experience which t e s t i f y  eloquently  to  the  
Inadequacy o f h is  own n a tu r a l is t ic  s ta r t in g -p o in t. Dewey's commitment 
to  the em pirica l-deno tative  method would seem to  have led  him to  conclu­
sions in co n sis ten t w ith the  fundamental assumptions with which he began.
A ctually , th i s  o b jec tion  was made much e a r l i e r  by Love joy in  an a r -
3*5t i d e  ca lled  "Fastness and Transcendence.""^ Here Love joy c a l l s  in to  
question Dewey's contention  th a t  " e .g . ,  a  p a s t f i r e  can be now 'known* 
o r become 'p re se n t-a s -a b s e n t, '  i f ,  a s  h is  theory  ho lds, nothing i s  now
given in  experience bu t the  e f fe c t  o f  the f i r e ,  v iz . .  the smoke."
37Lovejoy here and in  h is  essay, "The Anomaly of Knowledge," i s  
asking Dewey, and n a tu r a l is ts  in  gen era l, ju s t  how i t  i s  th a t  an organ­
ism can e f fe c t  th e  re la t io n  between a  p re sen t, a c tu a l th ing  and a  fu tu re , 
possib le  one. How does i t  l i f t  i t s e l f  out o f  time and a c tu a li ty  to  b ring  
th is  about? I s  th i s  not Indeed a  sign  o f a  tran scenden ta l, non-natura l 
mind a t  work?
-  lk l  -
Dewey's own answer to  th is  ob jection  i s  contained in  the essay, 
"Realism Without Monism o r Dualism -11."-^ I t  i s ,  in  my opinion, an 
em barrassingly poor e f f o r t  to  answer Lovejoy's c r itic ism s . Rather than 
to  d iscuss i t  in  d e ta i l ,  th e re fo re , l e t  me o f fe r  the follow ing a s  a 
defense o f Dewey's view ag a in s t both Lovejoy's and B arod i's  very tre n ­
chant c r i t ic is m s .
When I  become aware o f  f i r e  as  a  p resen t-as-absen t meaning o f  smoke 
(o r  o f  any o th e r meanings th a t  q u a l i t ie s  and o b jec ts  have), I  am not 
transcending the p resen t in to  the fu tu re . Such an operation o f tra n ­
scendence would indeed be possib le  only by a  transcenden tal o r  psychical 
kind o f th in g . What i s  happening i s  r a th e r  th a t  I  am using a  general 
p rin c ip le  I  know, v iz . ,  th a t  smoke always follow s f i r e ,  and upon seeing 
smoke now I  am in fe rr in g  th a t  the  general ru le  w ill  hold again and th a t ,  
as  before so many tim es, the smoke w ill  be seen to  have come about in  
conjunction w ith f i r e .  I  am no t transcending in to  the fu tu re  o r  the 
p a s t, but am making an in ference in  the  p re sen t. The p resen t-as-fu tu re  
f i r e  (which I  expect to  see) suggested by the  smoke i s  therefo re  no t 
apprehended d i r e c t ly ,  but i s  In fe rred  from the general p r in c ip le , " I f  
th e re  i s  smoke, th e re  i s  (o r  anyway was) f i r e , "  and the s in g u la r  propo­
s i t io n ,  "There i s  now smoke." The in ference i s ,  "There i s  (o r  was) f i r e , "  
In  making th is  in fe ren ce , I  no more go to  the  fu tu re  than I  go to  the 
apartm ent above mine when I  in f e r  th a t  the sounds I  hear up th e re  a re  
fo o ts te p s . Does such an inference requ ire  th a t  I  transcend from the 
apartm ent I  am in  to  the  one up above, no t o f course p h y sica lly , but 
psych ica lly?  What I  am contending i s  th a t  i t  does n o t, th a t  what one
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i s  doing in  making such inferences i s  making use o f a  general p rin c ip le
th a t  sounds o f th a t  s o r t  a re  created  by a  person walking on h is  f lo o r .
39But ano ther ob jec tio n , one which was made by Blanshard, can be 
ra ised  a t  th is  po in t: I f  we a re  not now d ire c t ly  p ro jec tin g  in to  the
fu tu re  in  a n tic ip a tin g  f i r e  from smoke, but a re  ra th e r  making an inference 
from a  p r in c ip le  o r  ru le ,  what exactly  i s  the s ta tu s  o f  th i s  ru le?  I s  i t  
not a  supra-tem poral kind o f th ing? Are we n o t, th e re fo re , in  understand­
ing such a  p rin c ip le , n ecessa rily  making a leap  out o f the  p resen t in to  
the fu tu re  and in to  the past?  For a  general p rin c ip le  l ik e  th is  by i t s  
very nature  holds fo r  a l l  tim es. So th a t  what we have avoided by re fe r ­
ence to  the p r in c ip le , v iz . ,  transcendence in to  the fu tu re , now seems to  
be contained in  the p rin c ip le  i t s e l f .
Here I  th ink one can answer th a t  a  general p rin c ip le  i s  not a  d esc rip ­
tion  o f p a st and fu tu re  events, but what i s  now sometimes c a lled  a  "d is ­
position" to  a c t  in  c e r ta in  ways under c e r ta in  cond itions. To say th a t  
one be liev es  th a t smoke means f i r e  i s ,  then , n o t to  say th a t  one i s  now 
surveying a l l  o f  time and noting th a t  throughout i t s  expanse a  c e r ta in  
law o r general p rin c ip le  holds tru e . I t  i s  ra th e r  to  say th a t  one i s  
in c lin ed , i f  he should encounter smoke, to  expect f i r e ,  A general p rin ­
c ip le  i s  a  d isp o s itio n  to  expect c e r ta in  th in g s , o r  to  do c e r ta in  th in g s , 
i f  c e r ta in  conditions a re  f u l f i l l e d .
We have already  seen th a t th i s  i s  Dewey's view o f meaning on p. 68 
o f  th is  d is s e r ta t io n . There I  in d ica ted  th a t  fo r  Dewey the meaning of 
a q u a lity  o r  th ing  i s  a  ru le  fo r  in te rp re tin g  o r using th a t  th ing  in  somt- 
p ra c tic a l con tex t. To say , then , th a t  a  th ing  is  portab le  i s  to  be
p repared  o r  d isposed to  perfo rm  a p p r o p r ia te ly  under c e r ta in  c ircu m stan ces . 
B ut such d is p o s it io n s  do n o t in v o lv e  making d i r e c t  ( o r  even in d i r e c t ,  
through m en ta l c o n te n ts , as  L o ve jo y  m a in ta in s ) c o n ta c t w ith  p as t and 
fu tu r e  t im e s , b u t ju s t  to  a c t  o r  to  be in  a  s ta te  o f  re a d in e s s  to  a c t .
But now I  th in k  we must add th a t  f o r  Dewey th e  meaning i s  a ls o  a  
p ro p e rty  o f  th e  o b je c t .  To say t h a t  c louds mean r a in  o r  th a t  smoke means 
f i r e  is  n o t  to  say m ere ly  th a t  som ething s u b je c t iv e  c a l le d  read in e ss  to  
e x p e c t r a in  and to  seek s h e l t e r  occurs in  me when I  see c lo u d s . F o r th e  
c louds them selves come to  have t h is  meaning as  a  q u a l i t y  b e lo n g in g  to  
them , n o t o f  course i n t r i n s i c a l l y ,  b u t because o f  t h e i r  in te r a c t io n  w ith  
me. J u s t as Desdemona's h a n d k e rc h ie f was I t s e l f  "charged w ith  h is to r y  
and p ro p h ecy ,"  and t h is  was in  th e  h a n d k e rc h ie f as a  p e rv a s iv e  q u a l i t y  o f  
i t ,  so a re  many o f  th e  meanings t h a t  th in g s  a r e  p e rc e iv e d  as hav in g  ju s t
ifO
such p e rv a s iv e  q u a l i t i e s  t h a t  b e long  to  them — a lw a y s , o f  co u rse , because  
o f  t h e i r  in te r a c t io n s  w ith  us and o u r e x p e c ta t io n s .
I t  i s  th is  q u a l i f i c a t io n  o f  Dewey's v iew  o f  meaning th a t  rescues  
him  from  p h ys ic a lis ra  and W atso n ian -typ e  b e h a v io r is m , I  b e l ie v e .  The 
W atsonian b e h a v io r is t  m ig h t a g ree  t h a t  meanings a re  e x p e c ta tio n s  and  
d is p o s it io n s ,  b u t he would n o t ag ree  th a t  th e s e  d is p o s it io n s  a re  c o r re ­
la t e d  w ith  "em ergent" p ro p e r t ie s  o r  q u a l i t i e s  in  th e  o b je c ts  them selves. 
O th e llo  in t e r p r e t s  Desdemona's h a n d k e rc h ie f as  in d ic a t in g  th a t  she has  
b e tra y e d  h im . Ib i s  meaning o f  th e  h a n d k e rc h ie f c o n s is ts  in  p a r t  in  a  
s e t  o f  e x p e c ta tio n s  and d is p o s it io n s  to  behave on O th e l lo 's  p a r t .  B ut 
i t  a ls o  c o n s is ts , and in  a  way th a t  is  in s e p a ra b le  from  those  exp ec ta ­
t io n s  and d is p o s it io n s ,  in  a  c e r ta in  q u a l i t y  o f  th e  h a n d k e rc h ie f i t s e l f
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whereby i t  i s  o b je c t iv e ly  charged w ith  h is to r y  and prophecy. T h is  i s
what Dewey means when he says t h a t  th e  expected  consequences o f  th e  use
o f  a  th in g  become "commuted in t o  . . .  b a re  th in g s "  th em selves , "When
am e v e n t has m eaning, i t s  p o te n t ia l  consequences become i t s  in t e g r a l  and 
funded fe a tu r e .  When th e  p o te n t ia l  consequences a re  im p o rta n t and r e ­
p e a te d , th e y  form  th e  v e ry  n a tu re  and essence o f  th e  th in g , i t s  d e f in in g ,
4lid e n tify in g , and d is tin g u ish in g  form."
There a re  many o th e r  problem s w ith  Dewey*s n a t u r a l i s t ic  account o f
consciousness o r  c o g n it io n . To c o n s id e r a l l  o f  them in  th e  k in d  o f  d e t a i l
th e y  re q u ir e  would c a l l ,  how ever, f o r  a n o th e r  d is s e r ta t io n ,  and one even
lo n g e r  than  t h is  one. B u t th e re  i s  one w hich I  would l i k e  to  c o n s id e r
b e fo re  le a v in g  t h is  s u b je c t .  T h a t i s  th e  problem  o f  how knowledge o f  th e
p a s t i s  p o s s ib le  f o r  an o rgan ism . Dewey, in  d is c u s s in g  t h is  problem ,
c h a r a c t e r is t ic a l l y  says v e ry  i l lu m in a t in g  th in g s  abo u t th e  v a r io u s  ways
42in  which we have knowledge o f  th e  p a s t , b u t f a i l s ,  I  b e l ie v e ,  to  d e a l 
w ith  th e  m eta p h ys ica l problem s in v o lv e d , th e  k in d s  o f  problem s p o in te d  
to  by L ove joy  and P a ro d i, t h a t  i s .  Such problem s have to  do w ith  th e  
q u e s tio n  o f  w h e th er c e r ta in  fh c ts  abo u t e x is te n c e  do n o t n e c e s s ita te  th e  
re c o g n it io n  o f  an e n t i r e ly  d i f f e r e n t  mode o f  b e in g  to  account f o r  them.
I t  i s  th e  k in d  o f  q u e s tio n  t h a t  l a u l  W eiss i s  concerned w ith  in  h is  book, 
Modes o f  B e in g .
L e t  me adum brate an answ er to  t h is  q u e s tio n  o f  how we have knowledge  
o f  th e  p a s t in  a  way th a t  I  th in k  is  c o n s is te n t  w ith  Dewey's p h ilo s o p h y , 
and w hich accounts  f o r  such knowledge on h is  own n a t u r a l i s t i c  grounds.
We a re  n o t ,  as  I  b e l ie v e  Dewey w ould a g re e , d i r e c t ly  a c q u a in te d  w ith
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th e  p a s t in  memory, any more th a n  we a re  d i r e c t ly  a c q u a in te d  w ith  th e
fu tu r e  in  a n t ic ip a t io n .  Our knowledge o f  th e  p a s t i s  an in fe re n c e  from
p re s e n t d a ta  and p e rc e p tu a l and c o n c ep tu a l o b je c ts  funded from  p a s t i n -  
43q u ir ie s ,  I  know th a t  I  w ent to  N o rth w estern  U n iv e r s ity  as  an under­
g ra d u a te , f o r  exam ple, because o f  th e  p re s e n t evid en ce  o f  h av in g  done so, 
and th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  assum ption o f  h av in g  done so is  th e  b e s t account 
o f  t h a t  e v id e n ce . O f c o u rs e , I  do n o t g e n e r a l ly  go through t h is  k in d  o f  
p ro o f w ith  re g a rd  to  my r e c o lle c t io n s  o r  b e l ie f s  a b o u t th e  p a s t , b u t  t h is  
i s  because such re c o n s tru c tio n s  o f  my p a s t e x p e r ie n c e , w ith o u t r e s o r t in g  
to  t e s t s ,  " is  so re p e a te d ly  con firm ed  by th e  course o f  ensu ing  events
t h a t  we come to  depend upon them w ith o u t a p p ly in g  s p e c ia l  t e s t s .  O nly
<|j|.
in  cases o f  c r u c ia l  doubt do we r e s o r t  to  th e  l a t t e r , "
B ut now th e  m e ta p h ys ica l q u e s tio n  rem ains! How cam I  even under­
s tan d  t h a t  I  had a  p a s t , o r  w i l l  have a  f u t u r e ,  f o r  th a t  m a tte r ,  u n less
45
I  am in  some sense now d i r e c t l y  a c q u a in te d  w ith  my p as t and my fu tu r e .  
Even, t h a t  i s ,  i f  one g ra n te d  th a t  in  knowing ab o u t my p as t X am te s t in g  
a  h yp o th es is  abo u t what happened on th e  b a s is  o f  what evidence e x is ts  
f o r  t h a t  h yp o th es is  to d a y , how am I  a b le  to  make sense o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h a t  h yp o th es is  r e fe r s  to  th e  p a s t u n less  I  have d i r e c t  acq u a in tan ce  a t  
le a s t  w ith  P ast-n ess?  I f  my awareness i s  l im i te d  to  th e  p re s e n t,  what 
sense does i t  make to  t a l k  ab o u t my p as t?  O r, f o r  th a t  m a tte r , how can 
I  even make sense o f  th e  n o tio * . o f  th e  p re s e n t, i f  I  do n o t have some 
d i r e c t  acq u ain tance  w ith  th e  pas t?
L e t  me now t r y  to  answ er t h is  o b je c t io n  to  w hat I  w ould ta k e  to  be 
Dewey*s v iew . Dewey would h o ld , as  I  have s a id ,  t h a t  memory is  n o t  d i r e c t
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acquaintance with the p a s t. And I  be lieve h is  view can be defended ag a in s t 
views l ik e  those taken by P rofessor William Earle in  the chap ter, "Memory," 
in  h is  book, The Autobiographical Consciousness.
F i r s t  o f a l l ,  how i s  i t  th a t we a re  ab le  even to  conceive o f the past 
i f  we a re  not d ire c t ly  acquainted w ith i t ?  The answer I  would suggest to  
th is  question i s  th a t  we a re  indeed acquainted d ire c t ly  with the  p ast.
For our awareness i s  no t lim ited  to  the  p resen t, but to  the specious p res­
e n t . And the  specious p resen t contains in  i t  fu tu re , p a s t, and present 
time modes. Thus do I  have the  m ate ria l out o f which to  construct my 
knowledge o f the p ast and my a n tic ip a tio n s  o f the fu tu re . For I  am, in 
the specious p resen t in  which I  now liv e  and o f  which I  am aware, aware 
o f what the p ast and the fu tu re  a re , although not o f the contents o f them.
Any awareness a t  a l l ,  i t  would seem, no m atter how th in ly  i t  be s l ic e d , 
n ecessa rily  contains a t  le a s t  a  p ast mode and perhaps a fu tu re  mode as w ell. 
You cannot s tep  in to  the p resen t even once. For the "present" i s  re a lly  
a re la t iv e  term. No moment i s  ab so lu te ly  p resen t. I t  i s  only more o r le s s  
p resen t than some o th e r moment, both o f  which, however, contain in  them­
selves p ast and perhaps fu tu re  modes.
I t  might seem th a t  the  a sse r tio n  th a t we a re  aware o f a  specious pres­
en t th a t  includes p resen t, p a s t, and fu tu re  time modes commits me to  the 
view th a t  I  am try in g  to  re fu te , v iz . ,  th a t  memory i s  d ire c t  acquaintance 
with the  p a s t. I  do n o t be lieve  th is  i s  the case, however, because in  the 
specious p resen t I  am no t remembering the  p ast mode th a t i s  immediately 
presen t to  me now. Memory i s  p rec ise ly  the  recap turing  o f a moment in  
one*s experience th a t  has s lipped  out o f the specious p resen t. I t  would
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su re ly  be preposterous to  say th a t  I  "remember" the beginning of the 
note when the middle, beginning, and an tic ip a te d  bu t no t given completion 
o f th a t  note a re  a l l  now p a rt o f  my specious p resen t.
Now to  come to  the second p a r t o f my defense o f memory as  in d ire c t  
acquaintance w ith the p a s t. What we do when we remember, I  b e liev e , i s  
e i th e r  o f two th in g s , n e ith e r  o f  which involves d ire c t  acquaintance with 
the past»
I ,  We a re  ab le  to  perform some ac tio n . This i s  the kind o f  memory
which co n sis ts  in  being ab le  to  do something ap p ro p ria te ly . I f
I  say, fo r  example, th a t  I  remember where I  put my ca r, my remem­
bering co n sis ts  in  my being able to  fin d  my car, Like under­
standing as  in te rp re te d  by W ittgenstein , then, to  remember i s  
to  be ab le to  do something. And the  way we know th a t we remember 
i s  no t by means o f a  d i r e c t  acquaintance with our p a s ts , bu t by 
attem pting to  perform the  action  which the a sse rtio n  th a t we 
remember p red ic ts  we w il l  be ab le  to  do.
I I .  The o th e r kind o f memory i s  what I  be lieve  Dewey might c a l l  a
"memory-perception." An example o f  th is  i s  my memory o f having 
seen Martin Luther King some years ago a t  a  church in  Menasha, 
Wisconsin, Now th is  k ind o f memory does not co n s is t in  being 
ab le  to  perform some task  ap p ro p ria te ly , but in  having a  per­
cep tion , i . e . ,  a  s e t  o f q u a li t ie s  o r  o b jec ts  w ith a  c e r ta in  
meaning. And I  believe th is  kind o f  memory can a lso  be seen 
n e ith e r  to  co n sis t in  nor requ ire  a  d ire c t  acquaintance w ith 
the p a s t, but ra th e r  an inference th a t  proceeds along the
m  -
following l in e s :
A, F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  a  perception which i s  taken to  he a  memory- 
perception i s  e i th e r  a  new one which I  must decide by a  
fresh  a c t  o f inqu iry  to  be memory and no t some o th e r kind 
o f perception , o r i t  i s  a  perception which a  previous a c t  
o f inqu iry  has funded with the sense o f  being a  memory- 
perception and no t some o th er kind o f  perception . Now i t  
i s  these raemory-perceptions in  the mode o f sense th a t  mis­
lead some philosophers in to  th inking  th a t  memory i s  d ire c t  
acquaintance with the p a s t. For they f a i l  to  re a liz e  the 
fa c t  th a t  there  has been a  previous establishm ent o f such 
memories, o r  a t  the very le a s t  a  previous establishm ent o f 
a  c e r ta in  kind o f  experience as being a  re l ia b le  sign th a t 
a  perception i s  memory. (See below, 2b, fo r  fu r th e r  devel­
opment o f  th is  l a t t e r  c r i te r io n .)
B, But i f  previous inquiry  has no t funded a  p a r tic u la r  percep­
tio n  w ith the sense o f  being a  memory-perception, then a 
new a c t  o f  inqu iry  has to  be engaged in . And th i s  inquiry  
involves the following stages:
1 , Ihe perception i s  f i r s t  determined not to  be a  sense- 
percep tion . This f a c t  i s  known by inference from e ith e r  
o r  some o r a l l  o f the  following:
a , I  cannot a c t  on the perception now. My perception 
o f  Martin Luther King, fo r  example, does not permit 
o f  my walking over and shaking hands w ith him, o r
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th e  l i k e .
b . The fa c ts  about the percep tion , what s o r t  o f th ing  
I  am doing in  i t ,  when i t  occurs, and /o r where i t
i s  a re  incom patible w ith what I  know on o th er grounds 
to  be the  case about the  p resen t.
c .  The p e rc e p tio n  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  u n d e ta ile d  and ske tch y  
as c o n tra s te d  w ith  w hat we know to  be th e  case w ith  
th e  p re s e n t, i . e . ,  th e  o b je c ts  o f  s e n s e -p e rc e p tio n .
I t  cannot, th a t  i s ,  be examined fu r th e r  and fu r th e r  
and thus sp e lled  out in  the kind  of inexhaustib le  
d e ta i l  th a t  sense-perceptions admit o f.
2. The perception i s  then determined no t to  be a  fan tasy - 
perception o r  an im agination-perception. And th is  occurs, 
again , no t by means o f d ire c t  acquaintance w ith the p a s t, 
bu t by e i th e r  o r some o r a l l  o f  the  followingi
a . The perception i s  independently v e r if ia b le  as  being
o f an event th a t  a c tu a lly  occurred by means o f p re sen t, 
i . e . ,  sense-percep tual, evidence. Such th ings as 
e n tr ie s  in  jo u rn a ls , o r photographs th a t were taken 
a t  the  tim e, o r testim ony from someone e lse  who was 
there  a re  examples o f th is  kind o f evidence.
b . The perception i s  a  fam iliar-seem ing non-contemporary 
percep tion , and i s  coherent w ith o th e r fa m ilia r-  
seeming o r independen tly -verified  non-contemporary 
percep tions. By " fa m ilia r ,"  I  mean the f e l t  conviction
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th a t  th is  has happened to  me before . This kind o f 
fa m ilia r i ty  has i t s e l f  been confirmed as  being a  
more o r le s s  re l ia b le  sign  o f v e r id ic a l memory- 
perception  by previous a sso c ia tio n  o f i t  with sub­
sequent independent in q u iry -v e r if ic a tio n s .
I f  a  l o t  o f  such fe m ilia r  and non-contemporary 
perceptions a re  found to  cohere with one another, 
and to  cohere a lso  with some o th er memory-perceptions 
which have been independently v e r if ie d , then one has 
a  very good case fo r  a  raemory-pereeption, ra th e r  
than  an im agination-perception.
c . The perception i s  one with regard to  which I  am ab le  
to  f i l l  in  a  number o f d e ta i l s ,  the before and a f t e r  
o f  i t ,  fo r  example. And these  d e ta i ls  occur to  me 
in v o lu n ta r ily , z a th e r than having to  be constructed  
by me. I  can say , fo r  example, what led  up to  and 
followed seeing  King, bu t not what led  up to  and f o l ­
lowed an imagined meeting with P residen t Nixon over 
h is  policy  in  Vietnam.
In my discussion  above o f the  general s o r ts  o f considera tions which 
Dewey o ffe rs  in  b ehalf o f  th is  view o f "mind" and i t s  re la t io n  to  "body,"
I  re fe rre d  to  th ree  such co n sidera tions. These were* (a ) the r e s u lts  o f  
the  ap p lica tio n  o f the  em p irica l, denotative method, i . e . ,  the  observation 
o f  the fa c ts  a s  we experience them; (b) the  assum ptions, whether hidden o r
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avowed, o f the philosopher who takes an a l te rn a t iv e  viewj and (c) the 
unacceptable consequences o f  the  a lte rn a tiv e  view o r  views. I  then added 
some co n sid era tio n s , d , in  defense o f  h is  view ag a in s t a c tu a l and pos­
s ib le  ob jec tio n s, I  would lik e  now to  re tu rn  to  the  th ir d  kind o f con­
s id e ra tio n , c , and in d ic a te  some o f the o th e r consequences Dewey believes ■ 
follow  from a lte rn a t iv e  th eo rie s  o f  mind and body.
In  Dewey's view, one o f the most serious consequences o f the view
th a t  mind and body, o r  s e l f  and the world, a re  d i s t in c t  e x is te n t ia l ly ,  a t
h6l e a s t  as  th a t  view i s  g en era lly  h e ld , i s  th e  evacuation o f "secondary" 
and " te r t ia ry "  q u a l i t ie s  from the "rea l"  world and the  re leg a tio n  o f them 
to  th e  world o f  the "mind." By "secondary q u a li t ie s "  Dewey re fe rs  to  the 
c o lo rs , sounds, odors, ta s te s ,  and so on o f  the  world o f  our ord inary  
experience, q u a l i t ie s  viewed by many mind-body d u a lis ts  a s  no t a c tu a lly  
p a rt o f  the fu rn itu re  o f  the  independently e x is tin g  un iverse , but prod­
u c ts  o f the ac tio n  o f primary q u a l i t ie s  (those described by physics) upon 
our minds. By " te r t i a r y  q u a li t ie s "  Dewey re fe rs  to  such q u a li t ie s  as the 
fineness o f a work o f a r t ,  the i r r i t a b i l i t y  o r  su r lin e ss  o f  a  bad w ait­
re s s ,  the  s to ic a l  look and ways o f  an American Indian.
A ll o f  these  q u a l i t ie s ,  which a re , a f t e r  a l l ,  the ones th a t  make 
the world in te re s t in g  and im portant to  us, a re  regarded by such p h ilo s­
ophers as  not r e a l ly  inheren t in  r e a l i ty .  They a re  the  products o f  r e a l­
i t y ' s  operation on u s. Whitehead puts th is  po in t a s  follows in  Science 
and th e  Modem World >
The mind in  apprehending experiences sensations which, properly  
speaking, a re  q u a l i t ie s  o f  the  mind a lone. These sensa tions a re  
p ro jec ted  by the mind so as  to  clo the appropria te  bodies in  ex tern a l
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n a tu re . Thus the "bodies a re  perceived as with q u a l i t ie s  th a t do 
not "belong to  then , q u a l i t ie s  which in  fa c t  are purely the o ff­
spring  o f the  mind. Thus n a tu re  g e ts  c re d it  which in  tru th  should 
. "be reserved fo r  ourselves* the rose fo r  i t s  scen t: the n ig h tin ­
gale fo r  h is  song: and the  sun fo r h is  rad iance. . . . Nature i s
a  d u ll  a f f a i r ,  soundless, s c e n tle s s , c o lo r le ss j merely the hurrying 
o f  m a te ria l, en d less ly , raeaninglessly.**'?
Dewey’s view avoids th is  outrageous denuding o f r e a l i ty  o f  a l l  th a t 
i s  in te re s t in g  and valuable in  i t  by recognizing th a t science simply 
se le c ts  from the r e a l  th a t  which i s  capable o f  providing co n tro l. I t  
does no t describe the exclu sive ly  r e a l ,  but the more e a s ily  c o n tro llab le . 
For i t s  purposes i t  picks out c e r ta in  aspec ts  o f the  given, re a l  s i tu a ­
tio n  o f experience. But the o th e r q u a l i t ie s  a re  a lso  th e re , a s  p a rt o f  
the re a l  world, and fo r  c e r ta in  purposes a re  even more im portant p a rts  
o f  i t  than those which the  s c ie n t i s t  d isc lo se s .
There a re , in  Dewey’s  view, more o f those hidden assumptions involved 
in  the thought o f those philosophers and s c ie n t i s t s  who want to  exclude 
secondary and te r t i a r y  q u a li t ie s  from the " rea l"  world. One o f these  i s  
the  assumption, re fe rre d  to  above, o f the "su p erio r r e a l i ty  o f  causes." 
Since we can co n tro l the scen ts and co lo rs  o f our experience by con tro l­
lin g  l ig h t  waves and sound waves, and they a re  th e re fo re  the causes o f 
the  co lo rs  and sounds, i t  i s  assumed th a t  the waves a re  the re a l  th in g s , 
and the co lors and sounds we experience merely m ental. But, in  f a c t ,  
e f fe c ts  a re  as  much a  p a r t o f r e a l i ty  (indeed, a s  we saw above, p. 135 
perhaps more a  p a r t o f i t )  a s  causes, even though some o f them do not 
seem to  give us handles fo r  co n tro l a s  much as do th e  re la tio n a l char­
a c te r i s t i c s  th a t  th e  sciences describe .
Another assumption in  back o f  the  theory th a t secondary and te r t ia r y
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q u a l i t ie s  a re  merely mental i s  th a t  the r e a l  i s  what knowledge o r cogni­
tio n  d isc lo ses  about r e a l i ty .  This i s  the assumption th a t  the " re a l i s  
the  ra tio n a l and the ra tio n a l i s  the r e a l ."  In f a c t ,  knowledge in  gen­
e ra l  and science in  p a r t ic u la r  give us only one po in t o f  view on r e a l i ty !  
they pick out re la tio n sh ip s  in  o rd er to  f a c i l i t a t e  co n tro l. This r e la ­
t io n a l ch arac te r o f  the  world i s  indeed a  p a rt o f  i t ,  bu t the secondary 
and te r t i a r y  q u a l i t ie s  d isclosed  in  fee lin g  a re  a lso , and perhaps even 
more profoundly, a  p a r t o f  i t .
F in a lly , the theory according to  which mind and body a re  separa te  
and ra d ic a lly  d is t in c t  e n t i t ie s  leads to  the problem o f how they can pos­
s ib ly  a c t  upon each o th e r, Thi3 d i f f ic u l ty  o f how a  purely s p i r i tu a l  
th in g  can a c t  upon a  purely bodily  th in g , and vice v ersa , was so acu te ly  
f e l t  by the philosophers who nevertheless  accepted D escartes ' s ta r t in g -  
po in t th a t  they devised, w ithout the  s l ig h te s t  b i t  o f em pirical evidence, 
such fa n ta s tic  hypotheses to  account fo r  i t  as Spinoza 's mind-body p a ra l­
le lism  and Malebranche's occasionalism . And i t  i s  c e r ta in ly  understandable 
th a t  they should have devised such ex traord inary  hypotheses. For i t  i s  
nothing sh o rt o f magical to  suppose th a t  a  pure thought, say the  thought— 
I t  would, be nice to  have ano ther cup o f coffee—could "produce" the move­
ment o f one 's  body in  the d ire c tio n  of the  coffee pot. To suppose th a t  
th e  re la tio n  between mind and body i s  in te ra c t io n a l i s  l ik e  supposing 
th a t  one could w ill  an ash tray  to  r is e  up o f f  h is  coffee ta b le , onto h is  
f lo o r , and down the  h a l l .  The p o s s ib i l i ty  o f a  causal connection between 
mind and body, a s  conceived by the  d u a l is ts ,  i s  equally  u n in te ll ig ib le  
and magical.
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Dewey's theozy remains in  touch with the  em pirical da ta  while a t  
the  same time avoiding any such ex trao rd inary  d i f f ic u l t i e s  and proposed 
so lu tio n s  as those mentioned above.
In  d iscussing  Dewey's arguments fo r  h is  theory o f "mind" and "body," 
I  have re fe rre d  to  th a t group o f arguments, c , which consider the conse­
quences o f  a lte rn a tiv e  po sitio n s  only in connection w ith Cartesianism , 
o r  mind-body dualism . There a re , o f course, o ther th e o rie s  o f the nature 
o f  mind and i t s  re la tio n  to  body which need to  be considered before one 
can maJce any claim  to  the p la u s ib i l i ty  o f  Dewey's view. One such view is  
the  Id e n tity  Theory. Ib is  i s  a view which d id  not e x is t  during Dewey's 
l ife tim e , a t  le a s t  in  the form in  which we th ink o f i t  today. A consider­
a tio n  o f  i t  w ill  th e re fo re  provide the kind o f  t e s t  fo r Dewey's view which 
he believed  a n a ly tic  realism  provided fo r  the  views o f Essays in  Experi­
mental Logic, which were o r ig in a lly  d irec ted  ag a in s t the kind of idealism  
contained in  the  philosophy o f Lotze, As Dewey says in  the "In troduction" 
to  Essays in  Experimental Logic, which was w ritten  in  1916, th ir te e n  years 
a f t e r  the  essays themselvest
I t  i s  one th in g  to  develop a hypothesis in  view of a  p a r t ic u la r  s i tu ­
a tio n ; i t  i s  ano ther to  t e s t  i t s  worth in  view o f procedures and 
r e s u l ts  having a ra d ic a lly  d if fe re n t m otivation and d ire c tio n , . . ,
A considera tion  of how sane o f  i t s  ^an a ly tic  re a lism 's^  main ten e ts  
compare w ith the conclusions ou tlined  above w i l l ,  however, throw 
some l ig h t  upon the meaning and worth o f the l a t t e r  [ [ i .e . ,  Dewey's 
own th e o r y ] .^
The following consideration  o f the Id e n tity  Theory on the  re la tio n  
between mind and body should serve th e re fo re  to  throw some l ig h t  on the 
meaning and t e s t  th e  worth o f Dewey's own view. I t  i s  a  kind of use o f
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the s c ie n t i f ic  method in  philosophy which charac te rized  Dewey’s own work*
A hypothesis which o rig inated  to  deal with one o r  more observed Mphenomena*1 
i s  then te s ted  on new "phenomena" which subsequently come to  l ig h t .
The Id e n ti ty  Theory, as i t  i s  developed by Place, F e ig l, and Smart, 
i s  an attem pt to  o f fe r  an account o f mental events which does not commit 
the philosopher to  the existence o f a  non-m aterial kind o f r e a l i ty .  One 
might m aintain, as indeed many philosophers have and s t i l l  do m aintain, 
th a t  the proper account o f such th ings as understanding, in tend ing , having 
afte r-im ages, and so on, i s  th a t  which describes them a s  non-m aterial o r  
non-physical events. There a re  a t  le a s t  two v a r ie t ie s  o f such a view. 
According to  the f i r s t ,  such events occur in  the non-m aterial minds o f 
the persons having them. According to  the o thers they a re  events which, 
although perhaps not occurring in  a  mind, and although always a tten d an t 
upon c e r ta in  physio log ical occurrences, are nevertheless  irred u c ib le  to  
such occurrences. The l a t t e r  view i s  u sually  c a lled  epiphenomenalism.
There a re , then , according to  e i th e r  o f  these views (the  ones the 
Id e n tity  Theory opposes, th a t  i s ) ,  c e r ta in  fa c ts  about our conscious l i f e  
which can be accounted fo r  only by recognizing the  ex istence o f an i r r e -  
ducibly mental p a rt o f us o r  irred u c ib ly  mental phenomena occurring in  us.
This conclusion the Id e n tity  Theory attem pts to  re fu te . For i t  i s  
the operating assumption o f the theory th a t th e re  are  no th ings in  the 
world th a t  a re  non-m aterial, th a t ,  u ltim a te ly , everything th a t e x is ts  
comes w ithin the m a te r ia lis t ic  scope o f  sc ience. Now some o f those men­
i a l  phenomena which some philosophers have held  to  be Irred u c ib ly  mental 
have, according to  the  Id e n tity  Theory, a lready  been adequately shown to
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50submit to  a  b eh av io ris tic  a n a ly s is . So-called  "mental" events such as 
understanding and in tend ing , we now see , a re  not r e a l ly  episodes occur­
ring  as irred u c ib ly  mental events in  the p r iv a te , s p i r i tu a l  world o f the 
one who understands o r  in ten d s , but a re  ra th e r  d isp o s itio n s  to  behave in  
a  c e r ta in  way. And th i s j  according to  P lace, i s  so because th is  i s  what 
"understanding" means. To say, th a t  i s ,  th a t  "George understands" i s  p re­
c ise ly  to  say th a t George i s  disposed to  a c t  in  a  c e r ta in  way, th a t ,  given 
c e r ta in  circum stances ( t e s t s  and the  l ik e ) ,  George w ill  perform the appro­
p r ia te  a c tio n . And a l l  o f  th is  i s  to  be understood a s  a s e t  o f  fh c ts  
about G eorge's behavior, and th e re fo re  as e n tire ly  w ith in  the scope of 
a  m a te r ia l is t ic  metaphysics.
Now the Id e n tity  th e o r is t  m aintains th a t  such accounts su ff ic e  to  
re fu te  the m en ta lis tic  in te rp re ta tio n  fo r  many o f the notions fo r  which 
i t  i s  claimed. I t  s u f f ic e s , fo r  example, to  show th a t  th e re  a re  no i r ­
reducibly  mental a c ts  o f  understanding, meaning, remembering, wanting, 
in tend ing , e tc .  A ll o f these  can be regarded as  what Ryle c a l l s  "d is ­
p o s itio n a l"  n o tions, i . e . ,  p ro c liv i t ie s  on the  p a r t o f  people to  behave 
in  c e r ta in  ways under c e r ta in  circum stances.
There a re j  however, some events in  the  conscious l i f e  o f  human beings 
which the  Id e n tity  Theory holds w il l  not submit to  such an a n a ly s is . The 
having o f  an after-im age i s  am example o f such an event. This, those who 
hold the theory in s i s t ,  i s  su re ly  an episode occurring now, not a  dispo­
s i t io n  to  behave in  a c e r ta in  way. I f  I  say, " I  am now having a  yellow ish- 
orange a fte r-im ag e ,"  I  am not d esc rib in g  something th a t  i s  going to  occur 
i f  something e lse  occurs. Rather am I  describ ing  o r  rep o rtin g  an event
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or process th a t  i s  going on in s id e  me a t  the  very in s ta n t o f  the u tte rance  
of the  sentence.
But th i s  obviously c rea te s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  fo r  a  m a te r ia l is t .  For I  
have sa id  th a t  I  am having a  yellow ish-orange image. But there  i s  nothing 
yellowish-orange in  the world around me; o r , i f  th e re  i s ,  i t  i s  not i t  
th a t  I  am seeing , but ano ther yellow ish-orange th in g , one in s id e  me. But 
there  i s  nothing yellow ish-orange in  my b ra in . Everything there  i s  grey- 
matte r .
Where, then; i s  th i s  yellow ish-orange phenomenon th a t  1 p ". now "look­
ing" a t?  Apparently i t  i s  not physica l a t  a l l ,  bu t an irred u c ib ly  mental 
phenomenon. Indeed; i t  i s  a s  a  "place fo r  w ild data" th a t  one d u a l is t ,
Lovejoy, th in k s  i t  i s  necessary to  assume th a t  th e re  i s  a  mind.
The answer th a t  Place and Smart make to  th is  ob jection  i s  th a t  i t  
commits what Place c a l l s  the Phenomenological F allacy . This co n sis ts  in  
regarding such an event as the  having o f an after-im age a s  the  ex istence 
o f "the l i t e r a l  p ro p e rtie s  o f o b jec ts  and events on a  p e cu lia r  s o r t  o f 
in te rn a l cinema o r  te le v is io n  screen , u su a lly  re fe rre d  to  in  the modem 
psychological l i t e r a tu r e  as the 'phenomenal f i e l d , '"  The assumption o f 
such philosophers i s ,  th a t  i s ,  th a t  having an after-im age o f the moon is  
seeing a  m iniature moon on a  kind o f  in te rn a l te le v is io n  o r  cinema sem en. 
To have an after-im age i s  therefo re  to  have a  re p lic a  o f  th e  th ing  ac tu ­
a l ly  experienced before o n e 's  consciousness, possessing the  same yellow ish- 
orange property  th a t  the  th in g  i t s e l f  possessed when one looked upon i t .
This view would, the  Id e n tity  th e o r is ts  ag ree, commit one to  the view 
th a t th em  i s  a  p a r t o f  us; o r  th em  am  events in  u s, th a t  am  irred u c ib ly
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mental in  n a tu re . But the view i s  m istaken. For when one has, fo r  ex­
ample, an after-im age o f  the  moon, one does not have a  l i t t l e  re p lic a  o f 
the  moon before him, but r a th e r  does he have "the s o r t  o f  experience which 
we normally have when, and which we have learned to  describe  a s ,  looking 
a t"  the  m oon.^
This, I  take i t ,  means th a t  we a re  now in  a  su b jec tiv e  s ta te  lik e  
the  sub jec tiv e  s ta te  we were in  when the moon was a c tu a lly  p resen t. And 
th i s  su b jec tiv e  s ta t e ,  we can q u ite  c o n sis te n tly  m aintain , i s  simply a 
b ra in - s ta te ,  fo r  i t  has none o f  these phenomenal, re p lic a - lik e  charac­
t e r i s t i c s  which had seemed to  some philosophers to  preclude i t s  being 
c a lle d  a  s ta te  o f the b ra in .
Smart, in  "Sensations and Brain P rocesses," g ives a  s im ila r rep ly
to  what he considers the s tro n g e s t ob jection  to  the  Id e n tity  Theory.
Ib is  i s  the one he a t t r ib u te s  to  Max Black, according to  which i t  cannot
make any sense to  say th a t  two th ings a re  id e n tic a l  ( e .g . ,  the Morning
and the Evening S ta rs )  unless they have p ro p e rtie s  by v ir tu e  o f  which
they  can be d is tin g u ish ed , "Suppose we id e n tify  the Morning S ta r  with
the  Evening S ta r .  Then th e re  must be some p ro p e rtie s  which lo g ic a lly
imply th a t o f being the  Morning S ta r , and q u ite  d i s t in c t  p ro perties  which
*52e n ta i l  th a t  o f being the Evening S ta r . Hence th e re  must be some prop­
e r t i e s  which charac te rize  the sensation  and e n ta i l  i t s  being the sensa­
tio n  i t  i s ,  and some p ro p e rtie s  which ch arac te rize  the  brain-process and 
e n ta i l  i t s  being the b ra in -p rocess i t  i s .
But now the  p ro p e rtie s  th a t  ch arac te rize  sensa tions are phenomenal 
q u a l i t ie s  such a s  yellow, green, e tc . But these  a re  n o t the s o r ts  o f
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th ings th a t  w ill  f i t  in to  the m a te r ia l is t ic  metaphysics. For, as Smart 
po in ts  o u t, they a re  e i th e r  "o b jec tive  emergent p ro p e rtie s  o f physical 
o b jec ts , o r  e lse  . . , [powers] to  produce yellow sense-data , where 'y e l ­
low ,' in  th is  second in s ta n tia t io n  o f  the  word, re fe rs  to  a  purely  phe­
nomenal o r in tro sp e c tib le  q u a li ty ."  To answer B lack 's o b jec tio n , Smart 
has th e re fo re  to  show th a t  h is  view commits him n e ith e r  to  the existence 
o f phenomenal p ro p e rtie s  in  the p e rce iver nor in  the  perceived. I  want 
to  come back l a t e r  to  h is  attem pt to  e lim inate  the l a t t e r  a l te rn a t iv e , 
th a t  i s , ,  the  ex istence of phenomenal q u a l i t ie s  in  the world. Suffice  i t  
to  say now th a t  he regards a  phenomenal p roperty , such as  a  co lo r, as a 
power in  an o b jec t to  produce a  d iscrim inatory  response in  the perceiver, 
no t a s  a  q u a lity  a c tu a lly  ly ing  upon the  surface o f  the o b jec t. There 
a re , then , no secondary q u a l i t ie s  in  the  world; th e re  a re  simply powers 
o f  ob jects  to  evoke responses from us.
But to  re tu rn  to  B lack 's  ob jec tion . I f  B lack 's  argument i s  co rrec t 
about id en tify in g  th ings o r ig in a lly  thought to  be d iv erse , l ik e  the Morn­
ing S ta r  and the Evening S ta r ,  then th e re  must be some q u a l i t ie s  th a t  
c o n s ti tu te  being a  yellow ish-orange after-im age and o thers th a t  co n s ti­
tu te  being a  b ra in -s ta te . But th is  would, o f course, commit Smart to  the 
a sse rtio n  o f the  ex istence or* phenomenal p ro p e rtie s—a view th a t  i s  anath­
ema to  him. His answer to  th is  i s  th a t  what happens when one has a  yellow ish- 
orange after-im age i s  n o t, a s  we saw th a t  Place a lso  m aintains in  connec­
tio n  w ith h is  d iscussion  o f the  Phenomenological F allacy , th a t ,  e .g . ,  a 
re p lic a  o f  the moon, a l i t t l e  moon, now l ie s  on a  kind o f in te rn a l phe­
nomenal f ie ld  possessing the  p ro p e rtie s  o f  being yellow ish-orange, round,
I160
e tc .  Rather i s  i t  the case th a t something i s  going on in  one which i s  
l ik e  what i s  going on when one i s  re a l ly  seeing the moon. And th is  some­
th ing  i s ,  Smart po in ts ou t, to n ic -n e u tra l. That i s  to  say, one i s  not 
committing onese lf, when one has an after-im age o r hears a  tune going 
through h is  head, a s  to  whether the  something going on i s  a b ra in -p rocess, 
a  process in  the "mind/ 1 a  f r e e - f lo a tin g  datum, o r anything e ls e —any more 
than a  person who rep o rts  th a t  someone i s  here to  see Mr. X i s  committing 
him self, by th is  mode of expression, a s  to  what p rec ise ly  the someone i s ,  
whether doc to r, lawyer, bum, o r what. The po in t i s  th a t  one simply does 
not know where o r what the s ta tu s  of what i s  going on in  him i s j  one simply 
knows th a t  i t  i s  the s o r t  o f  th ing  th a t goes on when he i s  r e a l ly  seeing 
the  moon.
So th a t  the  answer to  B lack 's  objection  i s  th a t  the  person who has 
an after-im age does not have any phenomenal p ro p ertie s  before h is  con­
sciousness a t  a l l .  He i s  aware o f something, but he does no t know what 
i t  i s  he i s  aware o f . Hence i t  i s  q u ite  possib le  to  id e n tify  th is  th ing  
he i s  aware o f, the  p rec ise  ch arac te r o f which he simply does n o t know, 
w ith a  b ra in -s ta te .  And we do th is  in  the  way we id e n tify  someone with 
a  docto r.
Now th i s ,  Smart adm its, commits him to  saying th a t  a  person id e n ti­
f i e s  a s ta te  he i s  now in  w ith a s ta te  he has been in  before , even though 
he does no t know the  p ro p e rtie s  on the b asis  o f which he i s  making the 
comparison. That i s i  since  he knows nothing o f b ra in -s ta te s , he cannot 
know th a t  the  p resen t s ta te  reminds him o f the p ast one by v ir tu e  o f , fo r  
example, s im ila r  configura tions o f  neurons in  them.
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Another way o f s ta t in g  th is  objection  and re b u t ta l ,  according to  
Smart, i s  the follow ingt The objection  i s  th a t  a  person unacquainted 
with b ra in  physiology knows p e rfe c tly  w ell what a  sensation  i s ,  but has 
no idea a t  a l l  what a  c e reb ra l process i s .  Hence ce reb ra l processes and 
sensations cannot be id e n tic a l .  Smart’s  answer i s  th a t  such a  person 
simply does n o t commit h im self one way o r the o th e r with regard to  the 
nature  and s ta tu s  o f h is  sensa tions, any more than the person who sees 
someone in  the room commits h im self to  the a c t i v i t i e s  o r  ch arac te r o f  
th is  person.
In  the In troduction  to  th is  d is se r ta tio n  I  re fe rre d  to  the inex­
h au stib le  richness of Dewey's philosophy w ith re sp ec t to  i t s  suggestive 
in s ig h ts  in to  the  nature  o f our experience. Here in  the Id e n tity  Theory 
we have exactly  the opposite kind o f philosophy. I t  i s  the type o f  phi­
losophy which sane phenomenologists c a l l  d ia le c t ic a l ,  in  th a t  i t  begins 
with c e r ta in  assumptions and proceeds to  deduce i t s  answers to  sp e c if ic  
questions from these b a sic  assumptions, and then to  answer ob jections and 
o f fe r  arguments in  i t s  defense. But i t  i s  a  kind of philosophizing which 
never re a lly  in te re s ts  i t s e l f  p a r tic u la r ly  in  d iscovering what experience 
i s  l i k e .  What i s  experience l ik e ,  a s  the Id e n tity  th e o r is t  sees i t ?  I t  
i s  an a f f a i r  o f  d iscrim inatory  responses, sans q u a li ta tiv e  perception , o f 
a  n o n -q u a lita tiv e , m a te r ia lis t ic  world—of course. Why? Because mater­
ia lism  i s  tru e . I  must say, I  have learned very l i t t l e  about experience 
from reading th e  Id e n tity  th e o r is ts ,  I  have been occasionally  impressed 
with th e i r  c lev e rn ess/ b u t I  have never found any o f the o r ig in a li ty  and
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s e n s i t iv i ty  to  experience which one d iscovers so abundantly in  Dewey.
Perhaps even worse than th a t  fh.ct, however, i s  the f&ct th a t  the 
whole theory re s ts  on an assumption th a t  no t only does n o t reveal any­
th ing  new about experience, but a c tu a lly  d is to r ts  i t ,  I  am re fe rr in g  to  
the view th a t  when we have c e r ta in  kinds o f "mental experiences," such 
as afte r-im ages, we a re  not a c tu a lly  seeing a  re p lic a , w ith phenomenal 
q u a l i t ie s ,  o f  the th ing  o f which we a re  having the a fter-im age. This 
view c e r ta in ly  f l i e s  in  the face o f experience as we a c tu a lly  have i t .
I t  c e r ta in ly  seems a s  though we sometimes, a t  le a s t ,  do have after-im ages 
which a re  o f  phenomenal q u a l i t ie s .  When one looks a t  an ob ject such as 
the sun, o r a  f i r e ,  and then has an a fte r-im ag e , one i s  su re ly  regarding 
an a c tu a l re p lic a  o f  the sun o r  the f i r e ,  w ith phenomenal, q u a lita tiv e  
p ro p e rtie s . And i f  one i s  asked, fo r  example, to  imagine the co lo r red , 
i t  seems as though, sometimes anyway; one e n te r ta in s  a re p lic a  o f  a  colored 
patch , o r even envisages a  p a r t ic u la r  colored o b jec t. And in  dreaming, 
one seems, sometimes anyway, a c tu a lly  to  be en te r ta in in g  the phenomenal 
q u a li t ie s  o f the persons and places being dreamed o f.
The Id e n tity  Theory re a l ly  has no phenomenological o r  em pirical- 
denotative ground whatever. I t  i s  simply an ad hoc move to  rescue a  
theory , v iz . ,  m aterialism . The only reason these  philosophers have fo r  
be liev ing  th is  theory i s ,  as  Smart puts i t  in  Philosophy and S c ie n tif ic
G(L
Realism. th a t science with i t s  " m a te r ia lis t ic  metaphysics" has accounted 
fo r  so much th a t  i t  i s  u n lik e ly  th a t  i t  cannot account f o r  sensations as 
w ell. Otherwise^ we are l e f t  w ith so -ca lled  "nomological dang lers,"  i . e . ,  
secondary and, p e rish  the th o u ^ it, t e r t i a r y  q u a l i t ie s .
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Let me now re tu rn  to  a  po in t d iscussed b r ie f ly  above, v iz . ,  the view 
o f the Id e n tity  th e o r is t  th a t  secondary (and, we may add, m utatls mutandl. 
t e r t i a r y  q u a l i t ie s )  do no t e x is t  anywhere a t  a l l .  There a re , th a t  i s ,  
according to  the  Id e n tity  Theory, no q u a li ta tiv e  yellow s, greens, red s , 
odors, sounds, e tc .  There a re  simply l ig h t  waves, sound waves, e t c . ,  and 
our behavioral responses to  these . We have been to ld  th a t  secondary qua l­
i t i e s  do not e x is t  in  us when we have a fte r-im ag es, e t c . ,  but th a t  ra th e r  
when we have such experiences we a re  having experiences lik e  the experi­
ence o f a c tu a lly  seeing the  th ing  o f  which we a re  now having the a f t e r ­
image, the perception o f the  yellow ish-orange moon, fo r  example. But now 
we re a liz e  th a t  what th a t  o r ig in a l perception  i t s e l f  was o f  was a  purely 
m a te r ia lis t ic  moon, a  moon devoid e n tire ly  o f q u a li ta tiv e  yellow-orange­
ness. In f a c t ,  there  are no co lo r q u a l i t ie s  out th e re  in  the  world a t  a l l .  
What, then , are  co lo rs?  What is  the co lo r red  i f  i t  i s  no t a  q u a lity
experienced as  ly ing  on the surface o f an object? To explain what he th inks
cc
a  co lo r i s ,  Smart uses the  notion o f a  "normal p e rc ip ien t,
"This i s  red" means something roughly lik e  "A normal p e rc ip ien t would 
n o t e a s ily  pick th is  out o f a  clump o f geranium p e ta ls  though he 
would pick i t  out o f  a  clump o f le ttu c e  le av es ."  . . .  I  th e re fo re  
e lu cid ate  colors a s  powers, in  Locke’s sense, to  evoke c e r ta in  s o r ts  
o f d iscrim inatory  responses in  human beings. They a re  a ls o , o f 
course, powers to  cause sensations in  human beln-- * (an account s t i l l  
n earer Locke’s ) ,  But these  sen sa tio n s , I  am ' , a re  id e n t i f i ­
ab le with b ra in  p r o c e s s e s . 56
So co lo rs  and odors and ta s te s  and a l l  o f th\ Im portant and
in te re s tin g  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f the  world a re  n o t q u a l i t ie s ,  bu t d iscrim ­
in a to ry  responses re su ltin g  from the  operation of l ig h t- ra y s , e t c . ,  on 
the p e rc ip ien t organism. This i s ,  o f  course, what one would expect the 
m a te r ia lis t ic  hypothesis to  lead to .  But i t  i s  so outrageously untrue
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to  experience as  i t  a c tu a l ly  occurs and as must be accepted by one f o l ­
lowing the em pirica l-deno tative  method th a t  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  believe 
th a t  anyone a c tu a lly  holds i t .
The Id e n tity  Theory seems to  me to  g e t in to  fu r th e r  d i f f ic u l t ie s  
when one considers o th e r  "mental" experiences. Like a fte r-im ag es, itc h e s  
and pains a re , fo r  th e  Id e n tity  Theory, no t to  be understood a s  d isp o si­
tio n s  to  behave in  c e r ta in  ways, but ra th e r  a s  episodes o r occurrences 
in  the in d iv id u a l having them. Now l e t  us co n sid er a  pain , say , a  too th ­
ache, The Id e n tity  th e o r is t  would presumably agree th a t  the  toothache 
c rea te s  s im ila r  problems as the a fte r-lm ag e . For i t  does no t seem as 
though we can adequately analyze the  toothache as being simply a b ra in - 
process any more than we can adequately analyze an after-im age as being 
simply a  b ra in -p ro cess . There a re ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  no pains occurring in  one’s 
nervous system, but ra th e r  electro -chem ical im pulses. We saw th a t  in  the  
case o f  the  b ra ix -p rocess  th a t  i s  the  after-im age i t  was necessary in  h is  
a n a ly s is  to  make a  re ference  to  something e ls e ,  v iz . ,  the  a c tu a l percep­
tio n  o f the  moon, as  something the  p resen t b ra in -p rocess resem bles. So 
i t  seems here the  proper an a ly s is  o f  the toothache w ill  requ ire  such a  
re fe rence . But what experience i s  the  experience o f the  toothache sup­
posed to  resemble? A toothache i s  n o t a  reproduction o f  some o th er ex­
perience which has the  a c tu a l e x te rn a l world d ire c t ly  a s  i t s  ob jec t. And 
y e ti  i t  to °  seems no t to  be analyzable simply in to  a  b ra in -p rocess.
Smart’s  own account o f pains such a s  toothaches i s  th a t  they a re  
experiences l ik e  th e  experience one has when, fo r  example, one s tic k s  
a  pin in  h is  f in g e r , o r  the l ik e  ex te rn a lly  caused experience. But th e re
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i s  c le a r ly  a  g re a t d iffe ren ce  between a  toothache and an experience lik e
th a t  o f having an afte r-im age . For the  l a t t e r  i s ,  by i t s  very n a tu re , a
copy^ o f  a  previous percep tual experience, and i s  immediately known by 
the  person to  be so . That i s ,  i t  makes some sense to  say of an a f t e r ­
image th a t  i t  i s  an experience in  which one i s  in  a  s ta te  lik e  a  s ta te
he was in  p reviously  when he was a c tu a lly  perceiv ing  something. But i t  
i s  r e a l ly  very fa r-fe tch ed  to  say th a t  the experience o f  a  toothache i s  
in  any sense a copy o f, o r  involves e s s e n tia l ly  a  reference  back to ,  a 
p in -p rick  experience.
S m art's  view here i s  th a t ,  ju s t  as th e re  can be no co lors in s id e  me 
when I  am having an after-im age i f  the  s e l f  i s  e n tir e ly  m a te ria l, so 
there  can be no pains o r  itc h e s  in  me. So we must somehow account fo r  
these experiences in  the way we accounted fo r  the  a fter-im age. Pains 
and i tc h e s , a s  they a re  experienced o r liv e d , a re  equally  the s o r t  o f  
th in g  th a t  cannot be going on in  a  body, since events in  the nervous 
system, which i s  where we would have to  suppose them to  be occurring, 
a re  lim ited  to  electro -chem ical even ts. But th e re  i s  no ex te rn a l ob ject 
to  which to  reduce the pain in  the way one might be ab le  to  reduce the 
after-im age to  a  previous percep tion .
Furthermore, even i f  we adm itted th a t  a  toothache could somehow be 
in te rp re te d  as  a  b ra in -s ta te  s im ila r to  the s ta te  one i s  in  when one i s  
being pricked with a  p in , what account a re  we to  give o f  the pain th a t 
i s  experienced when one i s  so pricked? Is  i t  a  d iscrim ina to ry  response 
to  pins a s  opposed to  pillow s? Surely th is  pain th a t  I  have when I  am 
being pricked with a  pin i s  a  q u a li ta tiv e  event irred u c ib le  to  d iscrim inato ry
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responses and b ra in -s ta te s .
F in a lly , to  deny th a t  a  person who has a  toothache i s  re a l ly  exper­
iencing  a q u a li ta tiv e  ache a t  the very time when he has the toothache i s  
ju s t  a s  absurd as denying th a t there  a re  experienced q u a li ta tiv e  co lo rs 
and odors in  the world. When I  have a  toothache, th e re  i s  a  th ing  ca lled  
an ache going on, and i t  i s  not reducib le  to  an e lectro-chem ical impulse. 
And, fo r  th a t  m atter, when one has the p in -p rick , one 's  experience o f 
th a t  pain i s  no t a  b ra in -s ta te  o r a  d iscrim inato ry  response e i th e r .  I t  
i s  a  new s o r t  o f th in g , a f e l t  q u a lity , which, as  Dewey po in ts o u t, emerges 
from the  more complex kinds o f  in te ra c tio n  th a t  animal organisms a re  ca­
pable o f.
The Id e n tity  Theory, then , l ik e  C artesian dualism , f a i l s  to o f fe r  
a  s a t is fa c to ry  account o f  the  fa c ts  about our experience. For i t  comes 
to  the  h ighly  untenable conclusion th a t  th e re  a re  no secondary q u a li t ie s  
in  the world, Andi as I  have suggested, i t  would deny even more vehemently, 
we may be su re , th a t  th e re  a re  t e r t i a r y  q u a l i t ie s  in  the  world. In  doing 
so , i t  fb i ls  u t te r ly  to  "find  a  place fo r  value" in  the world.
Dewey's theory , th e re fo re , seems to  me to  be the most p lau sib le  fo r  
the fou r kinds o f  reasons previously re fe rre d  to* (a) I t  i s  a  theory 
which is  tru e  to , o r  a  proper d e sc rip tio n  o f, the fa c ts  as revealed by 
c a re fu l ap p lica tio n  o f  the  em pirical-denotative  method, (b) The a l t e r ­
n a tiv e  views make assumptions which render an acknowledgement o f  the 
em pirical fa c ts  inconvenient, (c) The consequences o f  the a lte rn a tiv e  
views a re  unacceptable, e i th e r  because they c o n f lic t  with the da ta  o f
-  16? -
em pirical observation , o r because they make i t  im possible to  account fo r  
operations such as  knowing and valuing. F in a lly , (d) the ob jections to  
Dewey's own view can be answered along the l in e s  I  have suggested above.
In t h i s  defense o f Dewey's theory o f mind, I  have often  go tten  in ­
volved in  the  d iscussion  o f top ics  no t s t r i c t l y  re la te d  to  perception. 
N evertheless, a s  I  hope I  have shown, Dewey's theory  o f mind o r  s e l f  
derives fiom and i s  made possib le  by h is  view o f perception . Perception 
i s  i n i t i a l l y ,  both in  the  h is to ry  o f the  organism and in  the h is to ry  o f 
each experience, fe e lin g . What fe e lin g  i s  o f i s  a  to t a l  q u a li ta tiv e  
s itu a tio n  which i s  a  re a l  product o f the in te ra c tio n  of n a tu ra l events. 
But i t  i s  n e ith e r  bodily  nor m ental, n e ith e r  ob jective  nor su b jec tiv e . 
Within i t s  f i e ld  some ob jec ts  a re  forged out by perception of s ig n if ic a ­
tio n  and perception o f sense, in  connection with a  problematic s itu a tio n  
and the inqu iry  th a t  i s  prompted by i t .  These o b jec ts  a re , as a  conse­
quence o f in q u iry i re fe rre d  to  the ob jec tiv e  o r world s id e , o r  the  sub­
je c t iv e  o r  organism s id e  o f  experience. But these categories do not 
describe the  condition th a t  holds p r io r  to  inqu iry . They a re  p rov isiona l 
and pragmatic ch arac te riza tio n s  made w ith in  a  m ind-less, body-less q u a li­
ta t iv e  s i tu a tio n  which antecedes them, and to  which experience w ill  
re tu rn  when th e i r  problem i s  solved and th e i r  u t i l i t y  term inated.
NOTES
1 , W ill ia m  James, "Does Consciousness E x is t? "  Essays in  R a d ic a l E m piric ism  
and A P l u r a l i s t i c  U n iverse  (New Y o rk t Longmans, Green and C o . ,  1958), 
V o l. I ,  pp. 1-38.
2, See below, pp. 28 f f , ,  fo r  development o f th i s  notion ,
3, See p. 3? o f B ernstein , e d ., John Dewey on Experience, Nature, and 
Freedom.
4 , Ib id . .  p. 40.
5 , Ib id . .  pp. 40-41.
6 , Dewey, Theory o f Valuation, p. 2.
7, Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 25» "S e lective  emphasis . . .  i s  
the  h ea rt-b ea t o f mental l i f e .  To ob ject to  the  operation i s  to 
d iscard  a l l  th ink ing . But in  ordinary m atters and in  s c ie n t i f ic  
in q u ir ie s , we always re ta in  the  sense th a t the m ateria l chosen i s  
se lec ted  fo r  a  purpose j there  i s  no idea o f denying what i s  l e f t  
o u t, fo r  what i s  om itted i s  merely th a t  which i s  not re lev an t to  
the p a r tic u la r  problem or purpose in  hand.
8 , Ib id . .  pp. 258-59. I t a l i c s  mine.
9 , B ernstein , e d ,,  John Dewey on Expedience. N ature, and Freedom, p. 190.
I t a l i c s  mine, Sigmund Freud, in  C iv iliz a tio n  and I t s  D iscontents
(New Yorki W, W. Norton and Co., In c . ,  I 96I L^i r s 't  published in  
German, 19313)» p. 15» takes a  s im ila r  view o f  the ch arac te r o f  a  
young c h i ld 's  experience. He describes i t  a s  a  kind o f  "oceanic
fee lin g "  in  which a l l  ob jects  and q u a l i t ie s  a re  experienced on the
same le v e l, with no d is tin c tio n  between what i s  mine and what i s  
o ther.
10. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 13,
11. Ib id . . p. 15.
12. Dewey, L o g ic » The Theory o f  In q u ir y , pp. 33-3^.
13. Ib id . .  p. 152.
14. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 134.
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15. See below, pp. 137-39, ^ox fu r th e r  development o f  th is  po in t.
16. Dewey, E xp erien ce  and N a tu re , p. 109 and p. 252,
17. Note th a t  here we are making the kind o f consideration  which belongs to  
p a rt b o f Dewey's argument—i . e . , consideration  o f hidden assumptions,
18. Journal o f Philosophy. Vol. XXXVII, No. 22 (October 24, 1940), p. 595. 
Quotation from James i s  from P rin c ip les  o f  Psychology, Vol. I  (New York: 
Dover P ub lica tio n s , In c .,  1950), p. 272.
19. Journal o f Philosophy. Vol. XXXVII, No. 22, p. 595.
20. Sehilpp, e d ,, The Philosophy o f John Dewey, pp. 546-68,
21. Ib id . .  p. 541.
22. See the  essay, "What Pragmatism Means by P ra c tic a l ,"  in  Essays in  
Experimental Logic fo r  Dewey's development o f th is  p o in t.
23. Dewey, E xperience  and N a tu re , p. 263.
24. Sehilpp, e d ., The Philosophy of John Dewey, pp. 229-242. Dewey p ra ises
Barodl severa l tim es in  the course o f  h is  "Reply" fo r  Phxodi's excel­
le n t grasp  o f h is  thought, an honor no t s im ila rly  accorded to  Murphy,
25. Ib id . .  p. 240.
26. Ib id . .  pp. 597-99.
27. Using th a t  term now in  the sp ec ia l sense in  which Dewey uses i t  and
as defined  in  the chap ter on fee lin g  above, n o t in  the sense in  which
Parodi^talks about q u a li t ie s  as  being f e l t .
28. Dewey, Quest fo r C erta in ty , p. 129.
29. I b id . ,  pp. 129-30.
30. Ib id . .  p. 130.
31. Lovejoy, The Revolt Against Dualism, p. 101.
32. Sehilpp, e d ., The Philosophy o f John Dewey, p. 240.
33. Dewey came to  change h is  view about the  experience o f anim als. See 
the essay , "Q ualita tive  Thought," in  B ernstein , e d ., John Dewey on 
Experience. N ature, and Freedom.
34 . Dewey, The Influence o f Darwin an Philosophy, pp. 78-79 and p. 84,
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35. Journal o f Philosophy. Vol. XXI, No. 22 (October 24, 192*0, pp. 601-11.
36. Ib id . . p. 610.
37. A rthur 0 . Lovejoy, The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays (B altim ore»
The Johns Hopkins P ress, 1963).
38. Journal o f  Philosophy. Vol. XIX, No. 13 (June 22, 1922), pp. 351-61.
39. Brand Blanshard, The Nature o f  Thought. Vol. I  (New York: The Mac­
m illan Co., 1939) *  PPt 380-81.
40. E specia lly , o f  course, meanings which sire perceived as  the sense o f
q u a l i t ie s  o r  o b je c ts . Note th a t  a  novel s i tu a t io n , as  w ell a s  fa m ilia r
ones, can become perceived In the  mode o f sense. Thus Dewey says
(Experience and Nature, p. 261) th a t  when "we a re  b a ffled  by perplex­
ing cond itions, and f in a l ly  h i t  upon a  clew, and everything f a l l s  in to  
p lace, the whole th in g  suddenly, a s  we say, 'makes s e n s e . '"
41. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 182.
42. See e sp e c ia lly  Logici The Theory o f  Inqu iry , pp. 223 f f .
43. See above, pp .25-27, fo r  development o f  the notions o f  perceptual and 
conceptual o b jec ts ,
bb. Dewey, Logic> The Theory o f  In q u iry , p. 227.
b 5 . For a  w ell-argued development o f th is  kind o f  o b jec tio n , see the  chap­
t e r ,  "Memory," in  P rofessor William E a r le 's  book, The Autobiographical
Consciousness (Chicago! Quadrangle Books, 1972), pp. 142-7**.
46, Dating c le a r ly  from D escartes, Locke, and Newton—and ev iden tly  present
in  the thoughts o f  some Greek a tom ists and o f some o f th e i r  Greek and
Roman Epicurean borrowers.
47, A lfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New Yorkt The 
Macmillan Co., 1926), pp. 79“80,
48, Dewey, Essays in  Experimental Logic, p. 26,
49, U, T. P lace, " Is  Consciousness a  Brain Process," in  Vere Chappell, e d .,  
The Philosophy o f  Mind (Englewood C lif f s ,  N .J .i  P ren tice -H a ll, In c .,  
1962){ H. F e ig l, "The 'Mental* and the 'P h y s ic a l , '"  in  Minnesota 
S tudies in  the Philosophy o f Science. Vol. I I  (Minneapolis! U niversity  
o f  Minnesota P ress , 1958)1 J .  J .  C. Smart, "Sensations and Brain 
Processes," in  Chappell, e d ,,  The Philosophy o f  Mlndi J .  J .  C. Smart,
Philosophy and S c ie n tif ic  Realism (London1 Routledge and Kegan Paul,
19337:
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50. Place re fe rs  to  G ilb e rt R y le 's  Concept o f  Hind and Ludwig W ittg en ste in 's  
Philosophical In v estig a tio n s  as having demonstrated th is  d isp o s itio n a l 
ch arac te r o f  some "mental" events.
51. Place in  Chappell, e d ., Philosophy o f Hind, p. 108.
52. Smart, "Sensations and Brain P rocesses," in  Chappell, e d ,, Philosophy
o f Mind, p . 166,
53. I b id . . p. 166.
5^. Smart, Philosophy o f S c ie n tif ic  Realism, p. 68.
55. Smart, "Sensations and Brain P rocesses," in  Chappell, e d ,, Philosophy
o f Mind, p. 166,
56. I b id . ,  pp. 166-67.
57. S t r i c t l y  speaking, an after-im age should no t be sa id  to  be a  "copy" 
o f  an o r ig in a l phenomenon, e .g . ,  a  yellow ish-orange moon. For the 
after-im age i s  the complement o f  the o r ig in a l . I t  would th e re fo re  
be a  b lu is h -v io le t ,  n o t a  yellowish-orange image. This fa c t  would 
seem to  c rea te  even fu r th e r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  fo r  the Id e n tity  Theory.
For we see now th a t  an after-im age i s  no t a  su b jec tiv e  s ta te  l ik e  
th a t  which one was o r ig in a lly  in , and, furtherm ore, th a t  i t  involves 
those very phenomenal p ro p e rtie s  which the  Id e n tity  th e o r is t  has 
been try in g  to  g e t r id  o f.
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